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The addition of early voting laws has led to the many changes in the US political 
system.  In this dissertation I examine early voting early voting in a number of different 
contexts. First, how early voting fits in with the larger issue of voter turnout in the U.S. 
Second, why some states have early voting policies and other states choose to not have 
those policies. Third, how state-level political parties view the option to cast an early 
vote. Fourth, the differences between early voters, election day voters, and non-voters. 
Fifth, what are the determents of casting an early ballot. Sixth, do early voting laws lead 
to more electoral participation.  My findings suggest that early voting does not 
significantly change the way in which state-level political parties get people to the polls, 
early voters are different from election day voters, and that early voting policies 
significantly increase overall participation by 2% points. Early voting changes the way 
citizens participate in elections and this dissertation provides an early view of how this 




CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 




“I think it is a reflection of people’s busy lives and the complications of child care, 
weather and traffic as well as the complexity of our ballots,” said Debra Bowen, 
California’s secretary of state, and a supporter of voting by mail. “Very often, there will 
be 10 or 15 initiatives that are so complicated, so people will sit at the kitchen table and 
if they get stuck on something, they can step away or they can call somebody.” 
 
New York Times January 14, 2008 
 
Voter turnout in the U.S. 
 The dominant political system in the world today is democracy.  There are 
different types of democracies with different implication for each unique style of 
democratic political system.  The primary component of any democratic system is the 
election of representatives by the people.  The electoral connection between people that 
vote and the representatives that make up the government serves as a check that insures 
that representatives enact the will of the people (Meyhew, 2004).  In a democracy, an 
individual citizen can choose to vote for a new representative if the individual does not 
support current representative in office or the individual citizen can give a vote of 
confidence to keep the representative in office.  Other types of political systems do not 
include input from individual citizens.  For example, a dictatorship is a political system 
where one individual is the entire government and makes all political decisions.  In 
contrast, a democratic system allows various representative institutions (e.g., a congress) 
the authority to make political decisions by and for the people through electoral 
institutions (e.g., voting laws and procedures).  In this dissertation I examine the role of a 
new type of electoral institution, early voting.  Specifically, I examine the role of early 
voting in (1) shaping the way political parties mobilize voters, (2) who chooses to vote, 
(3) who chooses to early vote, and (4) affecting an increase in electoral participation. 
One of the possible measures of how well a democracy follows the will of the 
people (i.e., functions) is to measure how many people participate in elections.  If a 
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democratic country had 100% participation in elections, the government would represent 
the whole population, but as we will see, the U.S. has a participation rate between 55% 
and 60% for presidential elections, leading to questions about the representativeness of 
the U.S. political system.  For example, does low political participation in the form of 
low voter turnout lead to non-democratic decisions or policies?  The connection between 
participation and representation leads to the discussion of the importance of voter turnout 
presented in this document following a discussion of the major political theories of 
participation.  While the purpose of this dissertation is not to fully address specific issues 
of representation, I will examine what factors that lead individuals to choose to vote. 
 A longstanding debate in the political science literature involves whether the rate 
of participation among citizens and governmental responsiveness to citizens’ opinions are 
linked.  There are two different views on the link between political participation and the 
ability of a democracy to function and govern.  These views, the classic and the elitist 
view, focus on the number of individuals who participate in politics and the ability of 
governments to receive proper instructions on the will of the people from elections.  The 
classical view of participation is that citizens are knowledgeable about the political 
system and that the more voters there are, the better the democracy (Walker, 1966).  The 
classical view of political participation places great importance on the individual citizen 
who is assumed to be knowledgeable about public policy as well as the form and function 
of the political system.  Specifically, the classic view sees active citizens in various forms 
of political participation as molding the U.S. political system.  The classical view that 
high participation rates provide for a stable and functioning democracy includes the 
assumption that high participation rates mean that a high percentage of the electorate see 
its opinions translated into representation.  Taking this classic view, the U.S. democracy 
with turnout rates around 55% to 60% would be considered as not functioning as well as 
European democracies, which tend to have higher rates of turnout.  It is the stance of the 
classical view that if a large number of potential voters do not participate in elections, it 
is not possible for the government to represent accurately the whole country because the 
assumption is that non-voters would not necessarily support the same policies as the 
voting public.   
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On the other hand, the elitist view on political participation focuses on the belief 
that it is not necessary in a democracy for all citizens to be active in politics (Dahl, 1966).  
Many of the arguments presented in the elitist view stem from the idea that the general 
public is not well informed on political issues and hence does not know how to vote in 
accordance with its own best interest.  Therefore, political decisions are best left to an 
elite group of voters or a “consensus of elites” (Truman, 1959).  The elitist view supports 
the idea that if uninformed voters participate in elections, the electoral outcomes would 
be poor in that representatives, following the will of such voters, would enact legislation 
that does not accurately represent the real needs of the people.  The elitist view also 
includes the assumption that voters stay home on election day due to contentment with 
the political system.  This means that potential voters do not have a strong preference for 
one party or the other and would be just as content with either political party winning an 
election.  Key (1961) defines the political elite as “the influentials, the opinion-leaders, 
the political activists.”  Overall, the elitist view of the low U.S. voter turnout rate is that 
the specific number of voters per election is not necessarily important, due to uninformed 
voters, and that the need to increase voter turnout is overstated, due to the contentment of 
non-voters.  Critics of the elitist view see low participation may be due to the alienation 
of non-voters (Aberbach, 1969).  As mentioned in the discussion on the classical view of 
participation, low voter turnout is a cause for concern where in the elitist view, non-
participation ensures a more representative political system. 
Classical and elitist theories of political participation are typically concerned with 
the policy outputs of the government that best fit the wants and needs of the country as a 
whole.  In order to achieve the best policy outputs, classical theorists believe that a 
greater volume of participation is needed and elitist theorists believe that less and more 
elite participation is needed.  I use these theories as a lens to view the effectiveness of 
early voting policies in getting individuals to the polls (the classical theory) and making it 
easier for individuals to cast any type of ballot (the elitist theory). 
 In this dissertation I examine whether early voting policies fit into the classical or 
elitist views of political participation.  Early voting policies are meant to increase the ease 
of voting by increasing the flexibility of how or when a ballot is cast.  In broad terms, if 
early voting policies affect significantly higher voter turnout levels, then individuals have 
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been pulled into the political system and the classical view of participation is supported.  
In this case the classical view of full political participation is closer to being reached with 
higher levels of participation leading to better democratic electoral outcomes.  If early 
voting policies do not increase voter turnout, then the elitist theory is supported.  In this 
case the elitist view of political participation is closer to being reached with voters taking 
advantage of early voting. 
Based on the theoretical debate between the classical and elitist political views on 
participation, voter turnout rates are common topics of study across the subfields of 
political science. In this section of my dissertation, I examine voter turnout rates in the 
American political system and in other countries.  I first discuss a definition of voter 
turnout rates and then discuss studies that account for variation in voter turnout at the 
national-level across countries.  The basic measure of national-level voter turnout for a 
country is found by dividing the number of individuals who cast a ballot for a given 
election by the total number of individuals who are eligible to vote in a given country.  
As discussed above, classical democratic theory suggests that countries with higher 
percentages of voter turnout are more democratic and provide the citizens with a 
government that more accurately represents the views and opinions of its citizens 
(Sartori, 1997).  The U.S. turnout rate for presidential elections is significantly lower than 
the turnout in other counties for presidential or parliamentary elections (Jackman, 1987; 
Jackman & Miller, 1995; Norris, 1996; Powell, 1986).  When voter turnout rates are 
compared across different democracies, the U.S. is found to have one of the lowest 
turnout rates when compared to other Western Democracies like Germany, France, 
Sweden, and England (Franklin, 1996).  Table 1.1 shows the variation in aggregate voter 
turnout between U.S. and Western European with the U.S. at only 54% voter turnout in 
presidential elections starting shortly after World War II.  Two major differences between 
the U.S. and Western European countries that affect voter turnout are (1) the fact that 
many of the Western European governments are parliamentary and (2) the fact that, 
unlike in the U.S., many European counties have national voting days in which most 





Table 1.1: Average Turnout in Untied States and Western Europe, 1960-1995 
 Country Average Turnout Rate (%) 
 Austria 95 
 Italy 90 








 Finland 78 
 
Ireland 74 
United States 54 
Note: Table from Norris (1996) with select countries displayed 
 
The first major difference between the U.S. and Western European countries that 
affects voter turnout involves the structure of government.  The presidential system in the 
U.S. leads to low levels of participation compared to the European parliamentary system 
which lead to high level of participation.  An explanation of the differences in 
participation comes from the amount of influence the individual voter has at the ballot 
box.  The Electoral College system in the U.S. makes one vote have less of a potential 
effect on the election outcome than a ballot cast in a system where all votes are counted 
by proportional representation (Norris, 2004).  This leads potential voters in the U.S. to 
believe that any one vote will not greatly effect the outcome of an election.  The view that 
every vote does not count is very pronounced in a presidential election and is referred to 
as the “wasted vote”.  A voter who lives in a state that is considered to be a “safe state” 
due to its predicable support of one party over the other knows well in advance of the 
election that his or her vote will not make a difference in the election outcome. 
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 The second major difference between the U.S. and Western European countries 
that affects voter turnout involves the structure of election day.  The typical election day 
in the U.S. is similar to any other weekday.  Businesses remain open for normal hours 
with voters needing to find time to vote either before or after work.  There are some 
exceptions with certain sectors closing for the day.  For example, some states close state 
offices including schools and other government facilities.  In contrast to the business as 
usual nature of election day in the U.S., many European counties have implemented a 
national election day holiday that leaves little for citizens to do besides cast a ballot.  This 
provides opportunity for voters to cast their ballots anytime during the day. 
There are two closely related ideas that are used when attributing high voter 
turnout to an election day holiday.  The first idea is that when the opportunity to 
participate is increased, more individuals will want to take the opportunity to vote.  This 
idea assumes that when opportunity to participate increases there will be an overall 
increase in a nation’s rate of participation.  Later in this dissertation this theory is fleshed 
out by the rational choice theory of participation (Downs, 1957).  The second idea is that 
the government has the ability to run elections in a way that can give potential voters an 
incentive to vote on an election day holiday.  For example, the compulsory voting laws of 
many South American countries produce some of the highest levels of voter turnout.  
Fornos, Power, and Garand (2004) find that compulsory voting and other institutional 
factors such as unicameralism and concurrent legislative and executive elections are 
contributing factors to higher levels of voter turnout.  The U.S. case is viewed as a 
country that has a collection of laws that does not lead to high levels of voter turnout. 
 
Table 1.2: Election institutions across countries 
High Voter Turnout  Low Voter Turnout 
State Registration  Individual Registration 
Election Day Holiday  
Election Day on Business 
Day 




 There are three major national-level policy differences between countries with 
high voter turnout (i.e., Western European industrial countries) and the U.S. with low 
voter turnout.  These are represented along an ease of participation spectrum in Table 1.2.  
Components of the three policies associated with high turnout are election day holiday, 
national registration, and proportional representation.  Components of the three policies 
associated with low voter turnout are an election day occurring on a business day, citizen 
registration, and winner-take-all elections.  While there also are important cultural 
differences between countries that affect turnout, all three institutional policies associated 
with low voter turnout are in place in the U.S.  The three institutional policies discussed 
here are assumed to stay the same in the U.S. for the near future and do not represent 
possible or probable change in the political system.  The next section discusses the 
institutional policies that are currently changing in the U.S. system, specifically early 
voting policies, voter ID laws, and registration closing date. 
 The two ideas that electoral institutions and political opportunity have an effect on 
voter turnout intersect when discussing early voting policy.  Early voting will be further 
discussed as a possible instrument to increase participation in the U.S.  It is important to 
note that even if counties have the electoral policies and institutions available to increase 
turnout, citizens must take advantage of the opportunities that electoral policies allow.  
This dissertation will examine the issues of electoral policies and voters utilizing 
opportunities to vote in the context of early voting.  Question will be addressed pertaining 
to whether or not early voting will increase participation due to a new opportunity to vote 
and who is taking advantage of the ease of participation if participation rates remain the 
same with early voting policies in place. 
 The next section addresses some of the possible institutional changes that could 
increase participation in U.S. elections.  These changes will involve electoral institutional 
changes such as early voting. 
 
Electoral institutional changes that can increase participation 
 In the previous section I showed the U.S. to have a comparatively low level of 
voter turnout.  In this section I examine possible changes to increase the level of voter 
turnout.  The electoral system of the U.S. is not static.  There have been changes to who 
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votes as well as to how, when, and where voters vote.  For example, there have been 
changes in women’s and minority voting rights, changes in voting age, standardization of 
voting places and times, and policies to assist with registration.  I will discuss two 
categories when looking for policies to increase voter turnout in the U.S.  The first is to 
examine policies that are used in other countries.  The second is to examine the variation 
across the states that are within the U.S. electoral system.  These possible solutions will 
show that there are available options for the U.S. to increase participation. 
 Looking at the different electoral institutions across the world, there are two 
major policies associated with high voter turnout.  First, election day as a national holiday 
significantly changes the context of election day.  When an entire country takes a day off 
in order to vote in an election, an important message is sent to the electorate.  An election 
day holiday lets a nation’s voters know how important elections are to the country.  In the 
U.S. where there is no election day holiday, individuals are expected to fit voting in 
during a regular business day, making it possible for many potential voters to be too busy 
to vote.  In the U.S., the most common answer to give to the question “why didn’t you 
vote?” is that the person was too busy.  Arguably, it is important that voters know that 
voting is available if they choose to do so and an election day holiday is a possible 
response to the common excuse of being too busy on election day to vote. 
 The second major policy associated with higher voter turnout is registration 
policy.  The process of registration in the U.S. can be categorized as a system that places 
the responsibility of registration on the individual and not on the state.  The practical 
importance of this is that potential voters must first complete a registration step before 
they are allowed to cast a ballot on a separate occasion (Rosentone and Wolfinger, 1982).  
This turns participation in elections into a two-stage process for many potential voters.  
While some of these issues have been addressed by the Motor Voter Act (Highton and 
Wolfinger, 1998) the responsibility remains on the individual to register to vote when his 
or her address changes.  In other countries the government is responsible for making sure 
that individuals are registered to vote.  The voter registration process in other countries is 
similar to the census process in the U.S. in that government agents send out forms to 
register voters and send agents to check up on homes that do not respond to the mailed 
registration forms.  With the government being responsible for registration, the potential 
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voter is left responsible for only one step in the voting process, the vote.  By the 
government taking responsibility for registration, the voting public is likely given the 
idea that the government believes voting to be important.  In the U.S., there seems to be a 
mindset that voting is more of a personal responsibility and so individuals who would 
like to vote should not mind a few extra steps in the process.  The two major policies 
associated with high voter turnout in electoral institutions also play a part the next section 
in which different electoral institutions are compared across the states. 
One of the unique aspects of the U.S. federal system of government is that states 
are allowed to pursue different electoral policies within certain constraints placed on the 
states by the federal government (e.g., the Motor Voter Act of 1993 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965).  Some of the these electoral policies diffuse to other states, like early 
voting, and some polices, like the all mail-in voting in Oregon, have yet to diffuse.  Now 
I will address some of the specific policies that some states have implemented to make 
voting easier and more convenient. 
 Looking at the different electoral institutions across the U.S., there are a wide 
range of state-level electoral policies that can make voting easier or more difficult.  The 
major differences across state electoral policies involve (1) election day registration or no 
registration, (2) the date of registration before the election, (3) voter identification laws, 
and (4) early voting policies. 
 The use of election day registration or no registration is the first difference in 
electoral institutions found across states that can effect the ease of voting (Franklin and 
Grier, 1997; Knack and White, 2000).  There are 10 states that do not require voters to 
register at all before election day or to simply register as they vote.  This effectively 
changes the two-stage voting procedure into a one-stage procedure.  As discussed 
previously, whenever the voting process can be made simpler, the chances of more voting 
increases.  The ease of voting is increased when the citizen does not need to gather 
information about where they must register and where they must vote.  This information 
gathering time can be spent acquiring more information about the candidates. 
 Date of registration is a second difference found across state electoral policies that 
can affect ease of voting.  States are not allowed to have a registration closing date prior 
to 30 days before the election due to the 1993 Motor Voter Act; however, the difference 
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between requiring a voter to register 30 days before an election and not at all is quite 
significant.  A great deal of the election activities occur during the last 30 days of the 
election period.  For example, the debates between the candidates in the last few weeks of 
a campaign can lead to increases in mobilization efforts.  In states with closing dates of 
30 days before the election, unregistered voters cannot be affected by candidates’ 
mobilization efforts because the registration day had passed.  In contrast, a state without a 
registration closing date allows a voter to be swept up in the ending stages of the 
campaign and cast a ballot.  Franklin and Grier (1997) find that the Motor Voter Act does 
increase participation. 
 Voter identification laws are a third difference found across state electoral 
policies that can effect ease of voting.  Some states require voters to show some type of 
personal identification before voting.  Voter ID laws are put in place to increase ballot 
security by ensuring that the correct person voted.  Voter ID laws are controversial 
because many citizens without proper ID fall into the low-income category.  The concern 
with the balance between ballot security and ease of casting a ballot will only rise with 
the increased use of mail-in and absentee ballots where the only security measure is the 
address printed on the ballot.  The two major political parties are generally on opposite 
sides of the issue with Republicans favoring stronger ID laws and Democrats favoring no 
ID requirements.  Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (2008) find that voter ID laws do not have 
any affect on aggregate voter turnout when implemented and Larocca and Klemanski 
(2011) find that voter ID laws also do not have an effect on overall voter turnout. 
 Early voting policies are a fourth difference found across state electoral policies 
that can affect ease of voting.  Some states have early voting policies that include in-
person early voting and no-excuse absentee voting.  These policies make the process of 
casting a ballot easier by effectively expanding the voting period from election day to up 
to 30 days before election day.  Although all types of early voting allow busy potential 
voters to have a larger window of opportunity to vote, there are a few different types of 
early voting policies to consider.  In-person early voting follows the same voting 
procedure as that of election day voting with the voting period just extended.  
Liberalization of absentee and mail-in voting procedures allow for people to easily 
request a ballot and have more time to consider their choices before mailing back their 
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ballots.  Taken together these two categorizes provide more opportunity for voters cast 
ballots through a change in the institutions of elections.  Scholarship on the changes in 
early voting laws provide evidence that early voting laws lead to a small, about 2% to 
4%, but significant increase in voter turnout (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller, and 
Toffey, 2008).  The next section explains how early voting policies can lead to an 
increase in voter turnout. 
 
Table 1.3: State-level election institutions 
High Voter Turnout  Low Voter Turnout 
Election Day Registration  Registration Closes 30 Days Before 
No Voter ID Law  Voter ID Law 
Early Voting  No Early Voting Option 
 
 Similar to Table 1.2 that shows the different national-level policies associated 
with high and low levels of voter turnout, Table 1.3 shows the different state-level 
policies associated with high and low voter turnout.  The four differences across state-
level electoral policies that are discussed above all are associated with affecting voter 
turnout.  This means that some states could have policies that both increase ease of 
participation (e.g., no registration) and decrease ease of participation (e.g., voter ID 
laws).  This mixture of state-level laws both increasing and decreasing participation ease 
provides the opportunity to isolate and examine early voting policy and determine the 
effect of a policy on different aspects of the electoral process.  In this dissertation I 
examine the role of early voting policies in explaining the voter turnout picture across the 
U.S.  In the next section, I discuss the ways in which allowing individuals to vote early 
can lead to more electoral participation. 
 
How early voting can increase voter turnout 
 Electoral institutions and opportunity to vote explain part of the reason for low 
levels of voter turnout in the U.S.  Early voting is an electoral policy that has the potential 
to increase voter turnout by expanding the methods for voting.  Early voting also changes 
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the opportunity structure for voters by increasing the time period in which votes can be 
cast.  The next section explains how early voting policies fit into the political science 
electoral studies literature. 
 
WHY EARLY VOTING IS IMPORTANT 
Early voting is viewed in different contexts within the U.S. political landscape.  
The institutional literature examines the early voting mechanism as a change in the way 
individuals cast a ballot.  The institutional literature examines the link between specific 
electoral rules, voter turnout rates, and who chooses to vote in locations with different 
types of electoral policies.  The institutional literature also examines the link between 
national electoral policies and voter turnout in a comparative context by examining 
national-level of education, national wealth, and method of representative selection 
(Jackman, 1987; Jackman & Miller, 1995; Powell, 1986).  Studies of voter turnout in the 
U.S. examine the role of electoral institutions and laws such as the Voting Rights Act, the 
Motor Voter Act, and early voting laws.  Studies of the U.S. use the 50 states as different 
contexts to compare and contrast differences in population demographics and institutional 
differences.  The institutional differences that the state-level literature examines are 
polling place location, polling place hours, registration closing date, voter ID 
requirements, partisan registration process, election day registration, and early voting 
policies (Highton and Wolfinger, 1998; Stein, 1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
The literature on linkage institutions, such as political parties and interest groups, 
views early voting policies in two ways.  First, parties and groups view early voting 
policies as an opportunity for new voters to cast an early ballot.  One of the functions of 
parties and groups is to use many different mobilization techniques in order to get voters 
to the polls on or before election day.  Parties and groups also provide information about 
what views candidates hold (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Studies of parties and 
groups show evidence that these linkage institutions will use a variety of techniques to 
get their candidates elected (Hogan, 2005).  I predict that early voting laws allow parties 
and groups more opportunities to guide voters to the polls in different ways.  I also 
predict that an expanded voting period opens up opportunity for messages and 
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information to be sent to potential voters that include information about how to cast an 
early ballot. 
Second, parties and groups view early voting as a way get core supporters to the 
polls early in the election season so the parties and groups can concentrate on the swing 
voters as election day approaches.  This strategy allows parties and groups to use their 
resources more efficiently.  By sending messages and information about early voting 
early in the voting season, parties then can focus on sending targeted messages to 
undecided voters.  The use of targeted messages provides the opportunity for parties to 
bank core supporters then shift resources to undecided voters late in the season.  I predict 
that the banking method of mobilization will be most noticeable in groups with high 
levels of partisan support. 
The rational choice literature views early voting as a reduction of the costs 
associated with participation.  The Downs rational choice model (1957) predicts that as 
cost of participation decreases, the probability that an individual will cast a vote 
increases.  Early voting policies can be classified as a reduction in the cost of 
participation due to the increase in the number of available hours to cast ballots.  There is 
a small information cost associated with early voting due voters needing to gain 
information on when and where to early vote.  There is also an additional minimax regret 
cost of voting early in that early voters do not have the option to change their vote later in 
the campaign season (Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1974).  Early voting requires the voter to bet 
that no new information will be introduced into the campaign that will cause the vote to 
change his or her mind, this is similar to the idea that, in a close election, nonvoters 
would have wanted the chance to cast a ballot and regret the decision in not voting.  I 
predict that the overall effect of early voting policies is a reduction in costs that will lead 
to an increase in participation in elections. 
The democratic political theory literature has considered issues relating to the 
legitimacy of the U.S. democracy when some of the electorate casts a ballot before 
election day.  The concept of an informed electorate is central to the theory that 
democracy will accurately represent the interests and opinions of the citizenry (Mill, 
1859).  The issue that some democratic theorists have with early voting is that new 
information will come to light in the last few weeks of the election and change in minds 
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of the people who have already cast a ballot (Thompson, 2004).  Again, this can be 
viewed as a cost due to the locking in of the vote without the ability to change a ballot 
once it is cast.  This is not a problem in states without early voting policies because 
individuals are not allowed to vote until the campaign season is over on election day.  
Traditionally, candidates have limited their election day campaign activities to voting in 
their home district and then giving an acceptance or conciliatory address on election day 
night.  In the future we may see candidates choosing to early vote and then participate in 
a full day of campaign activities on election day.   
In this dissertation I examine two major questions that focus on the effects of 
early voting laws on the composition and size of the U.S. electorate.  The first question 
addresses the composition of the voting electorate when electoral laws are changed.  The 
composition of the electorate refers to the percentage of each demographic or political 
group that votes.  The composition of the electorate is measured through the use of exit 
polling and surveys that find out the percentage of a certain demographic that voted.  
Each percentage of a certain demographic that voted is then compared to its percentage 
level in the population.  Findings from the voter turnout literature provide evidence that 
voters are significantly more likely to be of high income and education levels 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).   
Changes in electoral institutions have lead to changes in the electorate.  Prior to 
the 19th Amendment, the eligible electorate only included males.  The electorate was 
effectively doubled with the inclusion of women voters.  The effect of the 19th 
Amendment has changed the landscape of American politics by including a previously 
nonvoting block of voters.  The change in the electorate that occurs from the change in 
early voting policy is expected to be less drastic than the change that happened after the 
Women’s Suffrage Movement, but I do expect to observe some changes.  For example, 
early voting will allow for “busy” individuals (i.e., individuals who either say they are 
busy when they do not vote on election day or because they have many things to do) 
more chances to find time to cast a ballot.  For these reasons I predict that early voting 
has the potential to change who votes in the U.S. 
The second question addresses the size of the electorate.  The size of the U.S. 
voting public is measured in two different ways.  The first way to measure the size of the 
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electorate is to simply count the number of ballots cast in each election.  This basic 
number count is heavily influenced by total population of the U.S. and generally rises for 
each comparable election cycle.  The second and most accurate measure of U.S. voter 
turnout is the to calculate the number of voters and compare it to the number of possible 
voters (McDonald and Popkin, 2001).  The McDonald and Popkin (2001) measure of 
voter turnout provides a better measure of how well a democracy functions, and is one of 
the central measures of the connection between the electorate and the government.  I 
expect that the percentage of voters will increase with the passage of early voting laws 
across the U.S. 
Overall, early voting is important because it has the potential to affect the size and 
composition of the U.S. electorate.  The literature in later chapters of this dissertation 
addresses the availability of electoral laws leading to changes in the size and composition 
of the electorate.  The effect that early voting has on the U.S. political system will be 
further examined by viewing early voting in the context of policy diffusion, parties and 
groups using of early voting in mobilization efforts, individuals choosing to early vote, 
and policies that lead to an increase in voter turnout.  This dissertation addresses these 
effects as well as the empirical and normative implications of early voting policies. 
 
WHAT IS EARLY VOTING? 
 There are many different laws that affect the way individuals are allowed to 
participate in campaigns in the U.S. political system.  Such laws include campaign 
finance laws that limit the amount of money individuals and groups can donate to 
campaigns, citizenship and age requirements for individuals who seek elected office, 
limits to how many votes an individual may cast in an election, and laws that govern the 
process by which a citizen votes.  Early voting laws fall into the category of laws that 
govern the process by which citizens vote.  Other laws that also fall into this category 
involve eligibility and identification requirements, registration laws, poll hours, voting 
machines use, and type of election (i.e., primary or general).  These laws all stipulate the 
mechanic of how individuals may participate in elections. 
 Early voting refers to the process of casting a ballot before election day.  There 
are many different avenues through which to cast an early vote.  Variation across the U.S. 
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in early voting policies is present because voting laws are produced and implemented at 
the state-level.  There have been some electoral laws passed at the federal level, such as 
the Motor Voter Act of 1993, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as constitutional 
provisions such as the 15th, 19th and 26th Amendments. However, most voting laws 
originate at the state-level, and early voting laws typically originate in the states.  Due to 
this variation, early voting policies are not standard across states.  In this dissertation 
early voting laws are considered to be state-level factors that have the potential to alter 
the composition and size of the electorate. 
 
Types of Early Voting 
 Three basic types of early voting, absentee voting, in-person early voting, and 
mail-in voting, are in practice in a number of states.  In this section I discuss these types 
of early voting as three broad categories that do not form strict boundaries between the 
three types of early voting laws.  For example, states may have an early voting policy that 
allows the voter to request a ballot by mail and then mail the ballot back to the election 
board.  One state may call this policy absentee balloting and another state may call this 
mail-in voting, making the distinctions difficult to untangle.  In this dissertation I code 
early voting laws by the name the state gave it.  In this section, I discuss the three unique 
types of early voting. 
First, absentee voting is the early voting process where voters request a ballot 
through the mail and return the ballot through the mail before or on election day.  The 
absentee voting process has been in place the longest of the three types of early voting 
and has traditionally only been available to specific groups of people.  For example, 
college students away from home and elderly individuals who would have a difficult time 
getting to the polls are allowed to request absentee ballots.  Absentee early voting allows 
individuals who are in specific situations the opportunity to cast a ballot.  Typically, 
states have absentee voting set up for individuals who reside in a location other than their 
district.  Recently, absentee voting polices have become more liberalized with some 
states requiring no excuse for absentee voting. 
 Second, in-person early voting is the early voting process in which voters visit a 
polling place a few days to a few weeks before election day.  This process effectively 
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stretches the voting period by opening polling places before election day.  The manner in 
which the polling places are distributed is up to the states themselves and they do not 
have to be in the same locations as the polling places for election day.  For example, 
Texas allows for early voting centers to be placed in shopping centers making early 
voting easier by providing the opportunity to vote in high traffic areas.  These early 
voting centers may be in public libraries, city halls, or the above-mentioned shopping 
centers.  Recently, in-person early voting has become much more common across the 
states with only a few states allowing the practice in the early 1990s and increasing to 27 
states in 2010 (Gronke and Toffrey, 2008).  The number of early voting and election day 
voting places do not represent a one-to-one relationship with the same number of election 
day voting places as early voting places.  Usually, there are fewer early voting locations 
than election day polling places.  For example, communities open up libraries or city hall 
for early voting and than open more neighborhood locations on election day. 
Third, mail-in voting is the early voting process in which voters may choose to 
receive ballots through the mail and send the completed ballot back in the mail.  This 
process is similar to absentee voting.  The difference between absentee voting and mail-in 
voting is that mail-in voting does not require an excuse, such as attending college, as to 
why the voter needs to vote before election day.  The distinction between the two types of 
voting is purely semantic when a state does not require an excuse for absentee voting.  
One state, Oregon, has used a system of all mail-in voting since 1998.  An all mail-in 
voting procedure requires the official election results to be delayed for a few days past 
election day as all the ballots are returned.  When elections are close many states have to 
wait until the last absentee and mail-in ballots are received before declaring a winner. 
Early voting has been implemented in states for a number of reasons, both 
practical and theoretical.  In the next section I discuss the positive and negative aspects of 
early voting as an electoral policy and the normative implications of early voting policy 





EARLY VOTING AS AN ELECTORAL POLICY 
 There have been different types of electoral policies that have had a great effect 
on the U.S. political landscape.  One of the earliest changes in electoral politics was the 
17th Amendment, which mandated direct election of U.S. senators.  This constitutional 
change took the election of U.S. senators away from the statehouses and allowed direct 
election of senators by the state population.  For U.S. senators, this change in the 
Constitution effectively changed their constituencies from state legislators to the voters of 
the state.  This change did not affect how citizens vote but instead changed the offices for 
which citizens vote.  A second example of historic electoral change is the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, which allowed the Federal government much more control over the states 
with regard to voter registration and ballot access.  At the time there were ballot access 
issues with the disenfranchisement of blacks and the poor in the South.  The Voting 
Rights Act caused turnout for blacks and the poor to increase greatly over time in the 
South and has had a significant impact on the composition of the electorate (Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993).  Finally, the Motor Voter Act of 1993 set standards for (1) the 
maximum number of days before an election a potential voter may be required to register 
in order to be eligible to vote, (2) the avenues through which citizens could register to 
vote (i.e., at the DMV or other public offices) and (3) dropping voters from the 
registration rolls due to non-voting.  Knack (1995) finds that the number of registered 
voters has significantly increased following the Motor Voter Act. The general trend of 
these electoral policies is in the direction of more transparency and increased ease of 
participation.  With the exception of voter identification laws most of the policies in the 
U.S. electoral policy area are an attempt to make voting more convenient.  This provides 
evidence that the trend in U.S. electoral policy is to move toward expanding the size of 
the U.S. electorate. 
Due to low rates of electoral participation in the U.S., recently implemented 
electoral laws have addressed the problem and attempted to encourage greater 
participation by easing the registration procedure (e.g., Motor Voter Act) and easing the 
voting procedure (e.g., early voting legislation).  In the next section, I discuss the reasons 




One justification for all types of early voting policies is that allowing citizens to 
vote over an extended period of time will increase the ease of to voting and thus increase 
the convenience of participating.  A favorite excuse given in the U.S. for not voting is 
that the potential voter is too busy on election day.  The increase in convenience should 
allow for more individuals to be able to participate and participate more easily.  As voting 
research moves forward it will be interesting to see if the frequency of the “too busy” 
response to why the individual did not vote changes if the voting process is made easier.  
In other words, early voting policies should test the idea that many Americans are too 
busy to vote. 
Early voting policies are somewhat controversial when viewed as making voting 
easier if only people who already vote use early voting.  If early voting policies end up 
not pulling more voters to the polls, the new policies end up simply making the voting 
process easier for people who would vote anyway.  This dissertation will addresses this 
issue in later chapters, but it is important to note that some citizens (i.e., the citizens who 
would have voted anyway) may benefit from early voting policies even if new voters are 
not brought to the polls. 
Various groups and politicians have commented on the new opportunities that 
early voting allows.  President George W. Bush commented that early voting makes the 
election a whole new ballgame.  Early voting allows for mobilization by groups and 
parties to take place over an extended period of time.  The extended voting period can 
make mobilization more costly for parties because a greater amount of time for voting 
means that more avenues for mobilization can be pursued.  Parties are able to update their 
contact information as voters cast ballots and are able to change strategies on the fly to 
mobilize more potential voters.  This change in strategies can be costly, but the ability to 
change strategies on the fly gives parties a new opportunity for effective mobilization. 
With few exceptions, there have been relatively few complaints concerning the 
implementation of early voting.  The concerns about early voting center on the potential 
for campaign or world events close to election day to cause individuals to wish to change 
their minds and not be able to change there vote.  So far, the inability to change your vote 
once it has been cast early does not appear to be a problem in that early research shows 
that a very small percentage of voters would have changed their votes if they could 
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(Kinski, 2005).  It is also worth mentioning that a large campaign or world event (e.g., a 
terrorist attack) has not yet occurred days before an election. 
 
The Normative Implications of Early Voting  
 There are many different normative issues associated with the new early voting 
policies that allow for votes to be cast before election day.  First, expanding the time 
period for voting can be viewed as a positive implication in the classical view of U.S. 
democracy because it makes it is easer for citizens to cast a ballot.  There is a value 
judgment that democratic countries must make about what barriers should be in place 
before citizens are allowed to cast a ballot.  The question of making the voting process 
easier is important to view as question about how easy participation should be in a 
political system.  In terms of elitist theory, there is a percentage of the potential voting 
public who are not informed or not informed enough to make a correct voting decision.  
Based on research, 25% of the U.S. population is uninformed, meaning that 25% of the 
voting public still needs more information to correctly pick the candidate that best 
represents them (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997).  It is also interesting to note that early voting 
allows voters to self-select by voting before the campaign season is over, so early voters 
are betting that there is not a new piece of information that would change their vote and 
they are confidant in their choices before the election cycle is completed. 
 Second, by allowing individuals to vote before election day, political systems 
suggest that citizens are able to make political decisions before a hard election day 
deadline and still approve of their selections after the election is over.  Early voting is 
significantly different than other proposed methods of making the voting process more 
convenient.  Voting on the Internet is one proposed method for making the voting process 
more convenient.  The current problems with Internet voting lie with security issues when 
transmitting votes on-line.  On-line voting provides the opportunity for a voter to possibly 
cast a ballot and then re-cast a ballot if he or she changes his or her mind before election 
day.  The ability to change your vote before election day allows for all information to be 
considered when voting while still providing the ease of casting an early ballot.  In effect, 
an early on-line voter could vote for his or her preferred candidate early, but than still be 
able to change his or her on-line vote any time before or on election day.  Currently, the 
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greatest concern with on-line voting is the security of an on-line connection between the 
voters and the government. 
Physical ballot security is also a concern with early voting.  Mail-in early voting 
ballots have to be mailed to and from election offices and it is difficult to know who 
actually filled out the mail-in ballots.  In election day voting, ballots go directly from the 
voters hand to the ballot box to be counted.   
 There are political theorists who view early voting laws as having negative 
implications for U.S. democracy.  Thompson (2004) makes arguments for only allowing 
mail-in voting for the elderly.  Thompson argues that the simultaneity of voting on 
election day is necessary for the democratic value of fairness.  He argues that the casting 
of early votes could provide more information for citizens who vote at a later date.  There 
are two different views of the role of information gathering in politics.  The first view is 
that individuals are responsible for collecting information on their own and will collect 
the amount of information that they require to make an informed decision.  This view 
assumes that voters know when they have enough information to vote.  The second view 
is that all voters should be given all information before they vote.  This view assumes that 
while the campaign is still running, information is being produced that all voters should 
use.  Since early voting allows individuals to stop collecting information, early voting can 
be seen as a process that changes voting from a collective acting to a singular action.  
Thompson’s argument against early voting comes down to the view that elections are a 
collective action undertaken by a group of citizens that should take place at the same 
time. 
 Thompson (2004) argues that voting is a national collective action, meaning that 
voting should take place at the same time or at least on the same day.  The view that 
democratic elections are a collective action could be altered if early voting changes 
elections to more of an individual action instead of a group action.  Putnam (2000) talks 
about the civic action of voting in that voters assemble in libraries, schools, churches, city 
halls, and other public institutions to cast a ballot as a group.  Early voting allows 
individuals to vote at home or over an extended period of time without having an 
interaction with many other voters.  This takes away from the collective act of going to 
the polls on election day and getting an “I Voted” sticker.  Early voting takes away some 
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of that excitement that goes along with the model of participation in which voters gather 
together on election day to vote.  The change in early voting policy reflects other changes 
in society that alter the way that information is disseminated.  For example, political 
information has shifted to the Internet and away from daily newspapers.  Time shifting 
has become commonplace with the advent of DVR’s, TiVo, Netflix, Hulu and other 
streaming content providers.  Early voting fits in with the belief that individuals should 
be able to watch TV or vote whenever the individual desires.   
 Ease of voting remains an important debate in U.S. politics.  How easy should it 
be to vote?  What policies are effective in increasing or maintaining voter turnout?  Is 
early voting changing the size and composition of the electorate?  This dissertation 
covers these and other questions regarding the effect of early voting on the changing 
landscape of U.S. electoral politics.  The summary of this chapter includes a discussion of 
why early voting is an important topic in different areas of the political science literature. 
 
SUMMARY 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an examination of the effects of 
early voting policies on the U.S. electoral system.  The way in which citizens are allowed 
to cast ballots is central to the discussion of democracy.  As the most recent change to 
electoral politics, early voting presents a new opportunity to examine the U.S. electoral 
system and the U.S. democracy. 
The public policy literature examines the effects of new policies across many 
different policy areas.  Due to differences in early voting laws across states, an 
examination of what determines the passage of early voting policies can uncover origins 
of early voting at the state-level.   A policy analysis of how early voting policies become 
laws will allow us to predictions to be made on whether other states will pass early voting 
laws in the future.  In this dissertation I address the determinants of early voting policies 
across the states.  In Chapter 2 I include an examination of the origins, frequency, and use 
of early voting policies across the U.S. 
The parties and interest group literature examines how parties and other political 
organizations react to changes in electoral policies.  In this dissertation I address how 
parties and interest groups utilize early voting opportunities.  Chapter 3 includes a 
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summary of the views of party organizers on what early voting means for their party 
organization and electoral activities.  Chapter 3 shows how and why parties are changing 
their mobilization strategies to fit new electoral landscapes. 
The electoral politics literature examines the role that the composition of the 
electorate has on the work done by elected representatives in the government.  In this 
dissertation I address the possible effects of early voting on the composition of the 
electorate.  Chapter 5 includes an examination of individuals who either decide to cast an 
early vote or who decide to vote on election day.  This chapter shows what changes in the 
electorate are observed and what the determinates are for early voting. 
The voter turnout literature focuses on the demographic factors of individuals 
who vote, and aspects of the political environment that predict voting.  In this dissertation 
I address effects of early voting on the size and composition of the U.S. electorate who 
turnout to vote.  Chapter 6 includes an examination of how early voting policies change 
the size of the electorate who turnout to vote.  As discussed in Chapter 6, voter turnout is 
an important determination for how well a democracy functions. 
In Chapter 7 I sum up the finding of the other chapters and discuss the 
possibilities for early voting research in the future.  Early voting policies are here to stay 
in the U.S. political context, and as more individuals choose to vote before election day, 




CHAPTER 2:  EARLY VOTING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Electoral laws are generally introduced, discussed, approved, and implemented at 
the state-level (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  In recent years, the federal government 
as become active in passing voting laws through the Voting Rights Act, which removed 
many of the barriers to participation for minorities, and the Motor Voter Act, which 
standardized the way that individuals register to vote.  In general, when the federal 
government steps in and creates voting laws the states are required to fall within the new 
parameters.  The Motor Voter Act required voting registration to be open until at least 30 
days before election day.  States are permitted to close the registration closer to election 
day if they choose.  Some states choose to have the maximum 30 days before closing 
registration, and some states have no registration or allow for election day registration.  
Thus far, the U.S. federal government has yet to define the terms of early voting.  Based 
on the current trend, I would expect the federal government to become involved in some 
way to standardize the way individuals can cast early ballots. 
Federalism delegates much of the responsibility for electoral policy to the states, 
including registration rules, hours of operation for polling places, ballot design, and more 
recently, the time frame allowed for casting ballots.  For example, states decide what 
their registration procedures are, what information is necessary for voters to apply for a 
voter registration card, and what they need to bring to the polls to cast a ballot.  Due to 
registration being a state-level process, some states have strict policies (e.g., registration 
must be originated at least 30 days before an election) and some states have less 
restrictive policies (e.g., registration is allowed on election day or is not required).  Early 
voting laws display the same type of range across states. Some states have few 
restrictions for early voting while other states allow for only limited types of early voting. 
 As the U.S. population becomes more mobile, election laws take on greater 
importance (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass, 1987).  For example, when voters move to 
different areas they may be unfamiliar with the electoral policies and may not fully 
participate in elections as soon as they move into the new area.  With the great variety of 
electoral laws in effect, certain states can be predicted to implement different types of 
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early voting policies (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Milller, 2008).  This chapter 
addresses the origins, history, and state-level determinants of early voting policies. 
Origins of Early Voting 
 Early voting, also called advanced voting, has been available for many years in 
the U.S., but only for specific subpopulations of the electorate.  Primarily the populations 
who were allowed to cast traditional absentee early ballots were the elderly, students, 
military personnel, and people who would be away from home on business (Fortier, 
2006).  Mailed absentee paper ballots were sent to individuals who qualified under these 
conditions and voters returned the ballots before election day through the mail or in-
person at city hall or another designated government building.  The general belief was 
that individuals who, with good reason, could not make it to the polls on election day 
should still be allowed the opportunity to participate in elections.  These conditions were 
gradually loosened in certain states and now many states allow for unrestricted early 
voting through mail-in and in-person voting.  The remainder of this section will review 
the major periods of electoral reform in the U.S. since the Civil War period up through 
the current expansion of early voting across many states. 
 The first period in U.S. history where early voting was debated and then 
implemented was during the Civil War (Fortier, 2006).  There were specific conditions 
about the Civil War period that led to the debate and implementation of absentee voting.  
The first condition was that the war required a large percentage of the population in both 
the North and South to be involved in combat.  This meant that a large portion of the 
voting population, males at the time, would not be able to physically cast a vote in their 
home precincts.  The second condition was that a large majority of the soldiers fighting in 
the war were Republican supporters.  Battles arose between the Democrats and 
Republicans in Union State Legislatures over if and how absentee ballots from soldiers 
would be counted in the 1864 presidential election.  Krehbiel (1998) has done extensive 
research in the congressional context on how rules of the political system are endogenous 
products of the political system, meaning that electoral laws are passed for political gains.  
This may be the case in the current voter rights debate in which Republicans advocate for 
(and Democrats oppose) strict photo ID laws. 
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The next major electoral reform that states adopted was the Australian ballot in 
1884 (i.e., secret ballot) (Fortier, 2006).  The Australian ballot changed the way voters 
cast ballots in four significant ways.  First, ballots were standardized and printed at public 
expense to eliminate the practice of parties or individuals producing their own ballots.  
Second, the names of all of the legal candidates appeared on the ballots.  Third, only 
election officers at the polling place distributed ballots.  Fourth, arrangements were made 
for curtains or private booths to provide secrecy in casting a vote.  Examining the change 
from a partisan ballot to the Australian ballot is important to the study of early voting in 
that the Australian ballot fundamentally changed the way Americans viewed their right to 
vote, as early voting may have the potential to do.  Before the Australian ballot, voters 
voted in public by carrying their party’s ballot to the polling place in view of partisan 
observers.  The use of party ballots allowed parties to see who supported them and then 
reward the voter for his support.  With the Australian ballot, individuals are able to keep 
their preferences to themselves thus weakening the control parties have over voters.  
Voters were left to vote without any direct social pressure that could sway their ballot 
decision.  The introduction of the Australian ballot was one of the components that led to 
the demise of the patronage system (Reichley, 1992). 
 Before the Australian ballot was introduced, voting was a very public and open 
procedure.  Parties would hand out ballots printed on paper that made it easy for party 
members to identify supporters on their way to the polls.  With the initiation of the 
Australian ballot, individuals were free to support one party publicly and vote for a 
different party in the ballot booth.  This allowed for voting to become less partisan and 
more personal due to the secrecy of the ballot (Fortier, 2006). 
The move to Australian ballots paved the way for future early voting laws to be 
passed.  First, when ballots became the responsibility of the state, political parties were 
shut out of producing and distributing ballots.  This greatly decreased the influence of 
parties on elections by removing the check they had in place to make sure that party 
supporters actually voted for the party.  The change to the secret ballot strengthened the 
link between government and voter during the election process and limited the influence 
of political parties.  Second, the Australian ballot made the vote something over which 
the individual voter was in control.  This also paved the way for early voting by shifting 
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focus to the individual voter and away from political parties.  The change from a party 
ballot to a secret ballot changed the view of voting from a collective and public act to an 
individual and private act. 
In the period after the implementation of the Australian ballot there were very few 
changes in terms of how voters cast ballots, with the exception of the expansion of 
absentee voting for military personnel, people who lived overseas, college students, and 
the elderly.  The major changes in electoral politics came instead with the expansion of 
the electorate to include women (1919) and 18-20 year-olds (1971).  The inclusion of 
most college age citizens and soldiers into the electorate contributed to the demand for 
absentee voting.  The participation of college students in elections is also part of a debate 
about where college students should be registered.  For example, should college students 
use their dorm room address or should they use their home address when registering to 
vote?  If students are required to vote in their home district it would be difficult to vote 
without some type of absentee ballot.  On the other hand, if college students were 
required to vote on campus, the effective populations around the college campus would 
be dominated by a population that may not live in the area year round.  As it stands now, 
many students can either register in their home district or at college, and absentee voting 
is open to college students. 
The electoral reforms considered in this dissertation deal with the voting policies 
that give all voters the ability to vote before election day.  There are two major groups of 
states that were early adopters of early voting policies.  In 1980 the first group of early 
adopting states allowed for the use of no-excuse absentee voting (i.e., mail-in balloting) 
(Tolbert, Donovan, King, and Bowler, 2008).  No-excuse absentee voting did not require 
an individual to state a reason as to why her or she could not make it to the polls on 
election day. Eighteen years later, Oregon would adopt a system that required mail-in 
ballots for all elections effectively making Oregon the only all-early voting state. 
The second group of early adopting states allowed for either in-person early 
voting or in-person absentee early voting.  This practice originated in Texas in the late 
1980s and was expanded in the 1990s to include Oklahoma in 1991 and Tennessee, New 
Mexico, and Nevada in 1994 (Tolbert, Donovan, King, and Bowler, 2008).  These laws 
allowed voters to cast ballots at polling locations before election day (Fortier, 2006). 
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Early voting would received a boost in support when the outcome of the 2000 
presidential election came down to what procedures would or would not be used to count 
votes in Florida.  Some of the specific concerns were the length of the ballot and the 
efforts used to ensure that ballots were clearly marked.  Those issues gave rise to the 
Help America Vote Act and the addition of early voting policies to many states’ electoral 
laws.  By allowing voters more time to interact with the ballot, voters have more of an 
opportunity to read and understand their policy choices and to make sure that their ballots 
are marked correctly. 
The 2000 Election and the Rise of Early Voting 
 The 2000 presidential election had an impact on how the voting population and 
Congress viewed elections.  The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 included 
provisions that addressed many issues relating to how voters state their preferences.  One 
of the by-products of the general movement toward making the voting process easier was 
that states started loosening their restrictions on who could cast early votes. 
 States such as Tennessee and Texas had already been experimenting with early 
voting before HAVA and one state, Oregon, had moved to all mail-in voting.  After the 
2000 election, early voting presented itself as a solution for many potential election day 
voting problems.  First, early voting increases the time individuals have to cast a ballot.  
This decreases the chances that voters will have to wait in long lines on election day to 
vote (Highton, 2006).  Second, early voting allows for mail-in voters to spend time 
considering everything on the ballot before making a decision.  Lastly, by making the 
voting process easier, early voting policies may lead to in increase in voter turnout 
(Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller, 2008).  The literature on the effect of early 
voting on voter turnout is mixed.  While some studies of early voting find that turnout 
rates are increased by as much as 19%, (Eagleby, 1987; Southwell and Burchett, 2000), 
other studies do not find a strong connection (Gomez, 2007; Stein and Donahue, 2008).  
Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller, and Toffey (2008) discuss the studies of early 
voting and voter turnout and conclude that early voting has a significant positive effect, 
of between 2% and 5%, on voter turnout (Gronke and Toffey, 2007).  These examples of 
early voting policies being associated with an increase in voter turnout has led to the 




HOW CAN VOTERS VOTE EARLY? 
 This section provides an overview of the types of early voting laws different 
states have by examining seven types of early voting that have been used in the U.S.  In 
this section I describe and detail the advantages and disadvantages of the seven types of 
early voting. 
Vote by Mail 
The first type of early voting, vote-by-mail (also known as mail-in or postal 
voting) provides individuals with ballots in the mail from one to four weeks before an 
election.  The completed ballots are returned to a post office or the county clerks’ office 
before the end of the election cycle. 
The advantages of vote-by-mail include the amount of time the voter has available 
to spend with his or her ballot.  Individuals who require more time to read ballots and 
individuals who need time to consider initiatives and referenda on the ballots may require 
more time to consider how they will vote.  Voting-by-mail allows voters the time they 
need to conduct research on any aspect of the ballot before making a final decision.  This 
type of early voting could also have a positive impact on people who may have difficulty 
getting to the polls and would prefer to be able to vote at home. 
One disadvantage of vote-by-mail voting involves the potential for voter fraud in 
that individuals could cast more than one ballot.  Because mailed ballots come through 
the post office, it is hard to determine whether or not the correct person filled out the 
ballot.  In addition to ballot security, there are other concerns with using vote-by-mail 
voting.  The first concern is that the ballot could be lost in the mail.  Second, individuals 
could misplace their mail-in ballot and not end up sending a ballot back to be counted.  
Third, individuals could incorrectly fill out their ballot and not be able to ask a question 
because they are on their own. 
Vote-by-mail is also troublesome in that all votes cannot be counted by the end of 
election day.  This occurs because some states allow ballots to be postmarked as late as 
election day.  This leads to questions about what would happen in a tight election with an 
unknown amount of mail-in votes possibly on the way.  The 2000 presidential election 
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provides an example of what occurs when election day does not end with a clear winner.  
In 2000, the President-elect had a shorter time to prepare for office. 
In-Person Early Voting 
The second type of early voting, in-person early voting (also known as in-person 
absentee balloting) provides voters with the option of casting an early vote at a voting 
location before election day.  In most cases the early voting locations are the same as 
election day voting locations. 
The advantages of in-person early voting include the convenience of voting 
before election day at the same location as a voter would vote on election day or an 
alternative designated voting location (e.g., a shopping mall, library, or city hall).  In-
person early voting expands the length of the voting period by allowing voters to plan 
ahead as to when they would like to vote.  This allows busy individuals many days in 
which to cast a ballot instead of having just a single shot on election day. 
A disadvantage of in-person early voting is that voting places may be just as busy 
during early voting as they would be on election day.  When early voting places are just 
as busy as they are on election day the incentive to cast a ballot before election day may 
greatly diminish.  In-person early voting also comes with the costs of staffing the polling 
places and taking up space in the polling place locations. 
In-Person Early Voting with Voting Centers 
The third type of early voting, in-person early voting with voting centers is very 
similar to in-person early voting with the one exception that voting centers are not tied to 
a single district.  This allows individuals to cast ballots at any voting center in the state, 
not just centers in their home district.  
The advantage of in-person early voting with voting centers is that these voting 
centers are often in a well-traveled area of town in close proximity to where potential 
voters are during the day.  Voting centers have been placed in such locations as shopping 
centers and city halls, making a trip to vote something that can be easily combined with 
regular errands.  Voting centers may be of great benefit for voters who live in the country 
where an extra trip into town can be costly and inconvenient.   
The disadvantage of in-person with voting centers is that they are in a convenient 
place only if voters use the places that the centers are located.  Traditional polling places 
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are in places associated with either the government (e.g., city hall or public schools) or 
with social groups (e.g., the Knights of Columbus or the Elks) that are long standing 
institutions of the community.  These places provide stability and consistency as to where 
individuals can vote and many voters may not wish to change their voting place.  Hence, 
voting centers may not be a viable early voting option for many potential voters. 
No-Excuse Absentee Voting 
The fourth type of early voting, no-excuse absentee voting (also known as vote by 
mail or absentee voting by mail), provides voters the opportunity to request absentee 
ballots as early as 45 days before an election and mail the ballot back on or before 
election day.  This is similar to the vote-by-mail procedure, with the major difference 
being that through no-excuse voting the voter must request a ballot for each election, 
while vote-by-mail voters are automatically sent their ballots. 
The advantage of no-excuse absentee voting is that individuals who are potential 
voters can plan ahead and request a ballot for any reason.  This mode of early voting can 
be helpful for people who work away from their home districts or for college students 
who are away from home for long periods of time.  No-excuse absentee voting has an 
advantage over traditional absentee voting in that anyone for any reason can request an 
absentee ballot.  No-excuse absentee voting effectively makes the state an elective mail-
in voting state, with individuals opting into the mail program. 
A disadvantage of no-excuse absentee voting is that some planning must take 
place before the potential voter receives a ballot.  For example, if a voter was called away 
on business unexpectedly, that voter would not have the time to request and receive an 
absentee ballot.  No-excuse absentee voting also has many of the same problems as mail-
in voting in that the integrity of the ballot may be compromised when it is mailed. 
Ballot integrity is a large issue with mail-in voting due to (1) possible intervention 
of third parties and (2) a loss of secrecy that is associated with the traditional Australian 
ballot (Harris, 1999).  Fraud by third parties refers to people receiving and filling out 
ballots meant for other people.  This becomes an issue when ballot access is not 
constrained to a monitored polling place.  The CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project 
(2001) recommends that absentee voting should be replaced with in-person early voting 
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whenever possible.  This allows individuals to vote early but in a much more secure 
manner. 
Traditional Absentee Voting 
The fifth type of early voting, traditional absentee voting, allows voters with a 
limited number of reasons to apply for absentee ballots.  Those reasons include being 
physically unable to get to the polls, being in the military, living abroad, or being away at 
college.  When individuals are away from their home districts for extended periods of 
time, traditional absentee voting allows for a mail-in absentee vote to be cast.  Absentee 
voting also may be done before election day in person if an individual knows that he or 
she will be away from his or her district on election day.  For example, if someone has a 
business trip coming up over election day, that individual can cast a ballot before election 
day at a polling place. 
The advantages of traditional absentee voting are the same as for no-excuse 
absentee voting but are relevant only for a limited population.  Traditional absentee 
voting is the oldest form of early voting with roots that trace back to ballots being 
provided to soldiers during the Civil War.  The advantage of traditional absentee voting is 
that populations of potential voters that are away from their home districts on election 
day are allowed to vote. 
The disadvantage of traditional absentee voting is again the same as for no-excuse 
absentee voting.  An added problem with traditional absentee voting occurs when a state 
must decide how strict or loose the regulations should be for establishing if a potential 
voter is eligible for an absentee ballot.  The difference between strict and loose absentee 
voting laws can be seen with some states allowing for any excuse, where other states 
require the voter to affirm that they were out of their district for a specific and limited 
reason, such as for work or school. 
Internet Voting (E-Voting) 
The sixth type of early voting, internet voting (also called e-voting), allows voters 
to cast ballots over the world wide web using a secure website.  Internet voting has been 
used in the U.S. only in certain primary elections. 
The advantage of internet voting is the extreme ease of voting it provides to 
individuals who have computers and who are connected to the internet.  Voting on-line 
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could be as easy as checking e-mail so there is tremendous potential for this mode of 
early voting. 
There are also concerns about internet voting.  First, many people do not trust the 
security of casting a ballot on-line.  Second, with the advancement of computers and the 
internet, a “digital divide” has been created with some people being much more 
comfortable than others when using computers. 
Voting by Phone or Fax 
The seventh type of early voting, voting by phone or fax, allows disabled voters to 
choose candidates over the phone.  Phone voting provides opportunity and convenience 
for individuals who would not normally have the chance to go to the polls and vote. 
The advantage of early voting by phone or fax is that individuals who are not able 
physically to make it to the polls still have an opportunity to cast a ballot.  This allows 
individuals the opportunity to vote without putting their health at risk. 
The disadvantage of early voting by phone or fax is that very few individuals get 
to use this mechanism for voting due to the specific health requirements voters must 
show before they are able to vote by phone or fax.  There are also security concerns with 
phone and fax voting that are similar to the security concerns of mail-in voting.  When a 
ballot is cast over the phone, questions can arise about the identity of the voter. 
Moving forward in this dissertation, I focus on two types of early voting policy, 
in-person and mail-in early voting.  I concentrate on these two types of early voting for a 
number of reasons.  First, these are the two most common types of early voting policies 
found across the states.  The next section presents a discussion of the number of states 
that have each type of early voting and shows that over half of the states allow for no-
excuse mail-in voting and 14 states allow for in-person early voting.  Second, early 
voting in-person and mail-in voting are two unique and observable political behaviors in 
that they require two different types of knowledge about where, when, and how to cast a 
ballot.  Third, other early voting policies (e.g., vote-by-mail, in-person early voting, in-
person early voting with voting centers, no-excuse absentee voting, and traditional 
absentee voting) can be grouped into either in-person or mail-in early voting.  The early 
voting policies such as absentee voting or voting by phone that don’t fit into the 
categories of in-person early voting or mail-in early voting are only open to specific 
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populations within states.  For the purposes of this dissertation, early voting options must 
be open to all residents of a state in order to tests theories about who chooses to vote 
early or on election day. 
Overall, the different types of early voting show that states are taking on the role 
of laboratories for policy by allowing and implementing different early voting laws since 
1980.  In the next sections I (1) introduce the variation of early voting policies across the 
states by year of adoption and (2) present a model that predicts when states implemented 
the two major types of early voting policies. 
 
EARLY VOTING ACROSS THE STATES 
 In this section I present descriptive data on the types of early voting allowed by 
different states since 1980.  The variation will be examined further in the next section of 
this chapter.  The four types of early voting and general ease of participation policies 
considered here are, in-person early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, in-person early 
voting, and election day registration. 
 
Figure 2.1 Trend in number of early voting states 1990-2006 
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Note: Early voting states include states with policies that allow for some type of early 
voting  
 
 Figure 2.1, shows the trend over time in state adoption of early voitng since 1990. 
There has been a slow rise in the number of states with early voting since 1990.  The 
large increase during the last ten years started after the 2000 election, in which there was 
controversy in the Florida election.  Currently, over 30 states now allow for in-person 
early voting with some states having a majority of votes cast before election day.  In 
terms of a policy change analysis, this graph shows the typical event driven change in 
policy.  After 2000 many states saw early voting policies as a way to decrease the 
possiblity of their state having the same election day problems as Florida had.  After a 
few more years, the number of early voting policies should become stable with all the 
states who are likely to pass laws doing so.  This is similar to the punchuated equliburm 
model in that few states had ealry voting laws before the event in 2000, the first 
equilburm, and then many states passed ealry voting laws that led to a new equilburm 
(Baumgartener and Jones, 1993).  Another policy process that may be happening with 
ealry voting is policy diffusion.  Policy diffusion occurs when a public policy is 
implemented in one state, is viewed by other states as a policy success, and is then 
implemented by the new states (Berry and Berry, 1990, Walker, 1969).  The typical 
policy diffusion starts with a few states adobpting the policy followed by more until all of 






Figure 2.2 Trend in no-excuse states 1980-2006 
Note: No-excuse states include policies that do not require a reason to request an absentee 
ballot 
 Figure 2.2 shows the trend in “no-excuse” states, which are defined as those states 
that do not require an excuse for requesting an absentee ballot. Unlike the dramatic rise of 
early voting, no-excuse policy has expanded slowly and consistently since 1980.  
Currently, a little more than half of the states have no-excuse early voting polices.  This 
graph shows that the liberalization of early voting laws has shown a positive trend in state 
policies for the last thirty years.  The fact that many states were already making no-
excuse voting easier, the events of 2000, and the increasing use of early voting in other 
states may explain why so may states passed early voting laws after 2000.  The overall 
shape of the graph is similar to the S-shaped curve found in the policy diffusion literature 






Figure 2.3 Trend in in-person early voting states 1980-2006 
Note: In-person early voting states allow individuals to cast in-person early voting 
 
 Figure 2.3 shows data on the number of states with in-person early voting for each 
year from 1980 to 2002.  There was a strong push for in-person early voting between 
1980 and 1994 with only 4 states adding since.  There are 14 states with in-person early 
voting, which are listed below with year of passage.  If early voting becomes more 
popular, I expect other states to copy the early voting systems of the 14 states that allow 
for this type of voting.  Again the overall shape of the graph is similar to the S-shaped 




Table 2.1 Date of early voting policy adoption from 1980-2006 
 Vote By Mail 
No-Excuse Absentee 
Voting Early Voting 
Alabama  1996  
Alaska    
Arizona  1992 1994 
Arkansas  1980 1996 
California 1980 1980 1998 
Colorado 2000 1992 1992 
Connecticut    
Delaware    
Florida  1998  
Georgia  1998  
Hawaii  1980 1980 
Idaho  1980 1980 
Illinois    
Indiana  2004  
Iowa  1992 1992 
Kansas  1996 2002 
Kentucky    
Louisiana    
Maine  2000  
Maryland    
Massachusetts    
Michigan    
Minnesota    
Mississippi    
Missouri  1998  
Montana    
Nebraska  1994  
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Table 2.1 (continued)   
 Vote By Mail 
No-Excuse Absentee 
Voting Early Voting 
Nevada  1980 1994 
New Hampshire    
New Jersey    
New Mexico  1994 1994 
New York    
North Carolina  2000 2000 
North Dakota  2000  
Ohio  2008  
Oklahoma  1992  
Oregon 1998 1984  
Pennsylvania    
Rhode Island    
South Carolina    
South Dakota  2004  
Tennessee   1994 
Texas   1992 
Utah  2004  
Vermont  1994 1994 
Virginia    
Washington 1994 2000  
West Virginia    
Wisconsin  2000  
Wyoming  2000  






Figure 2.4 Trend in election day registration from 1980-2006 
Note: Election day registration includes states that allow individuals to register and vote 
on the same date 
 
 Election day registration is one of the electoral policies that makes the preparation 
for voting much easier.  Few states have added election day registration since 1994.  This 
policy area is a potential growth area for states that want to make the voting process one 
step easier.  Election day registration fits into the early voting policy discussion in that if 
registration dates cause early voting to be more time consuming, increases in 
participation due to early voting may be limited.  For example, if a state allows for early 
voting but requires registration before early voting, potential voters who what to vote 
early but forget or have registration problems will be shut out of the process. 
 As can be seen on both the in-person early voting and no-excuse early voting 
graphs, about 30 states have passed laws relating to each of these early voting types.  
There are three possibilities for the future of early voting policy.  First, it may be the case 
that there are only about 30 states that are going to pursue liberalized early voting laws in 
general and that the remaining 20 states will not adopt no-excuse voting or other types of 
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early voting laws.  This assumes that early voting policies may not diffuse across the 
states.  Second, it may be the case that citizens will put pressure on their state 
governments to adopted more early voting policies and state governments will in turn 
continue to make the voting process easier.  Third, some states that have early voting 
policies will pull back on the types of early voting policies they have in place.  In other 
words, the graphs in this section may show the high point of the liberalization of voting 
procedures with more restrictive laws to be passed in the future.  In the next section of 
this chapter, I discuss the determinants of early voting including state-level factors, 
political factors, and the diffusion process. 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF EARLY VOTING POLICY 
 Electoral policy, much like many other state-level policies, can be examined as a 
case of policy innovation and diffusion.  Due to the large number of states that now allow 
for early voting, the determinants of early voting policies can be examined in a 
systematic manner using survival analysis.  Survival analysis allows for the causal factors 
that lead to the diffusion of certain policies across different states to be found.  Survival 
analysis is a form of statistical analysis that originally was used to predict survival rates 
in populations of humans or other animals across time.  In terms of humans, survival 
analysis predicts the change in probability of death due to given factors (Berry and Berry, 
1990).  Examples of this are studies of the effects of fatty foods, smoking, and alcohol on 
the human body.  The results of these studies show a number of years that the average 
person who uses tobacco, for example, could expect to have subtracted from his or her 
life.  Survival analysis predicts the death rate of an individual given specific conditions 
over time.  Another component of this analysis is that once an individual dies, he or she is 
dropped from the data set.  Dropping an individual case from the data set after policy is 
passed is done because once the policy is adopted, the model can no longer predict its 
passage. 
The textbook example of survival analysis in a public policy area is Berry and 
Berry (1990), who examine the expansion of state lotteries during the 1980s.  The typical 
policy diffusion follows an S-shaped curve, which over time, represents (1) a few early 
adopter states that introduce the policy, followed by (2) more states implementing their 
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own laws regarding the policy, and finally (3) a critical mass of states adopting the policy 
which encourages the remainder of the states to adopt the policy.  The last stage occurs 
due to a consensus being achieved for the policy across all states.  In the case of state 
lotteries, states did not want to loose lottery money across state borders so most states 
allow for some type of lottery.  In state politics, this means that some states attempt a new 
policy and become early adopters or policy leaders and serve as examples for other states 
to observe and evaluate.  California, New York, and Wisconsin have long been policy 
leaders for the other states in terms of education and health care.  Once a policy leader 
state implements a policy, other states may decide to adopt the policy as well.  I expect 
that there will be an observed policy diffusion in the early voting policy area starting the 
in early 1980s.  In order to predict early voting policies across the U.S., I examine both 
internal and external reasons that a state would pass early voting legislation. 
I examine five groups of variables to predict passage of state-level early voting 
policies staring with external causes and moving on to internal causes.  Diffusion 
variables make up the first group of variables discussed.  Early voting passage can be 
affected by external state-level factors such as neighbor effects.  Neighbor effects are the 
peer pressure of policy adoption in that states are assumed to put pressure on neighbors to 
pass similar legislation if the policy is successful.  Economic policies such as the lottery 
and sales taxes are policy areas that have been affected by neighbor effects.  In terms of 
state sales tax rate, it is easy to see that people who live close to the boarder of a state 
with a lower tax rate would have an incentive to cross the boarder to buy goods.  This 
would put pressure on their home state to lower the tax rate to become competitive. 
Although voters cannot go into a neighboring state to vote as they can to shop, it is 
possible that voters could see how easy and convenient early voting is and then 
communicate a desire for early voting to their representatives. 
Events make up the second group of variables discussed.  I examine the role of 
the 2000 presidential election as an example of event that calls into attention the problem 
of ballots being mismarked and not counted.  One of the advantages of mail-in voting is 
that voters have an extended period of time to make sure that their ballots accurately 
reflects their preferences.  In other words, people have the time to check their work 
before handing in their ballot.  In-person early voting can act as a voter bank where 
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voters can vote early in an attempt to make sure their ballot is counted.  Overall, I expect 
that as an event the 2000 presidential election caused states to reexamine their voting 
laws that lead to passage of early voting policies after the year 2000.  
State-level political factors make up the third group of variables discussed.  Early 
voting passage can influence internal political pressures such as political control of the 
state, state income, or ethnic diversity of the state.  Parties may wish to pass early voting 
legislation for a number of reasons.  First, parties that have a statewide registration 
advantage should receive electoral gains if participation is made easier.  Second, parties 
may think that barriers to participation are too high for their members and early voting 
would help with mobilization efforts.  Third, parties may have specific constituencies that 
would benefit from early voting policies.  For example, people in rural areas may be 
away from any polling place on election day and early voting would allow for easier 
participation.  Other internal factors will be examined in the next section.  State-level 
political factors include party control of government institutions, citizen ideology, and 
voter turnout.  I expect the state-level political factors, when measured in the Democratic 
or liberal direction (i.e., party control of government institutions and citizen ideology), to 
have a positive effect on early voting passage.   
State-level demographic factors make up the fourth group of variables discussed.  
State-level demographic factors act as estimations of demand for early voting.  These 
factors include state-level income inequality and population density.  For example, state 
with high levels of income inequality may be more likely to pass early voting legislation 
due to class participation bias and states with a high population density may be more 
likely to pass early voting legislation due to high congestion at polling places on election 
day.  In this case, early voting would serve as a release valve by bringing in some voters 
before election day and making the election day voting less crowded. 
The previous adoption of liberal electoral laws, besides early voting, is the fifth 
group of variables discussed.  I expect that states that pass legislation making the 
registration process easier also will adopt some type of early voting policy.  Passing 
electoral laws that make parts of the voting process easier provides evidence that a state 




 In the next section of this chapter I discuss the specific measurements of the 
determinants of early voting policy.  These determinants come from the five groups of 
variables discussed above (i.e., diffusion, events, state-level political factors, state-level 
demographic factors, and the adopting of liberal electoral laws).  Each variable will 
include the measurement of the variable and a predicted effect on passage of early voting 
policy. 
 Neighbor state effects.  One of the common findings among the policy diffusion 
studies is the effect neighbor states have on the spread of public policy (Berry and Berry, 
1990, Walker, 1969).  For example, when one state lowers its sales tax rate, residents 
from neighboring states may cross over to the lower tax state to purchase goods at lower 
total cost.  The home state that loses sales tax revenue may feel pressure in various ways 
to lower its sales tax rate.  Pressure may come from the complaints of citizens (especially 
citizens who do not live close to the neighboring state) and consumer and business groups 
that may lobby the state for lower taxes.  I expect that states that share a border with an 
early voting state will be more likely to pass an early voting law than states that do not.   
 Neighboring state effects are measured by calculating the percentage of border-
states surrounding a state that have an early voting policy on the books.  For example, 
Michigan has three border-states, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin.  One of those border 
state, Ohio, has an early voting policy.  That means the neighbor state effect would be 
measured as .33 (1 out of 3 possible states) for Michigan.  The variable ranges from 0 (no 
border state has an early voting policy) to 1 (all border-states have early voting policies). 
In the case of early voting policies, the neighboring state effect may be present.  It 
is possible that voters of a neighboring early voting state could hear about how easy and 
convenient early voting is and then communicate a desire for early voting to their 
representatives. 
 
H1: The passage of early voting laws by neighboring states should have a positive 
effect on the probability that border-states will also pass early voting laws. 
 
Event effects.  Events may also play an important role in the diffusion of policy 
across states (Berry and Berry, 1991).  Events have the effect of attracting the attention of 
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lawmakers.  In the electoral policy arena, a major event that focused attention on the 
voting issue, as discussed previously, was the 2000 presidential election.  This event 
should have caused state legislatures to reexamine the election laws they had on the 
books.   
The theoretical underpinnings for the 2000 election to have an effect on state 
election policies is based on a theoretical explanation of how policies are passed due to 
events.  Issue attention cycle theory predicts that once an event is raised to the public as a 
crisis in need of a solution, activity in the public policy area will be forthcoming (Downs, 
1972).  For example, the event of large hurricane destroying property could bring about 
some type of insurance reform legislation, or the event of a gun violence case could make 
policy makers look more closely at gun access laws.  In terms of electoral policy, the 
states had an opportunity to try to solve the problems associated with the counting and 
recounting of the ballots in the Florida 2000 election.  One possible way to fix the 
problem of the hanging chad would be to allow voters to complete their ballots at home.  
This would allow voters to check and recheck that their preferences are displayed on their 
ballots.  No-excuse absentee voting would allow people to spend extra time with the 
ballots. 
Events as a variable is measured by a dummy variable for all states for years after 
2000.  This captures the possible event effect of the 2000 presidential election.  I expect 
that after the 2000 election, states were more likely to pass early voting legislation to 
make sure that the state-level voting process allowed time for voters to carefully consider 
their ballots.  I expect the event effect of the 2000 election to be greater for no-excuse 
absentee passage compared to in-person early voting because no-excuse early voting 
allows voters to spend more time with their ballots to make sure that their preferences are 
clearly marked. 
 
H2: After the year 2000, states should be more likely to pass early voting laws. 
 
Statehouse party control.  Electoral policy primarily originates in the states.  
Many state-level policy studies show a significant relationship between statehouse 
control and policy outcomes (Berry, Fording, and Hanson, 2003).  Both branches of state 
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government (i.e., governor’s office and state legislature) should influence if and what 
type of early voting policy will be passed.  Based on party stances on other types of 
electoral policies (e.g., registration dates and voter identification), I expect that 
Democratic governors and state legislatures will be more likely to pass less restrictive 
policies such as in-person early voting, no-excuse absentee, and mail-in voting.  I expect 
Republicans, on the other hand, to be less likely to pass any type of early voting policy. 
Simply, Democrats tend to perceive that they benefit from expansions of the electorate, 
and they will perceive that policies such as early voting will expand the electorate and 
promote their electoral chances.  Party control is measured with a four-point scale in the 
Democratic parties direction, ranging from 0 (Republicans holding the statehouse, state 
senate, or the governor’s office) to 3 (Democrats holding the state house, state senate, and 
the governor’s office).  States with more governing institutions held by Democrats are 
expected to be associated with a higher probability to pass early voting laws.  I expect 
that states with more Democratic representation to be more likely to pass early voting 
legislation. 
 
H3: States with greater Democratic control of state policy-making institutions 
should be more likely to pass early voting laws. 
 
State citizen ideology.  State ideology also is expected to predict electoral policy 
output.  State ideology, as measured by public opinion polls, has been shown to have a 
near perfect positive relationship with overall state policy output (Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver, 1993).  I predict that public opinion will continue to have a strong positive 
relationship with electoral policy.  I predict that states with liberal leaning policy 
preferences will be more likely to pass early voting legislation.  The measurement of state 
ideology I use is a combination of the citizen ideology measures created by Berry, 
Ringquest, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and Berry, Fording, Ringquest, Hanson, and 
Klarner (2010).  The citizen policy measure describes “the average location of the active 
electorate in each state on a liberal-conservative continuum” (2010) with higher values 
representing more liberal state populations and lower values representing more 
 
	47
conservative state populations.  I expect states with more liberal populations to be more 
likely to pass early voting laws. 
 
H4: States with liberal populations should be more likely to pass early voting 
laws. 
 
State-level of voter turnout.  The percentage of eligible voters who turn out to 
vote in a state should be related to the passage of early voting laws in the state.  The state-
level voter turnout measure comes from the Michael McDonald United States Election 
Project webpage that expands the data set first presented by McDonald and Popkin 
(2001).  The measurement issue that McDonald and Popkin (2001) address is the 
difference found between the amount of turnout when it is calculated by Voting Age 
Population (VAP) instead of being calculated by the more accurate Voting Eligible 
Population (VEP).  The problem with using VAP is that the figure includes all people 
who are of voting age regardless of their eligibility to vote.  That means VAP includes 
ineligible populations such as non-voting felons, non-residents, and illegal immigrants.  
VEP removes these ineligible populations and produces a more accurate measure of state 
voter turnout. 
I expect previous levels of turnout to influence state policy in three different 
ways.  First, I expect that states with high levels of turnout will be more likely to pass 
early voting laws. Since a large share of the state electorate does vote, individuals will 
promote a policy that makes their voting easier and more convenient. Simply, people who 
would normally vote will support the added convenience of early voting.  Second, I 
expect that states with low levels of turnout will attempt to make voting easier for the 
potential voting population.  One-way of doing this is to adopt reforms such as early 
voting. Third, I expect that states with average levels of voter turnout to be less likely to 
implement any type of early voting policy.  This represents the “if it’s not broken don’t 
fix it” approach. 
I expect there to be a U-shaped relationship between state-level of voter turnout 
and probability that an early voting law will be passed.  A nonlinear relationship implies 
that there is not a one-to-one relationship between VEP and the probability that a state 
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will pass an early voting law.  This means that I expect that states with high and low 
levels of voter turnout will be more likely to pass early voting legislation.  The nonlinear 
variable will be captured by the VEP variable as well as the VEP variable squared. 
 
H5(a): States with high levels of voter turnout should be positively related to state 
passage of early voting laws. 
H5(b): States with low levels of voter turnout should be positively related to state 
passage of early voting laws. 
H5(c):  There is a nonlinear relationship between state voter turnout and state 
passage of early voting laws. 
 
Income inequality.  States with high concentrations of income may see early 
voting as a way to increase the number of people who go to the polls on election day.  
States with high levels of income inequality may want to make the participation process 
easier in order to provide a more democratic political system, where the economic system 
remains tilted to more wealthy individuals.  I predict that states with high levels of 
income inequality should be more likely to pass early voting laws to make the voting 
process easier. 
There should also be an interactive effect between income inequality and partisan 
control of the state government.  Specifically, states with high levels of income inequality 
and more Democratic party control should be more likely to pass early voting laws.  The 
Democratic party will typically try to fix issues with government intervention and early 
voting laws are a way to bring in more potential voters so the state government would 
represent the entire state population, not just the voting population (Bartles, 2010).  I 
predict that states with high levels of income inequality and Democratic party control 
should be more likely to pass early voting laws. 
 
H6: States with high levels of income inequality should be more likely to pass 
early voting laws. 
H7: States with high levels of income inequality and Democratic party control 




Population Density.  States that have high population concentrations of 
populations may see early voting as a way to decrease the number of people who go to 
the polls on election day.  High population density can translate into long lines at the 
polls on election day.  Long lines may be due to not having enough polling places or not 
having enough voting machines at each polling place.  Early voting can spread out voting 
over different days and help to decrease the amount of demand for voting on election day.  
On the other hand, states with low population density do not have as large demand for 
voting on election day.  I predict that states with high levels of population density should 
be more likely to pass early voting laws to make the voting process easier. 
 
H8: States with high levels of population density should be more likely to pass 
early voting laws. 
 
Early policy adoption.  States already have a number of electoral laws that 
determine how strict their voting laws are.  Strictness of voting laws can serve as a 
predictor for how likely a state is to pass early voting laws.  States with restrictive voting 
laws (e.g., must register 30 days before an election) should be less likely to pass early 
voting laws.  On the other hand, states with liberal voting laws (e.g., election day 
registration or no registration required) should be more likely to pass early voting laws.  I 
predict that states pass legislation that is consistent with other laws in that policy area.  
For example, states that have the most strict registration laws (e.g., must register 30 days 
before the election) should have the strictest ID requirements and the fewest early voting 
laws.  On the other hand, states that have no registration requirement are predicted to 
have the most liberal early voting laws. 
Electoral laws are measured by how many days before the election voter 
registration closes.  States with closer dates of 30 days prior to the election are predicted 
to be more restrictive in their voting and not have any early voting policies. 
 






 The next section of this chapter presents a model of early voting policy adoption 
across the states. 
 
MODELING EARLY VOTING POLICY 
 In this section I develop a model of state adoption of early voting policies. I use 
statistical analysis to predict passage of in-person, no-excuse early voting, and passage of 
any type of early voting law.  For each policy I estimate the predicted effects of several 
groups of independent variables on the passage of a given early voting policy and any 
early voting policy using time series probit analysis.  Time series probit analysis is a 
statistical technique appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables and is used to 
predict variables that are binary (i.e., either a 1 where the event or behavior occurs or 0 
where the event or behavior does not occur).  In this chapter I use a time series probit 
model to predict the passage of early voting laws at the state-level, specifically the 
xtprobit Stata command to account for autocorrelated errors and heteroskdasticity 
commonly found in estimated models of time series data sets.  The data set includes 
observations from the 50 states every election year starting from 1980 to the year 2006.  
The actual number of cases varies from model to model based on when the specific states 
adopted an early voting policy.  To estimate the passage of specific polices, I drop states 
from the analysis after they pass one of the early voting policies.  After the state is 
dropped from the time series, the effects of the passed policy are accounted for in the 
neighbor variable for the remainder of the time series.  States that do not pass an early 
voting law remain in the data set as potential future adopters of the policies examined 
here. 
 The data set includes observations from every presidential and off-year election 
year from 1980 to 2006.  I use a two-year measurement cycle so that the measurements of 
changing voting laws and voter turnout are accurate and unique data points.  If yearly 
measurements were taken for all variables (e.g., policy and voter turnout), some variables 
would remain the same for two time periods in a row.  The effects of diffusion include 
that one state sees that another state passed an early voting law but also that the 
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implementation of the early voting law can be assessed and observed.  Two-year 
observations follow the congressional election schedule, which means that cases can be 
dropped as the early voting policies are first implemented.  Taking observations every 
two-year election cycle means that each case is an observation of all variables every two 
years. 
The dependent variable is coded 1 for states that have either adopted early voting 
in the election year or adopted in the year before the specific election year.  That is, a 
state is coded as 1 if it passes on early voting policy during the two-year election cycle.  
The dependent variable is coded 0 for states that have not adopted early voting.  A state is 
dropped in the event history analysis after an early voting law is passed.  I code all states, 
starting in 1980, as 0 until an early voting policy is passed. 
The variables from in data set are compiled in Table 2.2, which shows the 
variable name, measurement of the variable, the data source for each variable, and the 
variable range.  The number of cases (i.e., state years) for each early voting policy 
changes based on the number of cases dropping out as the policies diffuses though the 
states.  There are a total of 281 possible cases for the no-excuse early voting model and 
the in-person early voting model.		
FINDINGS 
No-excuse early voting results 
Table 2.3 shows my estimated xtprobit model that predicts passage of no-excuse 
early voting policies.  I did not find any significant coefficients that predicted no-excuse 
early voting policy passage.  I also present the model estimated in Table 2.3 in Table 2.6 
with out the inclusion of the two interaction variables (voter turnout squared and party X 
Gini coefficient) and do not find any significant predictors of no-excuse early voting 
policy passage.   
Looking at the non-significant findings in Table 2.3 and 2.6, there are some 
interesting variables to examine.  First, the non-significant finding of the neighbor policy 
coefficient.  This represents an important finding because it provides evidence that the 
diffusion policy theory is limited to policies such as lotteries, taxes, social welfare 
spending, and living wills laws.  This makes intuitive sense in that it is expected that 
policies that have high levels of public awareness and interest could bring attention to 
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neighbor states.  This analysis provides evidence that low salience policies (i.e., early 
voting) may not diffuse in the same way as high salience policies (i.e., living wills and 
lotteries). 
The second non-significant finding involves the event year 2000 variable.  This 
means that the issues related to the Florida recount did not lead states to be more likely to 
pass early voting laws after 2000.  It may be because the focus of the Florida recount did 
not center on access to the ballot box but rather the issues with counting up the ballots 
after the ballots were turned in.  With the help of HAVA, states were given the 
opportunity to change to non-paper ballots to help improve the counting process post 
election.  Voting before election day does not necessarily help the voter make sure that 
his or her preferences were accurately shown, with the exception of mail-in voting where 
voters can spend as much time with their ballots as they wish. 
The third non-significant finding is for the voter turnout measures of state-level 
voter turnout and state-level voter turnout squared.  This is interesting because of the 
belief that early voting policies are a solution to the low voter turnout problem.  States 
appear not to take levels of voter turnout into account when deciding to pass early voting 
legislation.  This provides some empirical evidence to support the view that states view 
early voting opportunities as a policy to make the voting process easier for current voters 
and not as a way to get more people to the polls. 
The fourth non-significant finding involves the registration closing date.  This 
suggests that one type of liberalized voting policy is not necessary related to other types 
of voting policies.  This suggests that in the view of state legislatures and potential voters, 
the voting process is made up of two distinct parts, registration and voting.  The two-
stage nature of voting in the U.S. has been on the reasons for low overall participation in 
the electoral process (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).   
The fifth non-significant finding involves the political variables party aggregate 
strength and citizen ideology.  Neither of the political variables is significant witch 
provides evidence that early voting passage is a non-partisan policy position.  In Chapter 
3 of this dissertation I address the political motivations behind early voting policies and I 
will directly examine the possible partisan link between state-level party workers and 
early voting policies. 
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Overall, the no-excuse early voting model allows many factors to be ruled out in 
explaining what leads to early voting policy passage.  In the next section I examine a 
model that predicts in-person early voting policy passage with the same set of factors 
presented in Table 2.3 and Table 2.6. 
In-person early voting results 
The results for my second policy model are displayed in Table 2.4 and without 
interaction terms in Table 2.7.  The estimated model shown in Table 2.4 produced five 
significant coefficients.  The five coefficients include aggregate statehouse party control 
(-), citizen ideology (+), passage of motor voter act passage before 1993 (+), registration 
closing date (-), and the gini times the statehouse party control interaction term (+).   
State-level citizen ideology is found to be positively related to in-person early 
voting.  This means that states with more liberal population are more likely to pass in-
person early voting policies.  This finding falls in line with the thinking that liberals view 
the government as a solution to the low voter turnout problem and early voting policies 
provide a way to get more individuals to the polls.  There is also an argument that states 
with conservative ideologies would want to keep a more traditional election day policy.  
States with a relatively conservative liberal state-level citizen ideology may want to keep 
the voting process as traditional as possible and feel that early voting would remove some 
of the pageantry from election day.  In-person early voting often takes place in non-
traditional voting places like malls, and other non-standard polling places.  Also, 
conservative citizens may view election day in a similar manner to Thompson (2004) and 
believe that election day should be a national collective action where all votes should be 
cast on the same day.  A big concern about early voting is that early voters do not have 
the access to the same information as election day voters do.  This leaves open the 
possibility that new information may become available that would cause many early 
voters to want to change their vote. 
State party control is found to be a negative and significant predictor of in-person 
early voting policy passage.  This means that states with more Republican statehouses are 
more likely to pass in-person early voting legislation.  This finding is of particular 
interest because this model also estimated that states with more liberal populations are 
more likely to pass early voting legislation.  There appears to be a balance between 
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Republican statehouses and liberal state populations that both lead to passage of in-
person early voting policies.  Republican parties, like all parties, may pass early voting 
policies because they believe that the policy will increase the change of winning the next 
election. 
State-level income inequality measured by the interactive term gini coefficient 
times the statehouse party control coefficient and is found to have a positive and 
significant effect on passage of in-person early voting.  It appears that state legislatures 
with higher levels of income inequality and more Democratic party statehouse control are 
more likely to pass in-person early voting laws.  States appear to use these early voting 
laws as a way to encourage voting by all groups of individuals, not just the poor or the 
wealthy and this effect is only felt when interacted with more Democratic statehouse 
control.  Making voting relatively simpler could be a way to ensure that even in a state 
with high-income inequality, all citizens have an equal contribution in the electoral 
process.  This interaction variable is removed from the model in Table 2.7 and did not 
cause the single statehouse control or Gini variable to become significant.  This means 
that these two variables are significant when they interact in and the statehouse party 
control measure in Table 2.4. 
Passage of early Motor Voter policy is found to have a positive effect on passage 
of in-person early voting policies.  As discussed in the section covering no-excuse 
absentee voting, I expect early adoption of one type of electoral policy to translate into 
passage of other early voting policies.  In this model I find a positive and significant 
coefficient for Motor Voter policy on in-person early voting policies.  This finding 
supports the idea that states try to make the voting process easier as new electoral policies 
become known.  The idea that states have a consistent view and policy stance on electoral 
policy is a topic that warrants further empirical examination.  Some state-level electoral 
policies may fit together, like no registration requirement, no voter ID requirement, and 
an early voting policy.  These policies could be used to produce an ease of voting index 
across states to determine in which states it is easier or more difficult to cast a ballot.  A 
closer examination may find that states have a combination of electoral policies that 
appear to be inconsistent or incompatible.  For example, some states may allow for in-
person early voting but close registration 30 days before election day. 
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I also find that the coefficient on the registration closing date variable is negative 
and significant.  This means that state with a registration closing date close to election 
day are more likely to pass in-person early voting laws.  I think that it makes sense for 
states with more liberal registration polices that allow for registration close to election 
day would be in favor of having a liberal in-person voting to make the voting process 
easier.  This also fits into the idea that states have a liberal or conservative set of electoral 
policies.  A liberal set of voting polices would not include voter ID laws, no registration 
deadline, and one or more early voting policies.  A conservative set of electoral politics 
include voter ID laws, a registration closing date of 30 days before the election, and no 
early voting policies. 
The last set of models shown in Table 2.5 and Table 2.8 predict the passage of 
any type of early voting law. The only significant coefficient in Table 2.5 is the no-
excuse absentee early voting neighbor.  This means that states with more neighbor states 
with no-excuse absentee voting policy are more likely to pass any type of early voting 
policy.  This follows the traditional diffusion process where policies move from state to 
border state until all states have a similar type of policy.  Table 2.8 shows the model from 
Table 2.4 without the two interactive terms and includes the two positive and significant 
coefficients for no-excuse absentee neighbor and the gini coefficient.  The neighbor 
coefficient was discussed above in this paragraph and the gini coefficient measures the 
level of income inequality in each state.  This means that states with higher levels of 
income inequality will be more likely to pass any type of early voting policy than states 
with low levels of income inequality.  High-income inequality may lead to early voting 
policies because of the potential for income inequality to translate into political 
inequality.  Early voting policies are a way to make the voting process easier and in some 
states are viewed as a way to bring new voters to the polls (more on this topic in Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 in this dissertation). 
Overall, these models have found a few of the significant predictors of early 
voting policy, but do leave room for examining the effects of other variables. There are a 
number of possibilities as to what accounts for the remainder of the unexplained 
variation.  First, there may be other unique state-level factors that I have not accounted 
for in my model.  These effects could account for the non-partisan and non-ideological 
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findings of my two early voting models.  I do not think that early voting is a policy that 
easily maps onto the liberal and conservative policy preferences scale.  For example, 
liberals may favor early voting as a way to make voting an easier process in order to get 
more electoral participation, while at the same time, liberals may want to retain the 
collective action of voting together as a country on the same day.  Conservatives may 
want to make voting an individual choice by expanding the opportunity to cast a ballot 
over many days, but conservatives may also what to preserve the tradition of election day 
voting.  This possible effect would leave early voting off of the traditional liberal-
conservative scale of government stepping-in to government stepping-aside.   
Another state-level factor that may have an effect on early voting passage is 
media coverage about the benefits of early voting.  Media coverage could lead to public 
awareness of the policy, which could then cause citizens to lobby the statehouse.  The 
media coverage of elections may include segments and articles about how early voting 
could help busy citizens vote or show how early voting is being implemented in other 
states. 
One of the issues in the policy diffusion literature deals with what mechanism 
actually transfers policy knowledge from one state to another.  Some studies have 
examined policy entrepreneurs that travel from state to state and advocate for a specific 
policy (Mintrom, 1997).  In the next chapter of this dissertation I discuss early voting 
policies with representatives of political parties.  In my discussions, I did not hear about 
any type of policy entrepreneur active in the early voting policy area.  It may be the case 
that early voting policies are relatively simple policies to implement, make policy 
entrepreneur activities unnecessary.  Election policies are mostly internal government 
operations that do not require business groups to implement a portion of the policy.  This 
is in contrast to economic policies that need to fit into a current policy space.  Early 
voting, on the other hand, is a new policy in a new policy area with no entrenched group 
trying to stop passage of early voting laws. 
One of the strongest arguments for the passage of early voting is that U.S. is that 
voter turnout is relatively low compared to other industrial democracies.  The finding that 
the coefficients for voter turnout and voter turnout squared are not statistically significant 
adds another wrinkle to the early voting policy passage debate on whether or not early 
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voting has the potential to increase voter turnout.  I view the non-significant coefficients 
as an indication that low, medium, or high levels of voter turnout are not related to 
passage of early voting policies.  This may mean that states are looking to make the 
voting process easier for the citizens who are voting already.  Making the voting process 
easier opens up a debate about if government should just make the voting process easier 
for current voters or making the voting process easier in order to get more citizens to the 
polls.  If states are only make voting easier for current voters, the government is only 
spending money to keep current voters voting.  In the next section of this chapter I make 
suggestions about how to further examine the factors that lead to early voting policy 
passage in the U.S. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The growth in early voting policies has been drastic since 2000.  As these early 
voting policies become utilized by more people and more states, I expect the early voting 
will continue to expand until every state has some type of early voting option available to 
voters.  It may be that diffusion of early voting policies happens across states that have 
similar state-level factors, such as ideology, and not states that simply border each other.  
Diffusion may take the form of either in-person early voting or a no-excuse absentee 
voting.  The only impediment that I see to the remaining states passing an early voting 
option is the fear that new information may come to light late in an election that would 
cause early voters to want to change their votes after casting a ballot. 
Another possible avenue for more early voting options is the addition of on-line 
early voting.  Looking past the scope of this research, I predict that early voting will 
slowly spread around the rest of the country without the inclusion of any type of on-line 
voting until security is no longer a salient issue. 
The models in this dissertation show significant factors that affect the passage of 
early voting policies.  Those factors include state-level demographic factors (gini 
coefficient), political variables (citizen ideology and statehouse party control), and past 
policy outputs (early passage of Motor Voter Act and registration closing date).  
Including addition factors representing all three categories of variables may lead to a 
clearer explanation of what encourages early voting passage.  In future research scholars 
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may include variables in their models that represent demographic variables (state 
unemployment rate), political variables (early voting issue salience), and past policy 
outputs (state policy liberalism). 
There are other ways to examine early voting policy passage beyond just 
adding variables to the models shown in this dissertation.  A media study that examines 
news coverage in states that passed early voting laws could improve our understanding of 
passage of early voting policies.  For example, the framing and tone of media coverage 
may be constant across states that passed early voting laws.  A state-level analysis that 
examines individual votes for and against early voting passage across all states could 
include unique statehouse member factors, such as district level factors and individual 
demographic factors of the member’s constituency, that lead to passage of early voting 
policies.  An examination of states that voted on early voting policies but did not pass 
them also could be done in order to examine early voting passage. 
In this dissertation I find that early voting policy passage is a combination of 
different factors.  Some of these factors are examined further in Chapter 3 (How Political 
Parties and Groups Utilize Early Voting) and Chapter 7 (Conclusion).  In the next chapter 
of this dissertation I examine how state-level political parties view and use the new 




CHAPTER 3:  HOW POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS UTILIZE EARLY 
VOTING 
 Due to changes in the way elections are run, specifically with regard to early 
voting policies, I expect political actors to change strategies for mobilization during the 
new expanded election period.  Not all political actors are predicted to use the same 
strategies to increase the effectiveness of their past mobilization attempts when addresses 
early voting’s opportunities.  For example, some state-level political parties may start 
their phone calls to registered members on the first day of early voting and others may 
wait until election day to start phone calls due to cost considerations.  The primary 
function of the political party is to win elections and early voting laws provide a new 
context in which parties can operate. 
 Interest groups also use mobilization to increase support for selected candidates 
during election periods.  Groups are predicted to utilize the early voting period to 
increase support.  By expanding the period of voting, groups have new opportunities to 
get voters to the polls.  Under early voting, groups have the opportunity to inform voters 
that they can go right to the polls or vote on any day up to the end of election day.  There 
are also opportunities for more targeted mobilization techniques.  Recently, there has 
been a movement toward targeted mobilization due to better collection and analysis of 
data about voters and potential voters.  For example, parties and interest groups collect 
data on personal consumption patterns to determine which party and candidate an 
individual may prefer.  Potential early voters can be given direct campaign information 
about candidates, and they can be given information on how and when to cast an early 
vote. 
 Another option for parties and groups is to ignore the new early voting laws and 
not change any mobilization strategy that they use.  Political parties may see early voting 
as an opportunity to mobilize early but may choose to hold on to their resources until late 
in the election calendar.  This may be a function of how much money is available to the 
state-level party.  States with low levels of resources may spend money closer to election 
day and states with high levels of resources may spend money throughout the early 
voting period.  The specific mobilization techniques that parties choose to use are 
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presented in this chapter and are more closely examined in the interview section of this 
chapter. 
In this chapter I examine the many new possibilities that early voting presents to 
political actors and how political parties and interest groups use early voting as a way to 
mobilize supporters.  I use a qualitative research design to examine questions related to 
early voting and political parties that are not addressed in later chapters of this 
dissertation through quantitative research methods.  Specifically, I contact state-level 
political party representatives and interview them about issues relating to new early 
voting laws.  These interviews provide an inside look into how political parties are taking 
advantage of, or simply ignoring, the new early voting period and if the parties are in 
favor of expanded early voting policies in the future. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON PARTIES, GROUPS, AND ELECTIONS  
 This literature review is broken into two different sections.  The first section 
concentrates on general political science research based at the state-level.  This section 
provides an overview of the justifications for conducting state-level research.  The second 
section concentrates on research that focuses on state-level party effects on campaigns 
and elections.  This second section provides an opportunity to examine the mobilization 
techniques and other campaign behaviors of parties.  The literature provides a 
background for understanding how parties approach early voting mobilization by 
examining the mobilization techniques parties used before the recent addition of early 
voting laws. 
Parties and Interest Groups in the States 
 The federal structure of the U.S. political system allows the 50 states to produce 
and implement policies that fit each individual state’s needs while allowing the federal 
government to pass laws that effect the entire country.  The relationship between the 
states and the federal government has gone through many changes throughout the history 
of the U.S.  Upon passage and implementation of the Constitution, power was clearly 
divided between the state and federal level, but the relationship has changed to a form of 
federalism where both states and the federal government are active in many of the same 
types of policy areas.  This change has been called a shift from layer cake federalism, 
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where policy areas are clearly defined, to marble cake federalism, where policy areas mix 
together (Greenberg and Page, 2007).  This allows for an examination of the 50 states as 
different contexts, as well as pieces of the whole country.  State-level examination is 
beneficial for many different reasons.  First, the states have been viewed as laboratories 
of democracy in that the states often test new policies that may be too large or expensive 
to attempt first at the national-level.  Second, the states are able to pursue and enact 
policy that is formulated exclusively by and for the individual states.  Third, states 
provide fifty different contexts in which to examine U.S. political behavior.  While the 
states are an important component to the electoral policy discussion, the federal 
government has in recent years taken a large roll in crafting electoral laws.  For example, 
the Voting Rights Act (1965) that required southern states to open the voting process up 
to all citizens pushed the federal government to the forefront of the electoral policy 
debate.  The Motor Voter Act (1993) placed more requirements on the state by requiring 
voter registration material to be available at many different types of governmental offices 
and by requiring that registration closing dates could not be set more than 30 days before 
election day.  The mix of federal and state policy activity is important to the study of 
electoral policy, but in this chapter I will focus on the roll of individual state early voting 
laws and the effects of those laws in the state-level political context. 
 State-level election research is important because it provides a rationale for 
conducting small N studies that include interviews and case studies in order to generate 
theories to be tested in larger N studies.  Later in this chapter I present the results of 
phone interviews with members of state-level political parties in which the members 
discuss how the party’s mobilization efforts have been affected by the early voting laws.  
These findings can be used to generate theories about how parties utilize scarce 
resources. 
Parties and Interest Groups in State Elections 
The literature on the role of state-level parties and interest groups in elections 
examines a range of topics including election outcomes, party institutions, electoral laws, 
and voter turnout.  In this chapter I examine the state-level literature to show the many 
different contexts in which parties and groups try to win elections.  The literature 
includes how parties and groups mobilize possible voters. 
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The literature on state-level parties and interest groups specifically addresses 
questions concerning the electoral and political contexts that lead to campaign 
contributions from a variety of different interests groups (e.g., labor and business).  
Political spending and fund raising can have an impact as to if and how much parties are 
involved in early voting mobilization.  It is important to note that while early voting 
provides an opportunity for targeted mobilization, early voting also can be a costly 
campaign activity (for reasons discussed later in this chapter).  The mobilization efforts 
of parties and groups are constrained by how much money is available to spend during 
the election cycle.  The other major constraint that affects political parties is state and 
federal election laws.  These laws lead parties and groups to spend resources in different 
ways, which leads to the saying that money is like water in political campaigns in that it 
will always find a way into the political process.  In the context of early voting, changes 
in electoral laws may affect the way parties and groups view campaign-spending 
decisions during electoral campaigns.  Some of the electoral research (Hogan, 2005) 
suggests that political actors will adapt to new laws and regulations to maximize their 
effectiveness.  Hogan (2005) presents interest group activity and spending as a balloon 
model of activity.  Basically, an interest group will behave like a balloon that can change 
its shape to fit around any constraints or laws that states have.  The size of the balloon 
depends on the amount of money the interest group has to spend during the election.  
More money will translate into more possibilities for interest group activity.  This study 
of party and interest group behavior documents that political groups use many different 
types of mobilization techniques to get voters informed and to the polls.  The next section 
fleshes out the possible ways that parties may change their mobilization behavior due to 
changes in early voting policies. 
 
EARLY VOTING THEORIES OF PARTY CONTACT 
 In this section I discuss theories of party contact that can be applied to elections 
that allow for early voting.  These theories of party contact draw on rational choice 
theories and the views of early voting by the political parties.  These theories are further 
examined in the interview section of this chapter. 
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The Rational Political Party 
 Parties should display a behavior change after early voting laws are implemented 
across the U.S. due to the change in electoral environment.  The theories presented in this 
section represent possible actions that state and local parties could utilize during 
campaigns and are later examined through interviews with representatives from state 
political parties and interest groups.  Due to a lack of previous research on the 
relationship between early voting opportunities and party mobilization strategies, these 
theoretical strategies are only expected theories of party mobilization.  Qualitative data 
are collected in the form of interviews and are used to investigate the perceived impact of 
strategies parties are utilizing concerning early voting.  The use of interviews allows for 
theory building due to the lack of research in this area. 
 Parties play a crucial part in U.S. democracy as linkage institutions, in that 
political parties seek to win elected office by presenting candidates for elected office to 
the electorate.  Parties and their candidates are rational, goal-seeking actors who will 
utilize early voting to increase their chances of winning elections (Aldrich, 1995). In 
general, political parties should react to early voting policies by changing how they 
mobilize their supporters.  The change in mobilization strategy is due to the expanded 
time frame that voters are allowed to cast a ballot.  This provides parties with both an 
opportunity and a challenge.  Parties in early voting states have the opportunity to secure 
or “bank” the votes of supporters early in the voting period.  The challenge for parties 
comes with how to use campaign funds to mobilize their supporters over an extended 
election period.  Specifically, should a party spread resources out over the entire open 
election period, only mobilize early voters, wait until election day to mobilize supporters, 
or some mix of these three strategies? 
 Below, I discuss potential ways in which parties can use early voting in their 
mobilization efforts.  In the next sections I discuss differences between the Democratic 
and Republican Parties in both their views on early voting policy and their techniques for 
utilizing early voting. 
Contact all members as soon as early voting is available.  Parties may utilize a 
strategy that puts an emphasis on making sure their members know that they are able and 
are encouraged to vote before election day.  This strategy implies that parties are not 
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making distinctions among members of their party, all party members are considered 
open and available for early voting messages and information.  For example, parties do 
not break down their party lists into groups who have already voted or not voted.  They 
simply send repeated messages out to members about early voting. 
The “contact-all-members-first” strategy may be beneficial due to the repeated 
nature of contacts.  In this strategy members are contacted multiple times and reminded 
of early voting opportunities.  I would expect that this method would be an expensive 
mobilization option because the parties attempt to mobilize voters over a longer time 
period.  On the positive side, this strategy should be effective in gaining the most possible 
support during the election period. 
Contact active and involved members first.  A second strategy for mobilizing 
party members could be to contact members who are active in the party.  There are 
different benefits to the contact active members strategy compared to the contact all 
members strategy.  First, if strong party members vote early, they can tell other people 
about voting early.  This would cause mobilization to diffuse throughout the party from 
the active members.  Second, this group of potential voters is highly partisan and their 
votes can be seen as locked up for the party.   This would, in effect, lock up guaranteed 
party votes before election day without risking loosing some of those votes on election 
day due to unforeseen events such as illness, car problems, or long lines.  Active 
members are also the least likely potential voters to vote for the opposition as they are 
commented to the party.  This strategy may be viewed as a more cost effective than the 
contact all members strategy because it could be assumed that active members will 
actually vote for the party candidate. 
Combine early voting messages with “usual” campaign messages.  A third 
strategy for parties would be to simply add early voting information to strategies already 
in use.  This may be the least expensive method of mobilization in that parties already 
produce ads and leaflets and early voting information could easily be added to those 
existing forms of mobilization.  Early voting information can be added to flyers and other 
ads with little cost. 
 In the next section I discuss the potential views of Democrats and Republicans on 
early voting.  These views will be examined further in the interview section of this 
 
	65
chapter, which includes a discussion about a potential preference for election day voters 
over early voting. 
The Parties Prefer Election Day Voting 
 This chapter is presented as a study of how political parties change their 
mobilization behavior and how parties view the role of early voting in their state.  It is 
important to note that political parties may not wish to engage in early voting centered 
campaign activities.  When early voting laws go into effect, they effectively change how 
parties view the electoral time frame, and some parties may not want to change their 
thinking or mobilization strategies for a number of reasons.  First, political parties, like 
many other organizations, have conducted the business of mobilization geared toward 
election day for over 200 years.  As new early voting laws are passed, there may be some 
reluctance to change the way parties try to mobilize voters.  With early voting, the parties 
have to make new decisions about when to conduct their mobilization activities (e.g., 
television ads, door-to-door contacts, and direct-mail). 
 Second, political parties in states with early voting have to decide how to spend 
their resources in an electoral environment that has more mobilization options compared 
to an electoral environment that has mostly election day voting.  The first reason given in 
the previous paragraph addresses early voting taking up time in the decision-making 
process, where the second reason addresses the actual financial resource drain that early 
voting mobilization can have on an election campaign.  As the interview section will later 
show, there are many new ways to spend mobilization money in a state that allows for 
early voting.  For example, the voter drive rolls need to be updated frequently during the 
early voting period so a certain voter is not contacted after he or she casts a ballot. 
 Third, political parties may prefer standard election day voting because they hold 
a traditional view of election day voting.  Traditional election day voting includes the 
entire voting public gathered at local schools, churches, city halls, and other public places 
to cast ballots.  Traditional election day voting also insures that all voters have access to 
the same information before they cast a ballot.  In traditional election day voting, political 
parties can plan to introduce new information about their candidate or attack the other 
candidate right up to election day.  If early voting laws are in place, parties have a rolling 
target for mobilization based on how many days before election day that early voting 
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starts.  Overall, early voting presents challenges to political parties that, for the reasons 
stated above, could lead parties to have a preference for election day voting. 
The Democrat and Republican View Toward Early Voting 
 Different parties should have different attitudes and goals with regards to early 
voting policies and the electoral consequences of such laws.  Specifically, it would be 
reasonable to assume that Democrats and Republicans would react differently to the 
passage of early voting legislation in their home state.  As with most policies, the parties 
may view the outcomes of early voting policies in different lights.  For example, 
Democrats may view a stimulus bill as a way to raise employment and Republicans may 
view the same bill as a way to strengthen the overall economy. 
Democrats.  Democrats should view early voting policies in a positive light and 
should attempt to use early voting to increase their chances of winning elections.  The 
expanded election period should allow for more mobilization activities for Democrats to 
bring more individuals into the electoral process.  I predict that Democrats will utilize 
early voting to bring in more potential voters that would not have normally voted.  In 
other words, Democrats should view the expanded time period as an opportunity to 
expand their support at the polls through the mobilization of new voters.  Democrats are 
motivated to have a positive view of early voting policy because (1) Democrats think that 
early voting will increase the size of the electorate and (2) Democrats think that the 
expanded electorate will result in a net gain in votes for the Democratic Party.  There is 
some debate about whether an increase in the electorate will translate into increased 
Democratic support.  Knack (1995) examined the size of the electorate after the Motor 
Voter Act was passed and found that the Motor Voter Act had a positive effect on voter 
turnout but did not increase Democratic support.  Stein (1998) examined partisan use of 
early voting and found that more Republicans came out to early vote than did Democrats. 
Republicans.  Republicans also are predicted to view early voting policies as 
positive and attempt to use early voting to increase their chances of winning elections.  
The expanded election period should allow Republicans to bank voters early who would 
have voted on election day.  Republicans are also found to have an advantage in absentee 
voting and may try to support the specific early voting policy they believe to have an 
advantage in (Karp and Banducci, 2001).  I predict that Republicans will utilize early 
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voting to change when individuals choose to cast their ballots, but not attempt to pull in 
new voters.   
Overall, both of the parties view early voting differently, but still in a positive 
light.  The views of each party fall in line with one of the major theories on political 
participation.  The Democrats view early voting in the classical sense as encouraging 
more voters to go to the polls, and Republicans view early voting more in the elitist sense 
with the same voters casting ballots at their convenience.  These views are examined 
further in the interview section of this chapter. 
What if Parties Ignore Early Voting 
 Besides a possible preference for or against early voting, parties may decide not to 
engage in early voting activities even if voters in their state can vote early.  The strategy 
of ignoring early voting options may be useful in a number of different cases.  First, if the 
party in the state does not have the money to spend on early voting mobilization, the 
party will just concentrate on election day and traditional mobilization techniques.  
Second, if the party in the state does not think the race is competitive, then the party will 
spend less money on all aspects of the race and may cut the early voting mobilization 
budget to zero.  Third, if the party in the state does not think that the other party will try 
to use early voting mobilization, the other party may be less inclined to spend resources 
on early voting.  This is the opposite effect of a spending “nuclear arms race” between 
parties where each spends every dollar of funds to try and one-up the other party.  I 
expect this to happen only in states in which early voting is new.  Fourth, other studies of 
increased ease of voting due to the Motor Voter act did not find a partisan advantage after 
the law was in place (Franklin and Grier, 1997).  Parities may see that early voting will 
not help or hurt their electoral chances and choose not to support the legislation while in 
office.  Last, parties may ignore early voting mobilization opportunities due to personal 
views of the individuals running the campaigns.  Some individual candidates may view 
early voting as taking away from the collective act of voting on election day.  For all of 
these reasons, parties may choose to ignore the possibility of early voting and focus only 
on election day voting.  In the next section I examine the question of if and how political 




MOBILIZING THE EARLY VOTE 
 In this section I present a research design and the results of a qualitative analysis 
about the mobilization techniques that parties and groups use during early voting periods 
around the states.  The expansion of the voting period leads to an opportunity for 
mobilization to start much earlier than it does in standard election day voting.  Basically, 
early voting provides incentive for parties and groups to begin well before election day to 
start “banking” votes. 
Research design 
 When new laws and rules are introduced into a political system, the options for 
systematic study of the effects of those laws and rules are limited.  Typically, a statistical 
model is preferred in political science research where large amounts of data are collected. 
In studies of early voting, these data would include how many voters use early voting, 
how much money parties spend on early voting mobilization, what the effects are of each 
mobilization technique.  Because early voting use has been increasing in recent years, the 
data concerning mobilization techniques are not yet known across the 50 states.  This 
section describes a qualitative research design that examines early voting mobilization by 
state political parties.. 
 In this chapter I use a qualitative research design based on interviews as the 
method of data collection.  The target population for my interviews is state party officials 
who have knowledge about the early voting mobilization techniques used by their state 
political parties.  The interview process started with the identification of state party 
election officials from their state party webpage.  Once a party official was found, I sent a 
letter that (1) described my research, (2) included a few of the questions I would ask the 
respondent during the interview, (3) how the respondents would be identified in my 
study, (4) my contact information, and (5) my Louisiana State University Internal Review 
Board information.  The letter was printed on Louisiana State University Department of 
Political Science letterhead.  My sample population for the interviews was made up of 
Republican and Democratic state-level party staff in 25 different states.  Of the 50 
possible interview subjects in my sample population, I completed 12 interviews for a 
response rate of 24%.  Follow up question from the participants were not attempted. 
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 For my research purposes it was not necessary for the initial contact person to be 
my interview subject.  In some cases the party worker with information about early 
voting mobilization would not be the contact person listed on the party webpage.  In 
cases where my introduction letter was addressed to the incorrect individual, I provided a 
new letter to the correct individual either through the mail or sent him or her an electronic 
mail copy of the letter.  This insured that every person contacted for this study had the 
opportunity to read and review the way in which the information generated by the 
interviews would be used.  The title of the individual contacted varies across states and 
parties since many state parties are organized in a different way to meet the needs of the 
specific state population.  The titles of the contacted representatives include campaign 
director, director of voting, and director of voter drives.  My contact strategy was to 
contact the representative highest up on the state party webpage that was directly 
associated with voting or mobilization.  Sometimes I would interview that specific 
individual and frequently I would speak to an individual who worked directly for the 
original contact.  Due to the time frame of the interviews (April to June 2009), most of 
the individuals contacted were with the state party organization during the 2008 
presidential election. 
Due to the variation in state election laws, a classification of states into three 
groups provides a base level of differentiation between the states.  This classification 
provides a way to determine how parties behave in different early voting contexts. 
 The classifications of states are (1) states that have adopted early voting policies 
before the 2000 presidential election, (2) states that have adopted early voting policies 
after the 2000 presidential election, and (3) states that do not have early voting policies.  
This classification is used due to the large number of states that passed early voting 
policies after the 2000 election (see Chapter 2 for a full discussion).  This allows for a 
direct comparison between parties that have had many years to develop a early voting 
mobilization strategy and parties that are relatively new to early voting but still have had 
two presidential elections to implement early voting mobilization (2004 and 2008).  The 
third category, states with no early voting policies, allows for an examination of party 




 A secondary classification used to organize my findings in this section is party of 
the state political representative I interviewed.  This distinction is made to get at the 
differences between parties and their mobilization techniques.  Parties are made up of 
different constituency and parties may use specialized mobilization techniques for each 
group.  For example, Democrats may have ways to contact college students that are 
different from the ways used by Republicans.  When a state was selected for analysis, 
every attempt was made to contact both parties to provide a full picture of the state.   
Interview instrument 
 In this section I present an interview script for my interviews with state party 
representatives.  Interviews were conducted over the telephone with state party 
representatives.  Interviews were scheduled after the introduction letter was sent and a 
week passed in order for the representative to have time to receive and review the 
introduction letter.  Unless the representatives responded to my letter, first contact was 
then made by phone to see of the possible respondent would like to schedule a time for 
the interview and to make sure that the respondent received a letter of introduction.  
Phone interviews were not recorded but notes were taken for each interview.  The 
interviews were conducted from April to June 2009.  The questions focused on the 2008 
presidential campaign and how the state political parties use and view the new early 
voting laws. 
The response rate for this study is 48% with 12 of 25 contacts leading to a 
completed interview.  The sample size and number of contacts per early voting group is 
displayed in Table 3.1.  The interview script with five starting questions is shown in 
Appendix 3.1.The interviews progressed through the five questions based on the 
responses given.  I allowed the five questions to be open-ended questions that provided 
interview subjects the ability to provide information that was directly asked by the 
interview instrument and to provide information that the interview subject thought was 
relevant to the question.  This is important to the theory-building component of this 





 The interview process provided information from both early voting and non-early 
voting states.  The qualitative and quantitative findings I present in this chapter are 
compiled from all of the interviews conducted and do not include the names or states of 
interview subjects.  All interviews were conducted between April and July 2009. 
 Before the discussion of the individual responses, it is necessary to make an 
adjustment to the classification of the state early voting laws.  After the first three 
interviews, it became clear that political parties had not started to mobilize the early vote 
until the last few election cycles.  In other words, parties did not utilize early voting 
mobilization until recently, even though early voting laws were on the books for many 
years.  This makes the distinction between states with old early voting laws and new early 
voting laws less important.  I present the new classification in Table 3.2 that explains the 
breakdown of early voting and non-early voting states.  The change of classification 
shows that early voting mobilization is new, even if the law was in place for many 
previous election years.  The new classification will be used when discussing the findings 
from the five interview questions in this chapter. 
 The findings of the five interview questions are presented in 4 tables and 
summarize the responses of the 12 political party representatives that were contacted.  I 
separate the results into parties in order to examine a party’s motivations for using 
different types of mobilization.   This section also includes examples and a summary of 
the narrative responses from the different party representatives. 
Question 1.  This question centers on mobilization strategies and how political 
parties have possibility changed due to early voting laws.  Based on my discussions, 
parties mainly stick to their traditional mobilization techniques.  One representative 
mentioned, “we have some early voting information on our print.”  When early voting 
was available, our canvassers would tell the contact they could go vote right now.”  
Another said, “early voting was a part of our TV ads.”  Those inclusions are additions to 
standard mobilization techniques, and I do not expect that they will have much of an 
effect on getting party members to the polls early to bank votes.  The exception would be 
the direct contact made from a door-to-door canvass that mentions early voting as a 
current option.  The party worker can add a small reminder to the end of his or her 
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message and see if the individual is interested in voting during the early voting period.  If 
the response is positive, the party worker can hand the potential early voter another flyer 
with specific early voting information such as directions to the nearest polling place and 
voting hours.  This is an example of how early voting can be easily added to traditional 
mobilization techniques.  The next technique discussed by a few of the representatives 
involves combing a political event and voting early where potential voters gather at a 
political event and are encouraged to vote after hearing political speeches.  
A new mobilization technique addressed in my interviews was the combination of 
political speech with early voting on-sight.  This technique involves a political rally 
where the candidate or other party speaker addresses the crowd close to an early voting 
location.  These campaign rallies could also include musical performances or other types 
of entertainment to make the rally more of a show, as well as a political event.  After the 
speech in done the audience is asked to go cast their ballots right away.  This technique 
brings the decision to support a candidate closer in-line with the old style party politics 
model, where parties watched their voters go into the polls with their party ballots.  The 
rally-to-vote technique was one of the more controversial topics the party representatives 
discussed.  One Democrat said, “…it was a way to get a big crowd of voters to see some 
entertainment… and vote.”  In general, the Democratic Party was more in favor of using 
the rally-to-vote technique and the Republican Party was less in favor or it.  One 
Republican representative commented, “…our guy didn’t like the idea of herding the 
people listening to the speech directly into the booth.”  I believe that this feeling of 
hesitation is due to the view that your personal vote should be carefully considered and 
not simply something you decide on after hearing one speech.  Next, I turn to an 
overview of the general responses from Democrats and Republicans about the different 
mobilization techniques used with early voting. 
I display the summary of responses about the early voting mobilization techniques 
in Table 3.3.  Each cell contains the number of mentions for each specific mobilization 
technique and the percentage of representatives from each party who mentioned the 
specific technique.  While I did not code for a overall feel of whether or not party 
representatives liked or disliked early voting, a large majority of the party representatives 
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agreed that early voting laws extended the voting window to provide more opportunities 
for parties to get individuals to the polls. 
 Some of the specific changes in mobilization mentioned by the party 
representatives was a new type of political rally that includes early voting.  This practice 
was described as a regular political rally that takes place in front of or close to an early 
voting polling place.  In this type of rally, the candidate talks directly to the potential 
voters who can then go vote right after the rally.  Each party mentioned the political rally 
technique for mobilizing early voters, with 3 of 5 Democratic party representatives and 2 
of 7 Republican party representatives mentioned this specific technique. 
 Parties and groups use door-to-door techniques during regular elections, but in 
early voting states, they start door-to-door activities sooner.  In Table 3.3 I show that the 
door-to-door early voting technique was used by a majority of Democratic and 
Republican state parties.  Specifically, I find that 6 of the 7 Republican state parties and 4 
of 5 Democratic state parties mentioned that they used door-to-door mobilization. 
In early voting states, parties also move up all voter contact drives, such as the use 
of flyers and phone calls.  I find that both of the parties use flyers with mentions of early 
voting opportunities (Table 3.3).  One of the respondents stated that Labor Day is the 
starting point for mailing flyers in states with early voting.  Historically, Labor Day used 
to mean that the serious Presidential political campaign season could start.  Starting 
mobilization on Labor Day allows parties and groups to get the word out earlier to 
account for the expanded early voting season. 
Phone calls with early voting messages are used by a majority of both parties with 
7 of 7 Republican state parties and 3 of 5 Democratic state parties mentioning that they 
used phone call mobilization techniques with early voting messages.  Again, this is an 
example of how parties are attempting to bank as many voters before election day as 
possible. 
The last mobilization technique that was covered in the interviews was the use of 
targeted early voting mobilization.  This could take the form of going door-to-door, 
phone calls, or flyers, but the technique had to have a specific population of potential 
voters that the party was trying to contact.  These populations were from the prominent 
voter lists from the midterm elections and primary elections.  Targeted mobilization was 
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mentioned as being used by 5 of the 7 Republican state parties and 2 of 5 Democratic 
state parties. 
 Given that many of the changes in mobilization techniques mentioned by the 
interview subjects involve a great deal of time and effort, the interviews provide evidence 
that money is becoming increasingly important for conducting effective campaigns.  One 
of the ways that campaigns that involve early voting are becoming more expensive has to 
do with the cost of election staff.  Because of the dynamic early voting environment, 
there are opportunities for parties to center their mobilization efforts on specific 
individuals.  This targeted early mobilization is possible because some states update their 
early voting records as soon as a ballot is submitted, which is very costly.  This means 
that a political party can check to see which potential voters have cast an early vote and 
which have not.  This allows for well-financed campaigns to update their voter drive lists 
to eliminate those who have cast a ballot, leaving more opportunities to contact potential 
voters.  This requires a campaign that has the recourses to first obtain a voter file and 
constantly update the file as the campaign goes along.  Both parties commented on the 
potential costs of maintaining records.  One Democratic representative said, “we could 
employ more than one person to keep the voter file current.”  Another mentioned 
“staffing becomes critical as early voting opens up.”  Such comments show that early 
voting is contributing to ever increasing need for more money in running campaigns. 
Question 2.  Question two focuses on the differences in mobilization techniques 
between parties.  In Table 3.4, I present the percentage difference between uses of each 
technique shown in Table 3.3.  The major difference between the two parties and their 
mobilization techniques is the use of the political rally to bank early voters, with 
Democratic state parties 31% more likely to use political rallies than Republican state 
parties.  Besides pulling voters to the early polling places, the rallies also are covered by 
media sources whose coverage of the rallies serve to inform potential voters about the 
candidate and their opportunity to early vote.  One of the Republican state party 
representatives commented that the Republican candidates “were hesitant to use this 
technique because their candidate preferred to separate the campaigning and voting parts 
of the election.”  The other major difference between the parties was that the Republican 
parties used phone calls for early voting mobilization 40% more often than the 
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Democratic parties did.  These differences may be due to the level of resources available 
for each party. 
Question 3.  Question three centers on any benefits to individual candidates that 
early voting provides.  In Table 3.5 I show the count and percentages for party 
representatives thinking that early voting helped their candidate.  For the most part, party 
representatives did not think that early voting policies helped their candidate, with only 
14% of Republicans and 40% of Democrats thinking that early voting helped their 
candidate.  Based on the data, representatives thought that adding early voting only added 
more opportunities for all parties and did not help one party over the other.  One of the 
Republican representatives commented that one benefit of early voting was that the top of 
the ticket got an advantage in votes and that there is a roll off for other party candidates 
down the ticket.  I expected to find that strong partisans would be filling out the ballot top 
to bottom as soon as the ballot became available.  This leads to an evening out of the 
overall effectiveness of early voting mobilization techniques.  With both parties not 
seeing a unique advantage to early voting, it is not surprising that in Chapter 2 I do not 
find that one party control of the statehouse leads to passage of early voting policies. 
Question 4.  Question four addresses the use of targeted mobilization during early 
voting campaigns.  Targeting early voters is done through phone calls to remind potential 
voters that early voting is now available.  Table 3.6 shows that 71% of Republicans and 
40% of Democrats used targeted techniques.  One of the Democratic party 
representatives talked about the fact that “primary voters are becoming early voters.”  
This shows support that parties are effective in banking voters well before election day. 
Question 5.  Question five covers many different topics but most responses were 
about early voting leading to difficulty in the party representative’s job.  The difficulty 
comes from the monitoring process used when voters cast early votes. 10 of the 12 
representatives mentioned that early voting basically brings more headaches in that the 
addition of early voting adds the pressure of election day to the entire early voting period. 
An interesting implication of the findings in this chapter is that money in 
campaigns will become more important in elections as more states adopt early voting 
laws.  This effect puts more pressure on candidates to raise enough funds to run a viable 
campaign and raises the cost of doing business for all potential candidates.  While 
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making voting easier for the individual, early voters may be making campaigns more 
dependent on contributions from donors. 
Responses not associated with a specific interview question.  Some of the other 
interesting things that were mentioned in the interviews were the concerns about voter 
fraud and the need for stricter voter identification laws.  Republicans brought up the 
concerns about voter fraud more often than Democrats, with one Republican 
representative saying “the use of absentee ballots are always a potential problem.”  Also a 
concern was raised about multiple voting centers being open in the same community.  
The concern was that it might be possible for someone to cast both an early vote and a 
vote on election day.   
I now close out this chapter with a summary of the findings from the interviews 
and general reflections about the qualitative research process.  The conclusion section 
will also provide me with the opportunity to make further research suggestions for this 
new line of research that is now possible due to the increasing number of election cycles 
that have included parties and groups operating in states that allow for early voting. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The interview process undertaken for this chapter has provided some insights on 
mobilization strategies and early voting.  The role of money appears to be important in 
early voting mobilization.  Staffing of campaigns continues to be a concern for 
candidates, and early voting opportunities place even more pressure on campaigns to 
increase staff than does the standard single election day. 
To further the research presented in this chapter, more interviews with campaign 
staff could be conducted.  In addition, an in-depth, first-hand examination of the 
dynamics of the campaign, similar to Carsey (2000) in his examination of state governors 
races, is appropriate.  This would take considerable time and strong cooperation from one 
or two campaigns.  It is important to develop an account of how campaigns react to 
changes in the voter list and implement new mobilization strategies during the campaign.  
This would allow for a better understanding of how early voting is being used to bank 
voters before election day. Direct observation of the campaign during the early voting 
period would provide a better view of how much time and energy is spent on early voting 
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activities.  This type of study could answer some questions about how often concerns 
about early voting are addressed by the campaign.  For example, is it one person’s job to 
monitor early voting or should the campaign manager and candidate spend time 
conferencing to discuss early voting strategy? 
Another way to further the research done in this chapter would be to examine the 
amount of money spent by parties, candidates, and groups in states with and without early 
voting.  This would allow for an examination of a possible link between early voting 
states and cost of running campaigns.  It would make sense that states with early voting 
would have more costly campaigns than non early voting states, but it would be 
interesting to know by how much and in what areas (e.g., staff and advertizing).  Beyond 
the relative importance and day-to-day emphasis of early voting by the campaign, an 
examination of the financial recourses used on early voting could provide more insight 
into early voting mobilization.  While some campaigns may spend little time on early 
voting talk they may be spending large amounts or a significant percentage of 
mobilization dollars on early voting campaigns. 
This chapter shows that parties are changing and adapting their mobilization 
strategies as a result of early voting.  As more election cycles occur we will be able to 





CHAPTER 4:  WHO ARE EARLY VOTERS?  A DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY  
 
 In this chapter I examine the differences among early voters, election day voters, 
and non-voters by presenting descriptive statistics for these three groups.  In order to 
explain the selection of variables considered in this chapter, I present a discussion of the 
general motivations of individuals that lead to casting a ballot.  This allows me to 
introduce the established motivations for voter turnout, as well as the new concepts and 
variables that will be further considered throughout the remainder of this dissertation.  
This chapter allows for base comparisons of the different voting groups that will show 
that election day voters and early voters are different in specific and predictable ways. 
Moreover, the results of this chapter will guide the selection of variables to be examined 
later in this dissertation. 
 In the first section of this chapter I discuss the different motivations that lead 
individuals to vote.  The purpose of this introductory discussion of voter behavior is to 
provide a baseline that may be referenced in later sections of my dissertation.  Finally, 
before I discuss who early voters are I need to present a discussion of the general 
motivations that lead individuals to vote. 
 
WHAT MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO VOTE? 
 What motivates individuals to vote?  The relative effects of these motivations are 
modeled later in this dissertation (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).  There are a number of 
different motivations that lead individuals to cast a ballot during elections.  The 
motivations I examine here are examples of the established, or most common, 
motivations that have been studied in the political behavior literature.  I also present a 
discussion about the common elements found across the different motivations. 
Psychological motivations 
 The research presented in The American Voter by Campbell et al. (1960) provides 
a new way to view the motivations of individual voters.  The psychological motivation is 
articulated by Campbell et al. (1960), who finds that individuals do not pursue and collect 
a great deal of political information assumed by rational-choice theories (see below).  
This perceived lack of information does not keep individuals from voting in elections; 
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rather Campbell et al. uncovered a psychological motivation for voters to participate in 
U.S. politics.  Many individuals view politics in a manner similar to a sporting event and 
are fans for one party or the other.  This leads individuals to vote for a party or candidate 
with whom they have a psychological connection. 
 Psychological motivations also include party identification, candidate evaluations, 
and issue positions.  Party identification has been addressed as one of the major factors of 
voter turnout (V. O. Key, 1959).  The more an individual feels connected to a specific 
party the more likely he or she is to turnout to vote.  Party identification also has been 
identified as being associated with leaning toward a certain party even with out 
knowledge of the candidates.  For example, a Republican identifier may go into an 
election cycle thinking that he or she will vote for the Republican candidate regardless of 
any other factor. 
 Candidates also have an effect on the psychological motivations of voters.  The 
Obama 2008 campaign is a good example of how individual candidates can have a large 
impact on getting voters to the polls.  For example, many minorities held a strong 
connection with candidate Obama due to perceived similarities in personal backgrounds.  
Candidates can have an effect on voters based on their personal life stories, background, 
and communication skills.  Issue positions also can have an impact on voter turnout.  
When candidates place more emphases on certain issues, voters may be able to make a 
strong psychological connection with the candidate. 
Economic motivations 
 Studies of voters’ economic motivations for political participation stem from the 
seminal work of Downs (1957) in An Economic Theory of Democracy.  Downs applied 
the economic concepts of costs and benefits to politics and democracy.  The economic 
motivations for voting come from the perceived benefits that will be received when a 
voter’s preferred candidate wins the election.  If candidate A pledged to cut taxes by 10% 
and candidate B pledged to cut taxes by 5%, the voter would vote for candidate A (10% 
is greater economic benefit than 5%).  If both of the candidates were pledging the same 
tax cut, the voter could stay home on election day and receive the same benefits.  Similar 
policy positions of the presidential candidates are one issue that is given to explain low 
voter turnout in the U.S. (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Downs (1957) also places 
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electoral decisions in economic terms in his voter turnout formula U=PB-C where U is 
the utility or expected benefit from participation, P is the probability that your vote will 
win the election for your candidate, B is the expected party or candidate differential, and 
C is the cost of participation (e.g., going to the polls and information gathering).  Using 
Downs’ formula when both candidates have the same policy positions, they have the 
same expected benefits and the potential voter decides to abstain from voting because no 
personal benefit comes from the act of participation. 
 Electoral institutions come into the voter turnout discussion because the laws and 
rules of these institutions can make the voting process more or less costly.  Rational 
choice theory suggests that potential voters take into account the perceived benefit of 
voting compared to not voting.  This means that if a voter perceives the economic benefit 
of one candidate winning to be less than the cost of participation, the potential voter will 
stay home and not spend time to vote.  The use of a poll tax is a classic example of 
making the voting process more costly.  The poll tax translated into payment for political 
participation and turnout rates were low for poor populations.  An example of making the 
voting process less costly is the Motor Voter Act (1993), which made registration easier 
by requiring state run offices to have voter registration cards available.  This reduced the 
cost of participation because when someone moved into a new area they could change 
their driver’s license as well as their voter registration at the same time.  New issues with 
cost of participation focus on voter identification requirements that require voters to have 
some type of state ID or a birth certificate to participate.  As with the poll tax, this is 
typically a problem for poor populations. 
Mobilization motivations   
Individuals are motivated to participate in politics by political parties and other 
political actors such as interest groups.  These organizations have an incentive to 
mobilize individual voters in order to win elections (i.e., the primary focus of political 
parties is to win elections).  Mobilization by political parties takes many forms including 
making personal contacts, print advertisements, television advertisements, and rallies.  
These campaign activities raise awareness that an election is coming up and inform the 
public about policy positions of the candidates.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) find that 
reduction in campaign spending on mobilization is one of the predictors of the drop in 
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voter turnout in the last half of the 20th century.  Mobilization by political parties acts to 
cover the costs of gathering information about the candidates.  For example, when 
potential voters view advertisements, they are being given information that can be used in 
the decision making process (Popkin, 1991). 
Social motivations  
Social motivations for participation in politics stem from “overcoming the 
paradoxes of participation and rational ignorance”  (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). 
Individuals with social connections are able to cover the information costs associated 
with political participation.  Studies examine the role of social groups and environments 
in affecting the amount of information gained and the participation rate of individuals 
(Huckfeldt, 1979; Kenney, 1992).  There are two causal paths for social motivation to 
translate into political participation.  First, social connections may motivate individuals to 
participate in politics in a peer pressure manner some friends, relatives, or coworkers 
talking about going out to the polls, leads an individual to vote.  This is a similar 
argument to the circle of virtue discussed by Putnum (1993) where once a certain number 
of individuals vote, it becomes a social tradition.  Second, social connections may 
motivate individuals to participate in politics by helping to overcome the cost of 
participation.  The cost of gaining information is covered when friends and family 
provide campaign information to individuals through everyday conversation.   
State-level motivations   
Environmental factors with which an individual comes in contact during electoral 
cycles has an effect on the individual’s choice of vote.  These factors originate from a 
wide rage of state election laws, state population differences, and electoral schedules.  
State election laws vary drastically in two significant ways.  First, early voting laws 
across states range from liberal (states with early voting for more than 30 days before 
election day) to more strict (states that do not allow for early voting without an excuse).  
Second, registration laws across states range from liberal (no registration requirement) to 
more strict (state requiring registration 30 days before the election).  Liberal registration 
laws make participation easier by lowing the cost of participation (Downs, 1957).  
Further, states with no registration or election day registration have higher levels of voter 
turnout (Timpone, 1998).  States also have different electoral schedules that change the 
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political environment of the state by having more or less political offices up for election 
in a given year.  For example, in a presidential election year a state that also has a U.S. 
senate race and a gubernatorial election will have a very different political environment 
compared to a state with out a senate or gubernatorial race. The number of campaigns in 
a state can change the amount of political spending in the state making it more or less 
likely that an individual will be aware of and participate in the election.  There is a 
participation spill over effect from state-level races into presidential elections and a 
trickle down effect from participation in the presidential election to state-level races. 
Early voting motivations 
Convenience.  Election laws address the issue of when individuals vote, what they 
need to bring to the polling place, when the polls are open, and the amount of time a 
potential voter has to vote.  Early voting is a way to increase the amount of time 
individuals have to vote.  I expect that both individuals who are very busy (i.e., 
individuals who have various other responsibilities or obligations) and individuals who 
are not busy (i.e., individuals who have very few responsibilities or obligations) would 
take advantage of the opportunity to cast an early ballot.  Busy individuals may see early 
voting as a way to help squeeze voting into a busy schedule.  Individuals who are not 
busy and who could vote at almost anytime may see early voting as a way to still choose 
the most convenient time to cast a ballot. 
Low Information Needs.  A low need for information during a campaign may be 
another motivator for early voting.  Individuals who do not require additional time or 
information during the campaign season to make their vote choice may choose to vote 
early because they have no need for more time to gather information.  Highly partisan 
individuals who do not require the entire election period to make their electoral choice 
decision may be motivated to early vote.  This means that there is possibly a large group 
of individuals (i.e., individuals who are highly partisan) who could cast their ballot a year 
before election day and not think about changing their minds.  These individuals are more 
likely to identify themselves as strong partisans who hold strong views concerning the 
differences between Republicans and Democrats.  The converse of this argument should 
also hold, in that, individuals who identify themselves as independents should need the 
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most possible time in order to collect information concerning their electoral decision 
(Flanigan and Zigale, 1994). 
 Mobilization.  Members of social and interest groups may be encouraged to vote 
early by leaders and fellow members of groups with which they are affiliated. The 
traditional voter turnout literature finds that mobilization is a strong predictor of voting 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  In terms of early voting, groups may encourage 
potential voters to cast an early ballot in order to bank votes before election day.  
Banking early voters can maximize the group’s effectiveness by reducing the chance that 
voters find themselves too busy on election day to vote.  Groups are also trying to reduce 
uncertainty but getting supporters to the polls early and not counting on individuals to get 
to the polls on election day where something expected comes up and the potential voter is 
too busy.  Members of groups also may find out about early voting from other members 
in their group.  Information on early voting should be disseminated through groups in a 
similar manner as other political information. 
 Common elements of voter motivation.  Some motivations for political 
participation overlap.  For example, registration laws have a cost effect that is included in 
rational choice theory and registration laws are a state-level factor.  This means that the 
motivation to early vote is make up of state-level motivations (early voting laws are 
passed at the state-level) and rational choice motivations (early voting laws decrease 
costs).  There also are overlaps between social and economic motivations in voter 
turnout.  Social and economic motivations are related through the cost saving nature of 
information that being part of a social group provides.  Information gained through social 
acquaintances is information that does not need to be obtained through personal effort.  
The intersection of mobilization and economic motivations includes the actions of 
political parties (i.e., campaign ads and direct mail) by reducing the cost of participation 
(i.e., economic cost of collecting information).  All three categories of early voting 
motivations (convenience, low-information needs, and mobilization) reduce the costs of 
participation.  Overall, the motivations for voting and early voting are related and overlap 
in many ways. 
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 These motivations provide baseline explanations as to why individuals choose to 
participate in elections or choose to stay at home.  In the remainder of this dissertation I 
examine these motivations in much more detail.  These motivations will also serve as a 
rationale for the rest of this chapter in determining any differences in psychological, 
economic, political, demographic, and state-level factors that will provide evidence about 
differences between early voters, election day voters, and non-voters. 
 
ARE EARLY VOTERS DIFFERENT? 
 There are numerous studies that examine the many different factors that influence 
individual-level voter turnout.  In this I section examine the possible differences across 
groups of voters, specifically differences across early voters, election day voters, and 
non-voters.  Differences in the groups of voters are presented by comparing means and 
other descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables that are further 
examined later in this dissertation.  The independent and dependent variables are grouped 
into the motivation categories of convenience, low-information needs, and mobilization. 
The statistics used in this chapter are the means of the variables from the three 
different categories of motivations.  Once the means are calculated, I present a T-ratio, or 
a T-test, and an ANOVA test.  The T-test statistic indicates if there is a significant 
difference between the two groups (early voters and election day voters) and the ANOVA 
statistic indicates if there is a signification difference between the three groups (early 
voters, election day voters, and non-voters).  The T-test and the ANOVA are used as a 
first overview for the effects of each individual variable on early voting and election day 
voting.  I use multivariate statistics to predict differences in voting behavior in later 
chapters of this dissertation (see Chapter 5 and 6). 
 The data summary table Appendix 4.1 shows the variables used to predict 
political behaviors.  The three categories of variables use to predict political behaviors are 
demographic factors (e.g., measures of income and education), state-level factors (e.g., 
early voting laws, and the registration process), and political attitude variables (e.g., party 
identification and view of the voting process). 
The data summary table also includes the measurement of each variable and its 
source.  In Table 4.1, I report the means for early voters, election day voters, and non-
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voters and an ANOVA test (F-ratio) of significance for the difference in means among 
early voters, election day voters, and non-voter groups.  This table includes cases from a 
nationally representative data set that includes individuals who were asked on or after 
election day if they cast a vote in the 2004 presidential election.  Individuals who were 
surveyed fall either into the early voter, election day voter, or non-voter category.  Table 
4.1 shows the differences in the mean values of individuals who early voted, election day 
voted, and who did not vote.  The findings from the ANOVA analysis provide evidence 
that the three groups (i.e., early voters, election day voters, and non-voters are 
significantly different across demographic, political, and state-level variables.  This 
analysis does not test any causality between the independent variables and voting 
classification (early voting, election day voting, and non-voting).  The causal models are 
the focus of Chapters 5 and 6.  The focus of this chapter is to establish that there are 
significant differences among groups of voters. 
Table 4.2 reports a means test (T-test) between the early voters and election day 
voters groups.  This table shows cases that only include individuals who voted in the 
2004 presidential election.  Voters are coded as early voters if they cast a vote any time 
before election day and coded as an election day vote if they cast a vote on election day.  
This table addresses similarities and differences between early and election day voters.  
The findings shown in Table 4.2 are the most salient in this chapter because they show a 
comparison of individuals from the similar categories of early voter and election day 
voter.  This table addresses questions about how early voters are different from election 
day voters. 
In this chapter ANOVA analyses and T-tests are used to determine any significant 
differences between early voters, election day voters, and non-voters across one variable 
at a time.  Multivariate analysis using all variables from the three categories of variables 
to determine significant differences between early voters and election day voters is 
conducted in other sections of this dissertation (see Chapters 5 and 6).  The ANOVA 
analyses and T-tests used in this chapter provide a baseline analysis of potential 





 The data set that I use in this chapter, and for the rest of this dissertation, is 
compiled from many different sources.  First, the individual level data come from a 
nationally representative sample population, the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study 
(NAES) data set.  The NAES data set is different from the American National Election 
Study (ANES) in that the NAES polls the U.S. electorate during the entire presidential 
election cycle.  For example, the 2004 NAES includes responses from the primaries in 
early and late primary states, as well as questions that address the conventions and the 
presidential debates.  Over this same time period the ANES conducts many fewer polls 
with fewer overall responses.  Included in the NAES data set is a 2004 presidential 
election poll that is similar to the ANES poll but that contains more overall cases as well 
as more examples of early voting.  The large number of early voting cases is of particular 
interest for this dissertation.  The more cases of early voting that can be included in 
models, the more accurate, generalizable, and more predictive my estimations become.  
This is the primary reason for using the NAES 2004 data set over the ANES 2004 data 
set. 
Second, the data that measure state-level factors are obtained from various 
sources and are compiled by the author (see Appendix 4.1 for a detailed breakdown of the 
measures and sources).  The state-level measures were collected for the 2004 presidential 
election year.  The state-level measures come from the Politics of American States, Book 
of the States, and the National Council of State Legislatures (ncsl.org) (Kinsky 2005).  
The state-level measures include measures of state party competition, statewide races, 
dollars spent on political spending per capita, registration closing date, and early voting 
policies.  These data are integrated into the data from the NAES by assigning each 
measure to an individual case found in the NAES data set.  I merge the state-level 
measures with the individual level data.  This was done by coding each individual by 
state and then assigning individuals the appropriate state-level variables.  This means that 
the individual cases contain data at the individual level (e.g., demographics and behaviors 
of the individual) and at the aggregate level (e.g., state political spending and early voting 
policies).  For example, all the individuals who reside in Florida are assigned the same 
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figure for dollars spent on political spending per capita.  In the next section of this 
chapter I present the findings of the summary statistics. 
  
FINDINGS 
 I present the findings from this chapter in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.  These two 
tables show the differences between early voters, election day voters, and non-voters.  
The variables are organized into the three categories of variables, which are demographic, 
political, and state-level variables.  These variables are further examined in Chapter 5 and 
6 of this dissertation. 
In Table 4.1 I show the mean values and the F-statistics of the variables across 
early voting, election day voting, and non-voting.  The F-statistic compares means across 
different groups and determines if the groups are significantly different.  Those 
comparisons are used to determine if early voters, election day voters, and non-voters 
form significantly different groups.  The ANOVA test is used to determine if the means 
of each group are the same this test does not provide evidence as to which group mean is 
higher or lower than other groups  (e.g., ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that the mean 
of early voters equals the mean of election day voters equals the mean of non-voters).  
The F-statistics in Table 4.1 show that a majority of the variables across all the categories 
are significant.  The significant demographic variables are age, income, education, 
married, black, Hispanic, union, network news viewership, cable news viewership, 
number of kids, and part time employment.  The significance of the demographic 
variables shows that early voters, election day voter, and non-voters are distinct groups. 
Looking at the means in Table 4.1, early voters are on average 4 years older than 
election day voters and 12 years older than non-voters.  Age appears to be correlated with 
both types of political participation with older individuals associated with election day 
voting and early voting.  Income, education, and married all show a similar grouping of 
means with early voters and election day voters having means close to one another and 
non-voters having lower average values.  This provides some evidence that while some 
means are different across all three groups, other measures form a participation group 
(election day voter and early voter) and a non-participation group (non-voter). 
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The mean values for black provide a unique view of early voters.  The means for 
early voting and non-voting are the same and the mean for election day voting is less.  
This means that more African Americans use early voting than election day voting.  This 
is unexpected since I believed that the mean values would rise or fall across the three 
categories, with non-voter being a relatively low mean value to election day voter having 
a slightly higher mean value to early voter having the highest mean value.  The mean 
values of black suggest that early voting opportunities may be pulling African American 
voters to the polls. 
The three community type variables show a different type of relationship between 
the means.  The variables urban and suburban have almost the same means across all the 
three categories.  This implies that type of community does not affect the decision to vote 
or vote early. 
The means for the number of kids shows that early voters have on average the 
fewest children (about 2/3 of a child), election day voters have almost one child, and non-
voters have over one child.  Due to the convenience of early voting, I would expect that 
families with more children to be more likely to use early voting, however, the findings 
in Table 4.1 show evidence that families with more children are less likely to vote early 
or on election day.  That finding makes sense when considering that common reason non-
voters give for not voting is being too busy.  Overall there appear to be examples of the 
three groups being the same (i.e., the means for early voters, election day voters, and non-
voters are the same), and a few cases where only early voters and non-voters are similar.  
When the means of early voters and non-voters are the same it suggests that early voting 
policies are bringing in individuals who are not typical or traditional voters. 
The significant variables in the political variables category are belief that it is 
American to vote, I feel guilty if I don’t vote, elections make a difference, and party 
strength.  The non-significant coefficients from the political variables category are how 
soon mind was made up, Bush vote, my vote will be counted accurately, and ideology 
folded.  Three of the four non-significant findings (i.e., how soon mind was made up, 
Bush vote, and my vote will be counted accurately) did not include observations from 
non-voters and were dropped because individuals who did not vote were not asked these 
three questions.  The non-significant finding for the Bush variable suggests that there was 
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not a political advantage for early voting in the 2004 presidential election.  Also, early 
voting does not appear to be only for individuals who made up their minds early in the 
campaign season with little difference in means for the how soon mind was made up 
variable.  Lastly, the ideology and party strength variables do not have different means 
between the early and election day voters.  Again this suggests that early voters and 
election day voters have similar political views and opinions. 
I find that all the state-level variables, with one exception, are significant and 
form three different groups.  The state-level variables that are significant include 
registration-closing date, number of ballot measures, Governors race, Republican per 
capita spending, Democratic per capita spending, state population, and number of 
statewide elections.  The only non-significant state-level variable is the Senate race 
dummy variable, although the aggregate number of state-level elections is significant.  
These variables also are used in the next two chapters of this dissertation. 
The overall impression gained from the F-statistics when examining early voters, 
election day voters, and non-voters is that there are significant differences between these 
three groups.  The F-statistics provide evidence that the groups are different from one 
another but it can not inform us about any causal influences of the individual variable in 
predicting which group the individual will belong to.  The casual relationships are 
examined in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this dissertation.  Two of the three different 
groups are compared in the next section using a T-test to see if there are significant 
differences between the two groups of voters. 
The two groups I compare in Table 4.2 are all individuals who cast an early vote 
and all individuals who cast an election day vote.  This excludes all non-voters 
considered in Table 4.1.  This examination of only voters allows for comparison across 
type of voter.  This is important to the examination of early voting because there are 
questions about who is taking advantage of early voting opportunities.  Specifically, are 
the early voters different from election day voters, and if there are differences between 
the two groups, what are the demographic, political, and state-level differences?  The 
three groups of variables from the last section carry over to this section as well (i.e., 
demographic, political, and state-level variables). 
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I present the T-test findings in Table 4.2 and find that there are fewer differences 
between the two groups (early voters and election day voter) then there are among all 
three groups (early voters, election day voters, non-voters).  First, demographic variables 
that predicted differences between groups are age, urban, suburban, and evangelical 
church membership.  The variable age falls in line with the belief that older voters have 
more free time and would use that time to get voting out of the way before the election.  I 
find that urban voters are more likely to early vote and suburban voters are less likely to 
early vote.  I would expect that urban voters would be likely to early vote if potential 
voters were able to walk past potential polling places for a week or so.  The suburban 
negative value means that on average suburban voters are more likely to vote on election 
day.  Due to this finding, I would expect that suburban voters are busy and try to take 
advantage of the opportunity to cast an early ballot.  Evangelical church group 
membership also is positive meaning that evangelicals are more likely to cast an early 
ballot.  This is expected in that any group will try to mobilize its members and get them 
to the polls early. 
None of the political variables were found to separate the early voters and the 
election day voters.  This is an unexpected result with some of the variables including 
party strength and time when mind was made up on vote choice.  These are the voters 
that I expected to utilize early voting since they are the individuals who know who they 
will vote for before the party conventions have passed. 
Differences between early and election day voters are found in the state-level 
variables.  Those variables are registration closing date, state social capital, number of 
ballot initiatives, Senate race taking place, Republican spending, and number of state 
wide elections.  The significance of registration closing date shows that when registration 
closes closer to election day, voters choose to early vote.   The number of ballots leading 
to less early voting where individuals may need the entire election period to decided on 
all of the ballot propositions.  Also, the number of statewide elections may lead voters to 
take the entire election cycle to gain information and make a voting decision. 
The typical early voter.  Before moving on to a further examination of the 
individual effects of each variable in a multivariate context, I present a composite of the 
typical early voter based on the T-tests in Table 4.2.  While there are only a few variables 
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that were significant at the .05 level or above, there are still enough to make a general 
profile of an early voter.  There were few demographic differences found between early 
voters and election day voters with early voters being older and urban.  This provides a 
picture of early voters being older Americans who would have a shorter distance to travel 
to the polls due to living in an urban environment.  Older voters also include senior 
citizens who are more likely to vote, early or otherwise, than younger citizens.  I view the 
identification of older voters and voters who live in an urban environment as collecting 
low hanging fruit on the early voting tree because it is expected that both variables would 
lead to early voting due to the high participation rates of older voters and the ease at 
which it is to get around in a city.  Individuals living in the rural and suburban 
environments have more physical distance to cover between their job or residents and the 
polling place and previous research has found that commuting distance to the polling 
place was related to participation rates (Haspel, Moshe, Knotts, and Gibbs, 2005). 
The significant state-level variables, registration closing date, statewide elections, 
and number of ballot initiatives, suggests what a typical early voter is exposed to during a 
campaign.  The state-level variables show that the typical early voter resides in a state 
that has an early registration closing date.  This means that early voters have to plan 
ahead when casting their ballots due to the closing off of registration earlier in the 
election cycle.  I view this finding as evidence that early voters are individuals who 
gather information on where early voting places are and then plan a time to early vote.  In 
other words, early voters are individuals who plan ahead.  Table 4.2 shows that the 
number of ballot initiatives, republican political spending, and number of statewide races 
all have a negative effect on early voting, meaning that people residing in states with high 
numbers of ballot initiatives, republican political spending, and number of statewide 
races are more likely to vote on election day.  I read these results as evidence that 
individuals who have more electoral choices to make during the election (e.g., more 
ballot initiatives and statewide races) and information (e.g., political spending) will need 
to spend more time thinking over their electoral choices.  Basically, the more political 
choices that individuals need to make, the longer the time frame they need to consider the 
options.  I think this is largely the case in states with a high number of ballot measures up 
for consideration.  While early voting provides opportunity for people who are ready to 
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vote, some individuals may need to take more time and have to vote on election day.  
These issues are addressed the next chapter of this dissertation and examine the effects of 
different variables in a multivariate context. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I present data that show at the individual variable level, there are 
differences between early voters and election day voters.  These differences will be 
examined throughout the remainder of this dissertation.  This examination of the 
differences between early voters and election day voters will help guide the development 
of theories and hypotheses about what type of individual chooses to cast an early ballot.  
Based on the F-statistic and T-test results, the differences between early voters and 
election day voters include individual demographic factors, political factors, and state-
level contextual factors.  This provides evidence that the impact of early voting laws are 
not restricted to one group of voters. 
 The significant state-level variables support the idea that context can have an 
impact on voters getting to the polls.  The addition of contextual factors to the voter 
turnout models has added to the traditional list of demographic, political factors, and 
state-level factors.  Some studies have added contextual information to voter turnout 
models by integrating state or congressional district into turnout models.  The addition of 
context allows for more variation to be explained through the addition of local factors 
that now appear to have an effect on turnout (i.e., number of ballot measures and early 
voting policies).  The F-statistics provide the foundation that there are three groups of 
voting behaviors and that the three groups have factors that predict across the three 
groups (i.e., education, income, and age).  The limits of this chapter come from the 
neutrally of the statistics in terms of making any causal hypotheses that test the 
relationships between the groups of variables and casting an early vote or an election day 
vote. 
The potential causal relationships are specifically addressed in Chapter 5 
(demographic, political, and state-level variables) and Chapter 6 (demographic, and state-
level variables).  Moving on from this chapter, I will begin to examine the possible 
determents that separate the early voters from election day voters.  
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CHAPTER 5:  WHO VOTES EARLY? 
 
As new election procedures, such as early voting laws, are implemented, it is 
expected that some individuals will choose to change the way that they cast a ballot and 
some will continue to vote as they have previously (i.e., on election day).  With the 
advent of the various forms of early voting, potential voters are faced with two choices.  
The first is the choice between voting and not voting. This choice is one of the most 
studied in the political behavior literature.  I address the effects of early voting on voter 
turnout in the next chapter of the dissertation.  In this chapter I address issues related to 
when a person casts a vote rather than if a person casts a vote. 
 The literature on when individuals choose to vote is relatively new.  Before early 
voting was common, individuals were faced with the single decision of whether or not to 
vote on election day. Now, with expanded voting windows and alternative voting 
methods, individuals have the opportunity to vote weeks before election day.  Voters also 
have options to cast a ballot in different ways.  Although the literature on when individual 
voters choose to go to the polls is new, there is research that addresses the question of 
how individuals decide on the method that they will use to vote.  In this chapter I do not 
examine early voting in terms of when individuals decide to vote, but rather I examine 
the question of when individuals cast their ballots, either before or on election day. 
 In this chapter I examine the timing decision based on the opportunity for early 
voting.  Due to the changes in early voting laws, I expect that certain types of individuals 
will be more likely to choose to vote before election day.  In this chapter I model the 
differences between early voters, election day voters, and non-voters. 
 
THE LITERATURE ON EARLY VOTING 
Several studies of early, or pre-election day, voting have been conducted prior to 
the recent liberalization of state election laws (Stein, 1998).  Many of the studies on early 
voting concentrate on one form of early voting, such as voting by mail (Berinsky, Burns, 
and Traugott, 2001) or in-person early voting (Neely and Richardson, 2001; Stein, 1998; 
Stein, Garcia, and Monet, 1997).  While these studies provide an examination of the 
effects of one type of early voting on voter turnout and composition of the electorate, 
 
	94
they do not allow for a comparison to be made across modes of early voting.  In this 
chapter I examine early voting as in-person early voting and mail-in absentee voting.  
Differences between these two modes of early voting may provide insight into who 
chooses to vote early and what mode of voting they use when given different voting 
options. 
Local Studies of Early Voting 
 Studies on early voting have focused on a single county or state.  For example, 
Neely and Richardson (2001) use Knox County in Tennessee and Stein (1998) uses 
Texas as the populations of study.  Findings from these studies provide evidence that 
highly partisan voters and voters that live in areas with high levels of partisan 
mobilization are more likely to cast an early ballot.  Because of the specific contexts, 
such studies do not allow scholars to effectively generalize their findings to the U.S. 
population as a whole.  A larger sample size that includes individuals from a diverse set 
of states would better represent the total U.S. population and would permit researchers to 
make stronger generalizations and test results from previous studies.   
In this chapter I use a national sample size that provides a more complete picture 
of how Americans use early voting while accounting for state-level differences.  With 
more states now allowing for early voting, it is possible to observe the effects of early 
voting in a national context.  The studies discussed here help with the understanding of 
what type of voter uses early voting and only appear outdated now because the early 
voting phenomenon has spread to many other states.  The expansion of early voting 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation means that early voting has also grown from a 
state and local political behavior to a national one.  In this chapter I examine early voting 
using a national sample while controlling for state-level effects. 
Levels of Early Voting 
Studies on early voting have been conducted at two distinct levels of analysis, the 
aggregate and individual level.  Typically, questions concerning the implementation of 
early voting policies to increase voter turnout have used an aggregate unit of analysis, 
using data at the precinct level (Karp and Banducci, 2000) or county level (Stein and 
Garcia-Monet, 1997) to provide evidence for an overall effect of new electoral laws in 
specific contexts.  Karp and Banducci (2000) find that the adoption of all mail-in voting 
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increased voter turnout in Oregon’s low stimulus elections.  Stein and Garcia-Monet, 
(1997) find that (1) the county percentage of Hispanics, change in population, number of 
non-traditional early voting sites, and median home value are positively related to the 
percentage of county early voting turnout and that (2) the percentage of early voter 
turnout increases overall county turnout.  These studies provide evidence that early 
voting policies do have an effect on aggregate voting behavior.  Since early voting 
policies have been found to affect early voting behavior at the aggregate level, it seems 
reasonable that early voting policies could affect behavior at the individual level. 
Stein (1998) uses an individual-level analysis to address questions concerning the 
characteristics of individuals who use early voting (e.g., demographic factors such as 
income and education).  Neely and Richardson (2001) use an individual-level analysis to 
examine the degree to which early voters are similar to election day voters in terms of 
demographic and political factors.  Those studies find that early voters are more partisan, 
more ideological, older, wealthy, and are individuals who take a great interest in politics 
(Stein, 1998), and the major difference between early voters and election day voters is 
that early voters feel that the election is more important (Neely and Richardson, 2001).  
While these studies examine early voting at the state and local level I examine early 
voting at the national-level.  These studies provide the foundations for individual-level 
early voting studies by accounting for the attributes of early and election day voters that 
can be used in an national-level analysis.  The overall findings suggest that early voting is 
allowing traditional voters to take advantage of the new process of early voting rather 
than bringing new voters into the political process. 
Studies of both individual-level and aggregate-level voting address different types 
of questions about U.S. democracy, and the early voting studies also address these 
questions.  Aggregate studies of voter turnout find that the U.S. has low levels of voter 
turnout (Franklin, 1996).  Low aggregate turnout may cause representatives to represent 
only those who choose to vote rather than the population they represent.  Due to high 
participation rates among the wealthy legislators tend to focus on the wealthy while 
crafting legislation (Bartels, 2010; Gilens, 2000; Griffin and Newman, 2008).  Individual 
studies of voter turnout can predict what individual qualities, views, or demographic 
factors predict individual voting.  When certain types of demographic factors keep arising 
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as predictors of voting (e.g., education and income), they suggest that the composition of 
the electorate may be significantly different from the general population.  This is 
important because low levels of voter turnout may lead to undemocratic outcomes in 
policy.  Both the individual and aggregate level of analysis provides the opportunity to 
examine different questions about the form of U.S. democracy.  In this chapter I will 
focus on the individual-level effects on who and what type of early voting method voters 
use. 
Mobilization in Early Voting 
Little work has been done to address the effects of mobilization on early voting.  
Because scholars use the state or local unit of analysis, it is difficult to show statistical 
evidence of a mobilization effect when the individuals in the sample are assumed to 
receive the same campaign information.  Aggregate measures of mobilization, such as 
campaign spending, can be accounted for at the state-level, but it is important to note that 
not every individual will see the same level of advertising.  Neely and Richardson (2001) 
do not address this issue because many contextual variables at local and state-levels (e.g., 
political advertising, other elections on the ballot, and campaign spending) are held 
constant due to overlapping media markets and close geographic proximity of individuals 
in the sample.  Neely and Richardson use a county level analysis to strengthen the 
amount of statistical control while at the same time making it more difficult to generalize 
the findings to other contexts.  The use of the local level allows for statistical control 
concerning mobilization, but it does not allow for the examination of the effects of 
mobilization on early voting.  This is similar to the problems associated with case studies 
that focus on a few observations in that they allow for in-depth analysis for a few cases 
but do not allow for generalization to other sample populations. 
The importance of mobilization influences is most associated with Rosenstone 
and Hansen’s (1993) mobilization theory, which suggests that the decrease they find in 
political participation is largely due to the decrease in mobilization by political parties 
that in turn increase the cost of participation to the individual citizen.  Rosentstone and 
Hansen (1993) examine the effects of mobilization through survey questions pertaining to 
party contact.  The survey questions divide the sample population into two groups, one 
group that has been contacted by a party and one group that has not.  In the present 
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chapter I account for mobilization by examining individuals who receive large amounts 
of mobilization (e.g., strong partisans, individuals who receive political messages, and 
group members) and individuals who receive low amounts of mobilization (e.g., 
Independents, individuals who did not receive political messages, and individuals who do 
not obtain news).   
Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) mobilization theory of political participation is 
of particular importance in the context of early voting due to the changing nature of 
elections with the expanded use of early voting.  Before early voting, parties and groups 
had one target and all of their mobilization efforts were, by default, centered on election 
day.  When the election period expands to more days than election day, the costs and 
benefits of mobilization change based on the number of ways voters can cast a ballot and 
the number of days before an election a vote can be cast.  If voters have a full month 
before election day to vote early, parties and groups will have to rethink how they contact 
potential voters.  This chapter examines the effectiveness of mobilization where Chapter 
3 of this dissertation concentrates on the techniques used by parties to mobilize early 
voters. 
Timing of Voter Decision Making 
 One of the issues related to early voting is the ability of voters to make their vote 
choice decision before election day.  Alvarez (1998) describes the timing of the vote 
choice decision as a function of uncertainty.  Voters do not feel comfortable with 
deciding who to vote for until a certainty threshold is met.  This threshold is reached in 
different ways.  Alvarez utilizes a Bayesian learning model to predict when an individual 
reaches the threshold.  Other scholars use a probability model that takes into account 
voters “core political beliefs, their level of political engagement, and whether they have 
been exposed to political mobilization efforts” (Gronke and Toffey, 2008). 
 One of the major controversies surrounding the use of early voting is whether or 
not the electorate needs a full campaign cycle to be completed before making an 
informed decision about who to vote for.  The literature on voter information includes a 
debate about how individuals process information and if democratic outcomes result on 
the amount of information individuals receive.  The literature on voter information 
originated in the 1960’s with Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) in The 
 
	98
American Voter in which they examine the electorate as individuals.  They found low 
levels of both received information and interest about politics throughout the electorate.  
The scholarly literature looks at this problem in two different ways. 
First, the effects of information on the aggregate of voters are considered.  Page 
and Shapiro (1992) find that the aggregate public opinion of the electorate is stable and 
“rational.”  This finding supports the view that even if some of the individuals in the 
electorate make the wrong decision, they will effectively cancel each other due to random 
error.  Althaus (1998) finds that there are information asymmetries across demographic 
levels that cause aggregate preferences to be inaccurate and potentially undemocratic.  
These information asymmetries occur when predictable groups of individuals, who are 
more likely to cast ballots, have more information.  This translates into a political bias 
towards individuals who have more political information. 
Second, effects of information on the individual are considered.  Lau and 
Redlawsk (1997) explore the effects of information on the individual and find that across 
the 1972 to 1988 presidential elections, voters overall accuracy was around 80%.  This 
study assigned candidate preferences based on individuals who had similar demographic 
characteristics.  This means that individuals voted 80% of the time with their predicted 
correct vote. 
 The literature on voter information highlights the complexity of the way in which 
information availability affects electoral outcomes.  The introduction of early voting 
introduces another dimension to the examination of the effects of voter information on 
electoral outcomes.  There are three possible effects early voting could have on how voter 
information effects electoral outcomes.  The three effects are no effect, a negative effect, 
or a positive effect. 
An argument for early voting having no effect on voter information and electoral 
outcomes is that early voting only moves the date of vote and does not change any other 
electoral behavior of the voter.  Voters still acquire all the information they need and cast 
their ballots during the period.  An argument for early voting having a negative effect on 
voter information and electoral outcomes is that the shortened time period could lead to 
less time for information collection, which could lead to poor voting choices.  
Information that becomes available after an early vote is cast could cause a voter to 
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become unhappy with his or her vote choice.  In this case, early voting would prevent a 
voter from gathering adequate information and cause a poor vote choice.  An argument 
for early voting having a positive effect on voter information and electoral outcomes is 
that as parties and groups sent out information to coincide with the expanded election 
period, early voting may produce more information for a longer time frame during the 
election.  Overall, early voting is unique because individuals get to choose when they 
vote.  Some people choose to wait to the last minute and vote on election day and others 
choose to vote as soon as early voting polls open. 
Summary of Early Voting Literature 
 Examinations of the early voting literature show that there are significant 
differences between election day voters and early voters.  These differences are related to 
political and personal factors.  Political factors include the individuals political attitudes 
related to vote choice, namely strength of partisanship (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and 
Miller, 2008).  Personal factors include income, education, and age (Stein, 1998).  The 
early voting literature also shows that there is evidence that early voting leads to a small, 
but significant, increase in voter turnout (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller, 
2008).   
 There are many factors related to the choice to early vote that have not been fully 
addressed in the early voting literature.  The role of group mobilization has not been 
examined, particularly in how interest groups are effective in influencing individuals to 
vote early or on election day.  Although early voting has been examined in the context of 
state and local elections, a national examination of early voting that addresses issues 
present across states has not been done.  For example, states with no registration may 
have high levels of early voting and state with strict registration laws may have lower 
levels of early voting. 
This dissertation addresses issues related to early voting by utilizing nationally 
representative data sets, which allow me to explore the effects of individual and state-
level factors on early voting.  Specifically, the use of a large number of early voting cases 
allows for the examination of factors that are different across states.  Differences across 
the states in early voting policy are examined.  The inclusion of different state factors 
also provides an opportunity to test findings from the current early voting literature. 
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The variable names and coding for these variables are listed in Appendix 5.1. The 
data set I use in this paper is compiled from different sources.  First, the individual level 
data come from a nationally representative sample population, the 2004 National 
Annenberg Election Study (NAES) data set. The NAES data is a collection a data from 
the 2004 presidential election period starting during the pre-primary season in the fall of 
2003 and continuing through the general election in the fall of 2004.  In this chapter I 
only use observations from the 2004 general election time frame (i.e., from October 2004 
to November 2004). The portion of the data set that is not used includes observations 
from the 2004 primary elections, national party conventions, and the 2004 presidential 
debates. 
Second, the data for state-level variables come from various sources and are 
compiled by the author.  The state-level measures are collected for the presidential 
election year 2004.  These state-level measures are accounted for later in this chapter 
through the use of a cluster by state option in Stata, which allows for the state-level 
variables to be controlled and accounted for across an individual-level analysis.  
 
THEORY OF EARLY VOTING 
Why Do Voters Vote Early? 
 In this chapter I discuss and present hypotheses relating to why individuals would 
choose to cast an early ballot and if the availability of early voting increases the 
probability of an individual voting.  Each hypothesis is tested using multivariate 
statistical analysis.  Many of the variables examined have already been shown in the 
literature to be significant predictors of individual political participation, and in this 
research I incorporate those findings into my statistical models. 
Convenience 
Election laws address the issues of when individuals vote, what they need to bring 
to the polling place, when the polls are open, and how many opportunities a potential 
voter has to vote.  Early voting, specifically, is a way to increase the number of 
opportunities that individuals have to vote.  I predict that individuals who are very busy 
(i.e., individuals who have various other responsibilities or obligations) and individuals 
who are not busy at all (i.e., individuals who have very few responsibilities or 
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obligations) would be likely to take advantage of the opportunity to cast an early ballot.  
Based on the non-linear relationship between use of early voting and level of personal 
activity, I model this relationship using both the busy variable and the square of the 
composite busy variable.  The logic behind there being a connection between individuals 
being very busy or not busy at all and casting an early ballot is that individuals who are 
busy know that they are more likely to be busy on election day and may miss casting a 
ballot.  These individuals look ahead and choose to bank their vote during the early 
voting period.  On the other hand, individuals who are not busy have the opportunity to 
vote at almost any time due to their few responsibilities or obligations and will choose the 
most convenient time to cast an early ballot.  The specific hypotheses relating to the 
placement of individuals on the busy – not busy scale are tested using many different 
variables, some of which represent busy potential early voters and others represent non-
busy early voters. 
 Citizens who have busy schedules may benefit from the increased opportunity to 
cast a ballot over an extended voting period.  Specifically, individuals who have full time 
jobs or family obligations may be able to fit voting into their busy schedules if they have 
more than one day to vote.  The real advantage for individuals who live in early voting 
states is that once they decide to vote, they have many different chances to cast a ballot. 
 
H1A:  Individuals residing in early-voting states who have full time jobs will be 
more likely to cast an early vote than other individuals. 
H1B:  Individuals residing in early-voting states who are married will be more 
likely to cast an early vote than other individuals. 
H1C:  Individuals residing in early-voting states who have children will be more 
likely to cast an early vote than other individuals. 
 
There is a different way to look at the possible avenues to early voting besides 
convenience voting by those individuals who are busy.  Individuals who do not have busy 
schedules also may utilize the convenience of early voting.  This potential group of early 




H1D:  Individuals residing in early-voting states who are elderly or retired will be 
more likely to utilize early voting than other individuals. 
 
The last two hypotheses related to convenience are associated with physical 
proximity to the polling place.  Individuals who find themselves close to an early voting 
place before election day could eliminate an extra trip back to the polls on election day if 
they utilized early voting. 
Voters who reside in rural areas also may take advantage of the convenience of 
early voting.  Due to the large commuting time between home and the town, residents of 
rural areas should be more likely to utilize early voting to save both time, in terms of 
driving, and money, in terms of gas.   
 
H1G:  Individuals residing in early-voting states and who reside in rural areas will 
be more likely to utilize early voting than other individuals. 
 
Low Information Needs 
 Individuals who do not require additional time or information during the 
campaign season to make their vote choice should be more likely to cast an early vote.  
There are different causal paths that would lead early deciders to become early voters.  
First, highly partisan individuals do not require the entire election period to make their 
electoral choice decision.  Campbell et al. (1960) finds that the highly partisan electorate 
does not need campaign events, debates, or political ads to obtain information on how to 
vote.  This means that there is possibly a large group of individuals (i.e., individuals who 
are partisan) who could cast their ballot a year before election day and not think about 
changing their minds.  These individuals are more likely to identify themselves as strong 
partisans who hold strong views concerning the differences between Republicans and 
Democrats.  The converse of this argument also should hold in that individuals who 
identify themselves as Independents should need the most possible time in order to 
collect information concerning their electoral decision (Flanigan and Zigale, 1994). 
 Individuals with high levels of ideology (i.e., individuals with high levels of 
liberal or conservative viewpoints) are predicted to early vote.  I predict that voters with a 
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high level of ideology will have clear candidate preferences and will not require the entire 
election period to make their voting choice. 
 Education levels also may have an effect on the amount of information that the 
potential voter needs to acquire before making the decision to vote.  Individuals with high 
levels of education may be more familiar with collecting information from many different 
contexts and formulating a choice quickly. 
 
 H2A:  Individuals who reside in early-voting states and who have high levels of 
partisan strength will be more likely to early vote than individuals with low levels of 
partisan strength. 
H2B:  Individuals who reside in early-voting states and who have high levels of 
ideology will be more likely to early vote than individuals with low levels of ideology. 
H2C:  Individuals who reside in early-voting states and who have high levels of 
education will be more likely to early vote than individuals with low levels of education. 
 
Mobilization 
 Members of social and interest groups may be encouraged to vote early by leaders 
and fellow members of groups with which they are affiliated. The traditional voter 
turnout literature finds that mobilization is a strong predictor of voting (Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993).  In terms of early voting, groups may encourage potential voters to cast 
an early ballot in order to bank votes before election day.  Banking early votes can 
maximize a group’s effectiveness by reducing the chance that voters find themselves too 
busy on election day to vote.  Members of groups may also find out about early voting 
from other members in their group.  This type of political information should be 
disseminated through groups in a similar manner as other political information.   
The mobilization effect should be most pronounced in political groups and other 
groups that have an underlying political component.  For example, evangelical church 
members may be encouraged to vote by church leadership and union members may be 
encouraged to vote by union leadership.  To disentangle the mobilization effects between 
early voting mobilization and election day mobilization, I predict that individuals with 
group associations should be more likely to be mobilized to vote before election day due 
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to the social aspects of groups.  For example, evangelical church members may go to vote 
together. 
 
H3A:  Individuals with union group associations will be more likely to early vote 
than other individuals. 
H3B:  Individuals with evangelical church associations will be more likely to early 
vote than other individuals. 
 
*********** 
 The next section of this chapter presents a model of early voting that includes the 
three major hypotheses for early voting discussed previously and other control variables 
for political participation.  The purpose of the model is to find the differences between 
early voters, election day voters, and non-voters. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 This section examines the factors that lead individuals to vote early, vote on 
election day, or to abstain from voting.  Traditionally, voter turnout studies (e.g., 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) use logistic regression to estimate the effects that lead 
individuals to vote due to the dichotomous dependent variable (1=voted and 0=abstain).  
In the present analysis, I use multinomial logit regression to examine the determinants of 
three different voting behaviors.  I use multinomial logit regression (Long and Freese, 
2005).  Multinomial logit regression is used because of the non-ordered nature of the 
three level categorization of the dependent variable.  The three categories of variables are 
early voter, election day voter, and non-voter.  The categorized dependent variable was 
coded in order to compare early and election day voters to non-voters by the following 
coding scheme, 2=early voter, 1=election day voter, and 0=non-voter.  I use a non-
ordered multinomial logit as opposed to the more traditional ordered multinomial due to 
the non-stackable nature of comparing early voters, election day voters, and non-voters. 
Regression is most appropriately used in models with dependent variables that are 
continuous and that have a wide range of variation (e.g., household income, percentage 
support, or age of death).  Ordered logit is commonly used when a dependent variable is 
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measured as an ordinal variable.  For example, in studies that predict strength of 
partisanship where the depended variable ranges from 0, strong Republican identification, 
to 6, strong Democratic identification, the difference between a 0 and 1 and the difference 
between a 5 and 6 are assumed to be the same theoretical difference.  For example, if an 
individual changed his or her feelings from a 0 to a 1and another individual changed his 
or her feelings from a 5 to a 6, it would mean that both individuals changed their feelings 
the same amount.  Ordered logit models impose a standard theoretical space between 
each numeral that is not appropriate for modeling early voters, election day voters, and 
non-voters.  In this chapter the difference between the variables coded 0 (non-voter), 1 
(election day voter), and 2 (early voter) are not the same theoretical distance apart so 
ordered logit is not the appropriate method of estimation in this chapter.  Clearly, the 
difference between non-voters (0) and election day voters (1) and the difference between 
election day voters (1) and early voters (2) are not the same.  In this chapter, the voting 
categories are assumed to be different from the non-voting category, so I use non-ordered 
multinomial logit.  This allows me to find determinants that predict which category each 
individual belongs to.  All observations used in this chapter include individuals who 
reside in states with at least one type of early voting policy.  This means that every 
individual in this data set has the opportunity to cast some type of early vote and 
individuals who reside in states without an early voting policy are dropped.  This also 
means that the sample size is around 1200 in this chapter and around 5000 in the next 
chapter where all states, early voting state or not, are included in the sample population. 
 I also estimate a second logit model to identify any significant differences 
between early voters and election day voters.  The second regression addresses questions 
concerning possible differences across voters in their method of voting.  These 
differences are less apparent in the first estimated model but are directly addressed in the 
second model).  For example, in the first model, if income is found to be a significant 
positive predictor of both early voting and election day voting, it would be difficult to 
distinguish between those two significant coefficients.  The second model allows for 
direct comparison of the differences between early and election day voters.  The sample 
population used in the second model includes all the individuals who voted in the election 
with the distinction being made between early voters and election day voters (1=early 
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voters and 0=election day voters).  For the second model I use a logit analysis because 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable with an early voter and election day voter 
category. 
 Before presenting the two models I will discuss how state-level factors are 
incorporated into my individual-level model.  Because my data set includes individual-
level and state-level data, there is the potential for state-level effects to have an effect on 
the individual observations that are not accounted for by the state-level variables.  For 
example, individuals that live in different states are exposed to different political cultures 
(Elazar, 1972), weather conditions, or other state factors that I have not accounted for.  I 
use a cluster function for both of the models in this chapter order to account for the 
variation between states.   
  I will estimate two models in this chapter (1) the multinomial logit model that 
estimates three behaviors of early voting, election day voting, and non-voting and (2) the 
logit model that estimates the two voting behaviors of early voting and election day 
voting.  I also estimate a model that differentiates two categories of early voters: in-
person early voters and mail-in early voters.  This model allows for the use of a marginal 
effects post-estimation of the relative effects of each of the variables as the variables are 
manipulated.  This allows for relative effects of variables to be compared.  For example, 
when two variables are both found to be significant, one may have a 10% effect on early 
voting and the other may only have a 3% effect.   
The use of marginal effects estimation allows for the interpretation of results in a 
similar manner as ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.  For example, most OLS 
regression results are read as a relative change in the dependent variable based on a 
relative change in the independent variable holding all other variables constant.  Logit 
regression does not allow for these statements to be interpreted with ease.  Due to the use 
of logit, the marginal effects can be read as a change in the relative probability of the 
dependent variable based on a relative change in the independent variable holding all 
other variables at their means.  The classification of the two different models allows for 




Variables for Models Predicting Who Early Votes 
 Dependent variable.  Voter turnout is measured as a polychotomous variable, 
coded 2 if the individual early votes, 1 if the individual votes on election day, and 0 if the 
individual abstains from voting. Due to the non-ordered nature of this dependent variable, 
I use multinomial logit to estimate the parameters of this model.  The second model uses 
a dichotomous variable that is coded as 1 if the individual early votes and 0 if the 
individual votes on election day; this model is estimated using binary logit. 
 Independent variables.  The independent variables permit me to estimate the 
effects of convenience, low information needs, and mobilization on the probability that 
individuals cast an early ballot.  This analysis also will include control variables that have 
been shown to predict other forms of political participation.  The independent and control 
variables come from the voter turnout literature and are defined in Appendix 5.1.  The 
independent variables include the demographic variables sex, black, Hispanic, education, 
married, working, years at address, suburban, urban, and income.  These demographic 
variables act as control variables in predicting early voting use.  These variables are 
further examined as predictors of voter turnout in Chapter 6 of this dissertation and are 
discussed in Chapter 4 as possible predictors of early voting.  The political and state-level 
variables include care about election, network news use, cable news use, Ranney 
competition index, statewide races, per capita political spending, ballot measures, and 
registration closing date. 
 Convenience variables.  Convenience is measured by a number of variables.  
Some of the variables address individuals with high time demands, or individuals 
considered busy, and the other variables address individuals with low time demands, or 
individual considered to have a great deal of free time.  The high time-demand is 
measured by full-time job status and family obligations.  Full time job status is measured 
as a dummy variable coded 1 if the individual has a full time job and 0 otherwise.  I 
expect that full time job status will be positively related to election day voting and early 
voting in the first model but only with early voting in the second model.  Part-time job 
status is measured by a dummy variable coded 1 if an individual has a part time job and 0 
otherwise.  I expect that part time job status will be positively related to election day 
voting and early voting in the first model, but only with early voting in the second model.  
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Family obligations are measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if the individual has a 
spouse and 0 otherwise.  I expect that family obligations will be positively related to 
election day voting and early voting in the first model but only with early voting in the 
second model.  Family obligations are also measured by a variable that represents the 
number of children in the household.  This variable ranges from 0 for individuals without 
children to 5 for individuals with 5 or more children.  I expect that children will be 
positively related to election day voting and early voting in the first model, but only with 
early voting in the second model.  College student status is measured by a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the individual is a college student and 0 otherwise.  I expect that 
current college attendance will be positively related to election day voting and early 
voting in the first model, but only with early voting in the second model. 
Level of urbanization in the respondents’ home communities is coded with two 
dichotomous variables.  Rural residency is measured as 1 for respondents living in urban 
areas and 0 otherwise.  Suburban residency is measured as 1 for respondents residing in 
suburban areas and 0 otherwise.  The rural and suburban variables are hypothesized to 
have a positive effect on voter turnout and early voting in the first model, but only early 
voting in the second model.  Suburban residents have more possible early voting sites 
(i.e., court house, city hall, or libraries) that are closer than rural area residents have.  For 
rural residents, I predict that the cost of an extra trip would provide an incentive for rural 
residents to vote early before election day as they go about their regular activities. 
 Low information needs variables.  The degree to which individuals have low 
information needs is measured by two variables that account for strength of partisanship 
and undecided voters.  Strength of partisanship is measured as a folded 7-point scale that 
ranges from 3 high partisanship to 0 pure independent.  Individuals who have strong 
partisanship are more likely to have the necessary information to make their vote choice 
early in the election period.  Strong partisans have what Campbell et al. (1960) describe 
as a partisan filter through which all information passes, this allows individuals to see the 
best in their party and the worst in other parties when new information in obtained.  I 
predict that individuals who have higher levels of partisanship will be more likely to cast 
an early vote due to the lack of need to consume more information as the campaign 
progresses toward election day. 
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 Mobilization variables.  There are two measures of mobilization use in this study.  
Dummy variables are coded 1 for membership in a union and coded 1 for evangelical 
church membership and 0 otherwise.  Mobilization by groups, traditionally unions, 
represents the role that civic organizations play in turning out the vote.  Putnam (2000) 
argues that the decline of U.S. participation in groups also has led to a decrease in the 
level of civic activity by Americans.  By separating the two group membership variables 
I can see if there is a different group mobilization effect between groups that are more 
connected to employment (i.e., unions) and groups that are more connected to social ties 
(i.e., churches).  I predict that both group membership variables will have a positive 
effect on early voting and voter turnout in the first model, but only a positive effect on 
early voting in the second model. 
 
FINDINGS 
 In this section I discuss the findings from my two models, which are displayed at 
the end of this chapter in three tables.  The first model I discuss is the voter turnout model 
that predicts early voting, election day voting, and non-voting electoral behavior.  The 
model results are presented in Table 5.1 and show the estimations of the multi-logit 
model that predicts early voting, election day voting, and non-voting.  Table 5.1 displays 
the coefficients for early voting and election day voting compared to the excluded 
category of non-voter using the three major hypotheses presented in this chapter and 
demographic and state-level control variables.  The second model I discuss is the model 
that predicts early voters from the pool of all individuals who cast any type of ballot (i.e., 
early or election day).  Table 5.2 shows the estimated effects of the three major 
hypotheses and demographics and state-level control variables from the model in Table 
5.1.  In addition to the presentation of the early voting models, I present the estimated 
effects of changing the independent variables and the percentage change on the 
probability that an individual would early vote in the last column of Table 5.2.  For 
example, when the variable 65 years of age or older changes from 0 to 1, the percentage 
probability for early voting increases by 4%.  These estimations are used to show the 
relative effects of the independent variables. 
Findings from Table 5.1.   
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In Table 5.1, I present the estimated coefficients for the first model across the five 
groups of variables (convenience, information needs, mobilization, demographic, and 
state-level).  The first column shows the estimates for election day voting, while the 
second column shows the results for early voting. Each coefficient indicates the change in 
the log-odds ratio of election day or early voting in comparison to the log-odds ratio of 
not voting.  The significant coefficients from the first column are the convenience 
hypothesis (suburban and employment), information needs hypothesis (none), 
mobilization hypothesis (none), demographic control variables (income,), and state-level 
control variables (number statewide elections).  These significant variables are standard 
predictors of voter turnout and serve as control variables for the estimates in the second 
column where the early voting coefficients are displayed.  The four significant 
coefficients in the first column in Table 5.1 predict election day voter turnout compared 
to non-voting. 
Table 5.1 shows that individuals who are employed are more likely to vote on 
election day.  This finding matches the findings of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and 
Timpone (1998) that working individuals are more likely to cast a ballot.  This is due to 
social factors like discussing politics at work and working in an industry or sector that is 
regulated by the government (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
In Table 5.1, the negative significant coefficient on suburban means that 
individuals who live in suburban areas are less likely to vote on election day compared to 
rural individuals.  The two significant convenience hypotheses provide evidence that 
employed individuals are more likely to vote on election day and suburban individuals 
are less likely to vote on election day. 
The last two significant coefficients that predict election day turnout are the 
income and number of statewide elections.  Again, level of income is one of the standard 
predictors of voter turnout and I confirm that here (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  The 
number of statewide elections has a significant negative coefficient meaning that 
individuals living in states with more statewide elections are less likely to vote on 
election day.  This is an unexpected finding due to the number of election outcomes a 
voter could affect with more voting decisions to make on one ballot.  States with high 
numbers of statewide elections may provide too many choices and lead potential election 
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day voters to give up on information gathering on all their electoral choices and choose to 
not participate at all. 
 In the second column of Table 5.1 I present the findings for early voters, which 
are of specific interest in this dissertation.  The variables with significant coefficients 
(from the second column) are the convenience hypothesis (employed), information needs 
hypothesis (none), mobilization hypothesis (none), demographic control variables 
(income), and state-level control variables (number ballots, political spending per capita 
and registration closing date).  The employment variable is found to be significant and in 
the predicted direction.  Full time employment is a predictor of early voting, and it 
appears that fully employed individuals are taking advantage of the opportunity to cast an 
early vote.  This finding falls in line with my convenience hypothesis that states that if 
individuals are busy and have time constraints, early voting provides an opportunity for 
voters to plan ahead and vote early. 
The remaining significant coefficients come from the demographic and state-level 
control variables.  Income is the second predictor of early voting.  Individuals with higher 
levels of income are more likely to cast early ballots.  As discussed in the election day 
section of this model, income is one of the consistent findings in the electoral behavior 
literature.  I find that the number of ballots in a significant and negative coefficient for 
predicting early voting.  When the number of ballot initiatives and referenda increases, 
the likelihood that an individual will vote early decreases. This may be caused by the 
more ballots an individual has to learn about and research makes a voting decision 
requires more time spent on information gathering and pushes the voting decision back to 
election day.   
Political spending per capita is shown in Table 5.1 to be a positive and significant 
predictor of early voting.  Political spending per capita measures how much money is 
spent on campaign advertizing.  This political advertizing acts to cover the costs of 
participation by informing the public of a candidate’s positions.  When the population of 
a state is exposed to more political spending I find that the people are more likely to vote 
early.  This may be because individuals who are exposed to more campaign information 
will make their electoral decisions earlier in the campaign season and be able to cast a 
ballot without needing the full campaign to make a choice. 
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Finally, registration closing date is found to be a significant and positive predictor 
of early voting.  This state-level institution allows for voters with registration dates close 
to election day to register and vote early with only a few days in between.  In the next 
section I discuss the differences between early and election day voters including an 
estimation of the relative effects of each significant coefficient. 
Findings from Table 5.2 
Table 5.2 shows the estimated effects of the Table 5.1 variables on early voting as 
well as the marginal effects of the logit model.  The model shown in Table 5.2 includes 
observations of all voters (i.e., early voters and election day voters only), with nonvoters 
excluded from the analysis.  Table 5.2 shows the same significant coefficients as the early 
voting column in Table 5.1 and provides a direct comparison between early and election 
day voters. 
The last column of Table 5.2 shows the change in probability associated with a 
one-unit change in the significant coefficients used in Table 5.2.  First, none of the 
significant effects produce more than an 8% change in the probability of casting an early 
vote.  Second, the effects of the significant convenience coefficients added together 
would lead to around a 8% change in the probability of casting an early vote (i.e., full 
time employment 8%).  This means that all the largest effects of the four significant 
coefficients added together would change the probability in casting an early voter over an 
election day vote by -5% (i.e., full time employment 8%, suburban -7%, income 2%, and 
statewide elections -8%).  The next section sums up this chapter and makes suggestions 
for future research possibilities in this research area. 
Looking at the findings from this chapter, there does not appear to be a group of 
factors that can define who an early voter is or what motivates early voting.  First, early 
voters may not be any different than election day voters.  I think that one of the reasons 
that my models have found relatively few differences between early voters and election 
day voters is that there may not be many difference between the two voting groups.  The 
information required to cast an early vote compared to an election day vote is very 
similar.  Second, early voters may be different from election day voters in a way that is 
not captured by any of the variables used in the models.  There may be political or social 
variables that were not included.  Specifically, political or social factors such as letter 
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writing or the number of groups an individual is active in could be examined.  Third, 
early voters observed in 2004 have not established voting patterns that make their voting 
behavior predictable.  Last, due to the different dates that people vote, a snapshot model 
may not capture the voting dynamics in the same way that a time series model would.  A 
long-term type of model would be better able to examine the specific choices and 
influences that lead to early voting. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I examine the differences between election day voters and early 
voters.  Moving forward with this analysis, I would expand the number of factors that 
may predict early voting.  This could be done at the individual level through surveys and 
individual voter interviews.  Interviews could provide an opportunity to see what voters 
are thinking about when they cast an early vote.  The interview results could then be used 
to identify ideas and attitudes on future surveys. 
Of my hypotheses for predicting early voting, the convenience hypothesis is 
shown to be the strongest.  This provides evidence that individuals who are busy will take 
advantage of early voting if it is available to them.  The low information needs hypothesis 
not being supported may be the result of voters having the information they need but not 
using it to make a decision before election day.  One of the findings from Chapter 3 
shows that some individuals believe that they should vote on election day for the social 
benefits of participating in a nationwide election.  Such thinking may be working against 
the use of early voting.  This traditional voting view comes into conflict with the new 
non-traditional early voting view that individuals should vote whenever they choose.  I 
think that with time, the traditional view of voting will slowly fade away. 
One way to improve this analysis will be to add more years of observations to the 
models.  The data used in this dissertation are taken from the 2004 presidential election.  
Including data from the 2006, 2010 midterm elections and the 2008 presidential election 
would allow an examination to be done to determine if the same variables are significant 
in the elections following 2004.  The addition also would bring in more observations of 
early voting in new contexts, specifically the midterm elections.  The characteristics of 
midterm voters (i.e., more partisan and more politically active individuals) may make 
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their inclusion in my models particularly useful in testing my hypotheses on low 
information needs and high political partisanship.  This would address one of the 
questions central to early voting research, which is who early votes.  Finally, an 
examination of social groups and their decision of when and how to vote would flesh out 
the relationship between group membership and early voting.  For example, it would be 
interesting to interview group leaders during the election cycle to see if and when they 
encourage their group members to vote. 	
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CHAPTER 6:  EARLY VOTING AND VOTER TURNOUT 
 
 The scholarly literature addresses many categories of factors that affect voter 
turnout (e.g., demographic, political, and institutional).   One of the most important 
findings across single country and cross-country analyses is that electoral institutions can 
have a significant impact on the size of the electorate.  Constitutional issues such as how 
votes are turned into representation in government, procedural aspects of voting, such as 
when individuals may vote, registration requirements, and election day holidays.  All 
have been shown to be electoral institutions that affect the size of the electorate.  Early 
voting represents one of the new electoral institutions in the U.S., and in this chapter I 
address the links between early voting and voter turnout.   
 Voter turnout in the U.S. is one of the most studied issues in the area of electoral 
behavior.  Voter turnout is such an area of focus because the U.S. has one of the lowest 
turnout rates of any post-industrial western democracy (Franklin, 2001).  There is an 
underlying concern that low voter turnout translates into inaccurate representation.  
Inaccurate representation means that governing bodies do not follow the will of all the 
people and that the government is essentially only concerned with those who vote.  
Variation in turnout across the U.S. and other Western democracies are often attributed to 
differences in electoral laws and policies.  The major difference among these countries is 
the method used for the selection of representatives for governing institutions.  The U.S. 
has a majoritarian system where the winner takes all.  This creates many “wasted” votes, 
which creates a disincentive for individuals to vote.  That is, if an individual feels his or 
her preferred candidate will win the majority of votes with or without his or her vote, 
there may be little incentive to cast a ballot.  The majoritarian system also can lead to a 
disincentive to vote in that votes for losing candidates are considered wasted since they 
are not represented in the final election outcome. 
In contrast to majoritarian systems, many European voting systems are considered 
to be more representative of the population in that they use a proportional allocation of 
votes and seats.  A system of true proportionality would formulate representation based 
on the total voting population divided by the number of seats in each governing 
institution, usually a congress or parliament.  In this example a seat would be awarded to 
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each party that received the minimum of votes needed to gain a seat.  In the U.S. winner-
take-all system, representation goes to the candidate who has the most votes.  The 
incentives for each system are in contrast; in the U.S. if a voter’s preferred candidate is an 
underdog there is little incentive to vote, while in many European systems, second and 
third place vote getters still can receive a proportion of the representation.  There is an 
incentive for voters in the U.S. to stay away from the polls if the election is not 
competitive.  The U.S. system does not differentiate between a candidate that wins 50% 
plus one of the votes cast and a candidate that wins 80% of the vote.  In proportional 
systems, a higher percentage of the vote translates into more representation in the 
government.  In proportional systems, effectively all the votes are counted when 
determining the standing government, but in the winner-take-all system the only vote that 
decides the election is the vote that puts one candidate into the majority. 
Many changes in U.S. electoral laws focus on the how easy or difficult it should 
be to cast a ballot.  One example of this includes the Motor Voter Act of 1993, which 
required states to provide access to registration forms at most public offices (most 
notably the Department of Motor Vehicles) and which required that registration cards be 
excepted at least 30 days before the date of the upcoming election.  Another more recent 
example is the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which provided funds for states to 
improve voting technology and otherwise assist voters during the voting process. 
 While scholars have found that the Motor Voter and Help America Vote Acts 
make it easier to participate in U.S. elections, there is considerable debate regarding the 
effectiveness of these programs in increasing the level of turnout.  The debate centers on 
the issue of whether these new programs bring in new voters or if these programs simply 
make it easier for regular voters to vote.  This debate continues with the advent of new 
early voting laws across the country. 
 Recently, early voting laws have become popular across many of the states, with 
over half of the states now allowing some type of early voting.  This policy change 
allows scholars to gather and examine new data related to the ability of new election laws 
to pull in new voters.  In this chapter, I address whether or not making voting more 
convenient through early voting leads to an increase in voter turnout.  I examine the link 
between early voting laws and a possible increase in the probability that individuals will 
 
	117
turnout to vote.  This will provide evidence concerning the hypothesis that when 
individuals are given the opportunity to early vote they are more likely to turn out. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON VOTER TURNOUT 
 The voter turnout literature is one of the largest in the field of electoral behavior.  
In order to provide a review of the large number of theoretical perspectives and empirical 
findings, this review is broken into three main components.  This review includes (1) a 
review of the major theoretical perspectives on voter turnout, (2) a review of the literature 
that concentrates on institutional factors and electoral laws (e.g., registration laws), and 
(3) a review of the literature on early voting. 
 The first major theoretical prospective on voter turnout is the cost benefit 
calculation, or economic voting model, formulated by Downs (1957).  This theory states 
that individuals will turn out when the expected benefits of voting are greater than the 
expected costs of voting.  The voter’s decision is based on the (B) benefits gained from 
the difference in utility between the two candidates, the (C) costs of information and 
getting to the polls, the (P) probability that his or her vote is the deciding vote, and (D) 
the long-run utility of maintaining democracy.  This model has gone through many 
changes due to the debate concerning the measurement of the four above defined terms.  
The changes have been made as an attempt to solve the voting behavior paradox related 
to the original Downs model, which predicts that it is irrational to vote.  This means that 
the original Downs model predicts that no one is expected to participate in elections, but 
as we observe every election day, many do.  The first change was made by Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968), who reformulated the D term to represent the level of citizen duty felt 
by the individual.  This change has caused great debate in the literature as to the 
legitimacy of the rational choice model (Aldrich, 1993). 
 There are many scholars who have challenged the ability of the rational choice 
model to predict voting with the inclusion of the D term.  Ball (1976) assumes that voters 
will not pay for something they can get for free, meaning that a voter will not incur costs 
of time and money to vote if his or her candidate will win without his or her vote. Ball 
also questions the degree to which the duty term fits within a rational-choice framework.  
Green and Shapiro (1994) also are critical of the degree to which the rational choice 
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model can predict reality and are critical of the model’s ability to move voting behavior 
research forward.  Green and Shapiro (1994) argue that the rational choice paradigm has 
pushed the political science research agenda for long enough and a new paradigm needs 
to emerge. 
The debate over the usefulness of the rational choice model is important in the 
voter turnout literature because on one level the assumption that individuals will engage 
in political behaviors if the benefits of participation outweigh the costs stands on strong 
economic grounds and translates to many other types of human behavior.  For example, 
in social networking contexts the benefits of attending a conference (finding new research 
partners or learning about job opportunities) out weigh the costs (flight and hotel).  On 
another level, rational choice theory involves psychological benefits to voters, which lead 
to problems related to how to account for and quantify these psychological benefits from 
political behavior.  For example, the feeling of doing one’s civic duty by voting is a 
psychological factor that would be difficult to quantify.   
The second change to the Downs model was made to the C term by Aldrich 
(1993), who explains that political leaders have the opportunity to cover much of the 
costs of participation (such as information costs) through campaign events, television ads, 
and other mobilization techniques.  The changes in the formulation of C help to describe 
voter turnout by allowing for political influences to decrease the participation costs to 
individuals.  The third change to the Downs model also was to the C term.  Blais (2001) 
changed the C term by removing the economic rationality restraints placed on it by 
Downs.  Voting is a low cost and low benefit activity, which Blais argues makes the 
decision to vote such a low cost activity it, is not rational to spend the time thinking about 
the costs and benefits. 
 The second major theoretical prospective of turnout deals with individual political 
attitudes.  These have been examined by many scholars starting with Campbell et al. 
(1960) in The American Voter.  Political influences include individual partisanship and 
strength of partisanship.  The theoretical justification for the inclusion of political 
variables is that individuals who are highly involved in politics and who have emotional 
ties to the parties are much more likely to participate in elections than others who do not 
have strong partisan ties.  Party attachment has typically been measured as individuals’ 
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scores on the 7-point partisanship scale (strong Republican to strong Democratic) (see 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  The partisanship scale is determined by asking 
respondents questions regarding their party affiliation and the strength of that affiliation.  
For example, if a respondent stated that he or she was affiliated with the Republican 
party, he or she then would be asked if they are affiliated with the party was strong or 
weak.  This leads to strong Republicans and Democrats to be coded as 7 or 1 respectively 
and Independents to be coded as 4.  Partisanship is also measured using a folded measure 
of partisanship that ranges from non-partisan (coded 0) to strong partisan (coded 3).  This 
second measure captures the strength of the individual’s Republican or Democratic 
partisanship.  The measurement of partisan strength has been greatly debated due to the 
non-linearity of the relationship between the partisanship and vote choice and 
partisanship voter turnout (Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye, and Wolfinger, 1992).  
Keith et al. (1992) finds that there are many “closet” partisans that behave similarly to 
partisan identifiers but do not admit to being partisans.  The problem with using the 
folded partisanship measure is that the difference between non-partisans (coded 0) and 
weak partisans (coded 1) is not the same difference as between weak partisans and 
partisans.  This problem is specific to the folded partisanship measure when predicting 
voter turnout. 
 The third major theoretical prospective of turnout deals with campaign effects.  
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have greatly contributed to the understanding of the 
positive effects of mobilization on voter turnout. At the outset of a political campaign, 
individuals may have relatively little information about the policy positions of competing 
candidates.  Campaigns correct this by informing the public on these matters.  
Rosenstone and Hansen find that parties choose what groups to mobilize in order to 
maximize their support relative to the costs of mobilization.  This is typically measured 
as contact with the campaign during the election period.  In their experimental study of 
the town of New Haven, CT, Gerber and Green (2000) find that in-person contacts are 
much more effective in mobilizing voters than phone calls and leaflets.  Scholars have 
also examined the role of interest groups as mobilizers. For instance, Kenny, McBurnett, 
and Bordua (2004) examine the role of the National Rifle Association (NRA) in shaping 
elections, while McDermott (2004) examines the ability of labor unions to provide cues 
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to Democratic voters.  These studies provide support that groups have the ability to send 
signals during the campaign season to their own supports. 
 Another type of campaign effect on voter turnout is the effect of television 
advertizing on the electorate.  The effects televisions ads have on the electorate can be 
viewed as (1) an information source for campaign information and (2) a possible method 
to affect voter turnout. There is a debate in the campaign effect on turnout literature as to 
the ability of negative TV ads to increase or decrease turnout.  Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, 
and Babbitt (1999) found, using a meta analysis, that negative ads do not have a negative 
effect on turnout.  Brader (2005) examines the emotional effects of negative 
advertisements and finds that negative ads do have a negative effect on voter turnout.  
Overall, the literature on an individual’s emotional and cognitive reactions to campaign 
ads finds that the effects of ads may be either mobilizing or de-mobilizing depending on 
the individual’s views of each candidate. 
 The forth major theoretical prospective of turnout involves social effects.  Putnam 
(2000) examines the relationship between social capital and turnout and suggests that 
declining social capital is one reason for the decrease in turnout over the past fifty years.  
It is hypothesized that when individuals are involved in many social activities they are 
more likely to become informed about politics and be more likely to participate in 
political activities such as voting.  In terms of the rational choice model, social networks 
act as a conduit for information distribution that decreases the cost of participation.  
Social capital has been measured in a number of different ways at the aggregate-level 
(e.g., number of groups in a state) and individuals level (e.g., number of times friends 
come over for dinner).  Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) find that social effects are a 
positive predictor of voter turnout in their civic voluntarism model, which predicts that 
social networks create opportunities for political action, and through those opportunities, 
individuals can more easily participate in politics (including voting). 
 The fifth major theoretical prospective of turnout deals with personal resources.  
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have examined the role of individual resources in 
predicting voter turnout.  The theoretical reasoning behind this is that individuals with 
high levels of education should be more able to understand how the political system 
works.  Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) find that income, age, and type of employment 
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have an effect on voter turnout.  They suggest this is due to the chances that political 
discussions will occur in higher paying jobs, that citizens gain experience as they age, 
and that professional or managerial workers will be more likely to engage in political 
discussions with coworkers. 
 The sixth theoretical prospective on voter turnout to be considered in this section 
deals with institutional factors.  Institutional factors such as registration closing date and 
early voting fall within the rational choice framework.  The rational choice framework 
allows for predictions of increased voting to be made when the costs of participation are 
lowered or eliminated.  Changes in many institutional factors could greatly lower 
participation costs.  For example, the 16th Amendment eliminated many costs of 
participation (e.g., poll taxes), so scholars using the rational choice model would predict 
an increase in turnout following the passage of the 16th Amendment.  Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) find that African American turnout has increased since the Voting Rights 
Act was passed in the 1960’s. 
The institutional voting laws literature examines electoral variations within 
countries (e.g., within the U.S. or Germany) and across countries (studies that include 
new democracies or advanced Western industrial democracies).  This section presents a 
review of the policies that are examined in the both the U.S. and international voter 
turnout literature. 
 The Voting Rights Act had a significant effect on Southern and black voters 
during the 1960’s.  The policy made it easier for blacks and poor voters in the South to 
become registered and participate in elections.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) credit the 
Voting Rights Act, along with the civil rights movement, for increasing black voter 
turnout.  This act also effectively increased the total number of potential voters by 
standardizing registration requirements across states. 
 The Motor Voter Act (1993) addressed low voter turnout by making registration 
for elections much easier than it was before.  The Motor Voter Act required that all states 
permit mail-in registration, registration at certain public offices, and specifically for 
registration at the Department of Motor Vehicles.  This act addressed the concern that an 
increasingly mobile public was finding it difficult to become registered to vote in time to 
cast a ballot.  Timpone (1998) and Knack (1995) examine the effects of this act at the 
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individual and state-level and find that many more potential voters are becoming 
registered.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Timpone (1998) and Knack (1995) conclude 
that the increase in registration did not translate into an increase in voter turnout. 
 Many studies have examined the roll of strictness of registration requirements.  
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) define the registration requirement as a barrier to 
participation and quantify this as the number of days before the election that registration 
closes.  The logic behind their assumption that registration closing date is a barrier to 
participation is that many individuals may become aware of an upcoming election only as 
election day approaches, yet some states close registration 30 days before the election.  
This does not allow individuals to be caught up in the campaign and decide to vote at the 
last minute.  States that do not require voters to be registered, or allow for same-day 
registration, are seen as reducing the cost of participation by not requiring an additional 
trip for individuals to become registered. 
 There are many policies examined in the comparative literature for affecting 
participation costs.  The first is election day as a national holiday.  An election day 
holiday eliminates the problem for many people of having to squeeze in voting before or 
after work.  In the U.S., concerns about time constraints on election day are addressed 
with early voting rather than an election day holiday.  Early voting policies are seen as a 
solution to the work problem, in the sense that when the election period is expanded, 
individuals can schedule voting to be done at a more convenient time.  
 A second policy that could reduce the cost of voting is government registration. 
Currently, individuals have the responsibility to register on their own, but proposals to 
turn responsibility over to the government are hypothesized to create higher turnout rates. 
This would effectively turn all elections into same-day registration elections, thus 
allowing for individuals to decide on election day to cast a ballot. 
The six theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter (i.e., rational choice, 
political attitudes, campaign effects, personal resources, social effects, and institutions) 
serve as the foundation for the research conducted later in this chapter.  The next section 
addresses the connections between the different theoretical perspectives presented. 
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Synthesis of Competing Theoretical Perspectives 
 The six theoretical perspectives for voter turnout presented in the last section do 
not fall into cut and dry categories.  Instead, these six perspectives can be viewed as 
being connected in certain aspects. 
 First, the institutional and the rational choice perspective are related.  The 
institutional concept of barriers to participation and the rational choice concept of costs 
and benefits are linked in that as barriers to participation are reduced, the cost of 
participation also is reduced.  For example, election day registration reduces the cost of 
participation by not requiring the voter to register before elections. 
 Second, campaign activities and the rational choice perspective are connected.  
Many political campaign activities act to reduce the cost of participation.  For example, 
mobilization by political parties provides costly political information to politically active 
citizens.  By reducing the cost of participation, political parties in turn increase the 
chance that individuals will turnout to vote.  Television ads are a specific type of 
mobilization used by political parties and other groups to subsidize the cost of 
participation and increase turnout. 
 Third, social effects and resource effects are connected.  These two concepts are 
related in that level of resources is related to level of social effects.  For example, 
individuals who are well educated or have a large income will be more likely to have a 
job that encourages political activity.  Both high levels of resources and social 
connections predict that individuals will be more likely to vote than individuals who have 
few social connection and low levels of resources. 
 Fourth, political attitudes and campaign effects are connected.  Theses two 
concepts are inversely related in that when individuals have high levels of political 
attitudes or knowledge, the effects of campaigns are mitigated.  Among individuals who 
have a high level of partisanship, it is possible that campaigns will have little or no effect 
on voter turnout due to the high level of commitment to a specific party the individuals 
have.  The converse to this relationship also should hold in that individuals with weak 
partisanship may be open to viewing campaign events as information sources and be 
persuadable to vote in the upcoming election. 
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 The next section addresses the theoretical links between early voting laws and 
voter turnout.  Many of the theoretical perspectives presented in this chapter on voter 
turnout can be used to explain the effects that early voting has on voter turnout. 
 
THEORIES OF THE EFFECT OF EARLY VOTING ON VOTER TURNOUT 
Based on the institutional voting literature, barriers to participation keep 
individuals who would have normally voted from participating in elections.  Early voting 
policies have changed the process of voting in a way that should theoretically decrease 
the barriers and costs of participation. 
 The civic volunteerism model examines voter turnout in terms of social factors 
and political opportunities.  This literature presents political participation as a function of 
the types of opportunities individuals have to participate in government.  By increasing 
the number of days individuals are allowed to vote, the opportunity for participation 
increases and that should lead to an increase in voter turnout.  The rational choice, 
opportunity, and mobilization perspectives help to explain the effect of early voting on 
participation. 
Rational Choice 
 The most common theoretical justification for the argument that early voting 
policy encourages participation is the Downsian rational choice framework that addresses 
the costs and benefits of participation (Downs, 1957).  This theoretical perspective 
predicts that individuals who reside in states with early voting policies will face fewer 
costs associated with voting.  Specifically, voters have a longer opportunity to cast a 
ballot during the election period.  This allows busy potential voters to have many 
opportunities to cast a ballot.  The reduction in costs follows from the ability of the 
individual to decide when he or she casts a ballot instead of being required to wait for 
election day.  This can be viewed in game theory terms as playing the vote decision game 
over multiple days instead of just on election day.  This means that if an individual has a 
10% chance of casting a ballot on any one given day, he or she will have the same 10% 
chance of voting for many days in a row.  If there are 10 early voting days this means that 
the individual will, on average, cast a ballot during the election period.  This view 
assumes that individuals have a given desire to cast a ballot and that given many chances 
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to vote they will be more likely to take advantage of an expanded voting period.  With an 
expanded voting period individuals can choose the time to vote that is the least expensive 
for them.  For example, time may be relatively expensive on a workday, so a voter may 
be more likely to vote on a day off when time is less expensive.  Early voting allows 
individuals to vote when it is the least costly to them.  By expanding the election period, 
potential voters are exposed the campaign events and have the option of casting a ballot 
before the campaign is over. 
 
H1:  Individuals who reside in states with early voting policies will be more likely 




 The civic voluntarism model presented by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
uses the civic connections an individual has in his or her community to predict 
participation in many different political and non-political civic activities.  Group 
membership is found to predict an increase in the probability of casting a ballot in the 
Civic Volunteerism Model.  I hypothesize that there will be an interaction between group 
membership and early voting opportunity that will increase the change of casting a ballot 
when compared to the individual effects of group membership and early voting 
opportunities on voter turnout. 
 
H2:  Individuals who reside in states with early voting policies and who have 
group memberships will be more likely to vote than other individuals. 
 
Mobilization 
 Early voting laws not only provide individuals with the opportunity to cast early 
votes, they also provide the opportunity for political parties to mobilize their supporters 
to vote before election day.  Political parties may use stronger mobilization efforts in 




H3:  Individuals who reside in states with early voting policies and who are 
contacted by a political party will be more likely to vote than other individuals. 
 
****************** 
 In the next section of this chapter I present a model of voter turnout that examines 
the hypotheses presented in this section. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In this section I specify a logit model that accounts for the effects of both 
individual-level and state-level factors on individual voter turnout. This model is a 
standard logit model that predicts individual voter turnout predicted by the factors listed 
in the variables section of this chapter (Long and Freese, 2005).  Using logit analysis 
allows for the control of state-level factors while pooling voters from different states 
together to make a representative sample.  This is done using the cluster by state option in 
all the models of voter turnout.  The sample population used for this chapter is all 
individuals who provided an answer to the question, “did you cast a vote for President?” 
Beyond a single logit model that predicts voter turnout across all states, I also use 
a voter turnout model that uses only observations from states with early voting laws and a 
second voter turnout model that uses only observations from states without early voting 
laws.  These two models provide the opportunity to compare the effects of predictors on 
voter turnout.  Any differences in the estimated coefficients that are found will provide 
evidence that the presents of early voting changes the voting environment.  I use the stata 
command mfx to estimate the marginal effects of the independent variables.  This 
estimation provides a percentage change in the dependent variable (voting early) than all 
other independent variables are held at their means. 
In the next section of this chapter I present the variables that are used in the voter 
turnout models.  Variables are presented with their coding and the expected effect of each 
on voter turnout. 
 
	127
Variables for the Voter Turnout Models 
Dependent variable.  Voter turnout is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the 
individual voted in the 2004 general presidential election and 0 otherwise.  The major 
issue with collecting self-reports on voter turnout centers on the over-reporting problem.  
The over-reporting problem is related to social desirability, with individuals having a 
tendency to say that they have voted even if they did not.  This comes from the feeling in 
the U.S. that being a good citizen is linked to participation in elections.  Studies have 
examined the over-reporting problem across national contexts (Karp and Brockington, 
2005) and within the U.S. (Sigelman, 1982).  Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy (2001) 
examine the determinants of over-reporting and find that there are predictable groups 
who over-report, namely individuals who are educated, partisan, and religious.  Using the 
Current Population Survey Voting Supplement, Highton (2005) finds that race is a 
significant predictor of over-reporting voter turnout, with over-reporting rates of 3.6% for 
whites, 6.1% for blacks, and 5.5% for Latinos. 
Reduction of cost.  Policies that reduce the cost of early voting can have an effect 
on turnout, so I include in my models a state-level variable that measures what early 
voting policies each state has available for voters to use.  Early voting policies are 
measured in one model by two dummy variables, and early voting policies are measured 
by one composite variable in the other model.  States with in-person early voting are 
coded as 1 if the state allows for in-person early voting and 0 otherwise.  The second 
dummy variable is coded as 1 if the state allows for no excuse mail-in voting and 0 
otherwise.  The composite variable is the number of early voting mechanisms allowed per 
state and is measured from 0 (no early voting policies) to 2 (both no excuse mail-in and 
in-person absentee).  This composite measure will only be used when dummy variables 
for each type of early voting policy are not used.  I also estimate a separate model 
includes the two early voting dummy variables and not the composite variable to show 
any differences between in-person and no-excuse mail-in voting policy effects on voter 
turnout.  I expect that all the early voting measures have a positive effect on voter 
turnout. 
Opportunity to vote.  Opportunity is measured by two dummy variables.  
Specifically, individuals who are members of unions and evangelical Christian groups 
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will be coded as 1 for each group membership considered here.  Evangelical Christian is 
measured as 1 for the individuals responding that they are an evangelical Christian and 0 
otherwise.  I hypothesize that the evangelical Christian variable has a positive effect on 
voter turnout due to mobilization efforts of those churches.  This measure may lead to 
higher voter turnout the church by groups covering much of the information costs of 
participation, such as gathering information on when and where to vote, and providing 
social motivation by encouraging all members of the group to participate in the election. 
Union household is coded as 1 as for homes with at least one union member and 0 
otherwise.  I hypothesize that the union household variable will have a positive effect on 
voting based on the political exposure that being in a union brings through meetings and 
political information provided by union representatives. In addition, unions invest 
substantial resources in mobilizing union members during elections, so union members 
should be more likely to vote as a result of these mobilization efforts. This measure may 
lead to higher voter turnout by groups, in this case unions, covering much of the 
information costs of participation, such as when and where to vote, and providing social 
motivation by encouraging all members of the group to participate in the election. 
Mobilization.  Contact by a party is measured as 1 for individuals who were 
contacted by a political campaign during the election and 0 for individuals who were not 
contacted.  I hypothesize that party contact will have a positive effect on voting due to the 
decrease in costs associated in information gathering during the election (Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993).  Party contact is associated with the mobilization motivation of voter 
turnout. 
 Individual level variables.  Included in my models of voter turnout are several 
independent variables that represent individual attributes found in previous research to be 
related to turnout behavior. Previous research has found that men are more likely to 
participate in politics than women (Timpone, 1998), but women have slowly begun to 
overtake men in participation rates.  I measure sex of respondent as a binary variable 
coded 1 for women and 0 for men, and I hypothesize that sex is positively related voter 
turnout. 
Over 65 years of age of respondent is measured on a scale from 18 years to 97 
years of age.  Over 65 years of age is related to voter turnout in a number of ways.  One 
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way age effects voter turnout is by determining when individuals were socialized into the 
political system.  Time of socialization translates into higher participation rates for voters 
who first were able to vote during WWII and early post war period.  A downward trend 
in voting is seen from the WWII era generation to individuals who were first able to vote 
during the Vietnam War period (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Over 65 years of age 
effect on voter turnout also may be related to interest in the issues addressed by the 
government.  Issues important to younger voters (e.g., college tuition) frequently are not 
addressed as much as are issues important to the elderly (e.g., taxes on retirement 
income).  I expect over 65 years of age to have a positive effect on voter turnout.  
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) find that increases in age up to age 65 is associated with 
increased voter turnout and after age 65. 
Race of respondent is measured using two variables, one variable for black 
respondents (coded 1 for blacks and 0 otherwise) and another variable for Hispanic 
respondents (coded 1 for Hispanics and 0 otherwise).  In past research, scholars have 
found that individuals from racial minority groups are less likely to participate in politics.  
Historically, minority groups have participated less in politics due to few electoral 
options to vote for someone of a similar race or the opportunity to reelect someone with a 
similar race (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Thus, I hypothesize that each of my two 
race variables will be negatively related to voter turnout. 
Married status is measured as a binary variable coded 1 for married respondents 
and 0 otherwise.  Married individuals are more likely to vote for the same candidate due 
to a variety of social reasons (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Specifically, married 
respondents are more likely to talk together about the election and are more likely to have 
someone to go to the polls with (i.e., one another).  I hypothesize that married status will 
have a positive effect on voter turnout. 
Residential mobility is measured by the number of years the respondent has lived 
at his or her current address.  Moving does bring about certain problems in relation to 
voting.  The need to register to vote in the new location is one of the common 
impediments to turnout for individuals who move from one location to another. New 
residential locations also may bring about uncertainty about local political happenings.  
That uncertainty has the potential to put new residents at an informational disadvantage, 
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and that can result in lower levels of participation.  Lastly, moving to a new residents 
means that potential voters also have to find new polling places and become familiar with 
local voting technology and procedures before voting (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  
Given this, I hypothesize that the number of years individuals reside at their addresses 
will have a positive effect on voter turnout. 
 Education of respondent is measured on a scale ranging from 1 (8th grade 
education) to 10 (graduate degree).  Increased education has been found to lead to higher 
voter turnout by providing citizens with more information on how to navigate the 
political environment (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  I expect education to have a 
positive effect on voter turnout. 
 Income of respondent is measured on a scale from 1 (income of less than 
$10,000) to 9 (income of more than $150,000).  Higher levels of income may provide an 
incentive to vote in elections due to the potential higher levels of taxation that may be 
voted on.  Voters with higher levels of income also may have a job in an industry that is 
more directly affected by politics, such as education, law, or business.  Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) and Stein (1998) find that income is related to political participation, and I 
expect that income will have a positive effect on voter turnout. 
Current employment status is measured as a binary variable, coded 1 for working 
respondents and 0 for all other respondents.  Current employment status is hypothesized 
to have a positive effect on voter turnout based on findings of past research (Rosenstone 
and Wolfinger, 1978).  Some research has suggested that unemployed individuals should 
have more time for politics and thus may vote at higher rates. Alternatively, others 
contend that unemployed individuals will be distracted from politics by their unemployed 
status and will be primarily searching for employment, and hence unemployed 
individuals should have lower rates of turnout.  Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) find 
that unemployment predicts not voting, and I expect employment will have a positive 
effect on voting in my models. 
Urban, suburban, or rural residence is measured with two dichotomous variables. 
Urban is measured as 1 for respondents living in urban areas and 0 otherwise.  Suburban 
is measured as 1 for respondents residing in suburban areas and 0 otherwise.  The urban 
and suburban variables are hypothesized to have a positive affect on voter turnout.  
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Residents of highly concentrated areas have more pubic service centers that are closer to 
homes than they are in rural areas, making participation easier in that polling places are 
closer. Individuals also have higher levels of social connectedness in non-rural areas, and 
this may translate into higher levels of voter turnout (Putnam, 2000). 
 Strength of party identification is measured by creating a folded measure of 
partisan strength with strong Democrats and Republicans coded as 3, regular Democrats 
and Republicans coded as 2, leaning Democrats and Republicans coded as 1, and 
Independents coded as 0.  I expect that strength of partisan identification will have a 
positive effect on voting because highly partisan individuals are generally highly 
motivated to participate, and they have been described as having a high sense of citizen 
duty due to their strong partisan connection (Downs, 1957; Stein, 1998). 
Network and cable television news viewership is measured by two variables, one 
measure for network television news use and one measure for of cable television news 
use.  Both are measured on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the number of days a week each 
type of news media is viewed.  I hypothesize that both network and cable television news 
viewership has a positive effect on voter turnout and election day voting due to the 
reduction in information costs associated with participation (Downs, 1957).  These two 
news media measures represent individuals directly gathering their own information as 
opposed to indirectly gathering information from political campaigns or social groups.  
Potential voters can gain information related to candidate issue positions and practical 
information about when and where they can vote in their own local area. 
State-level variables.  State-level competition is measured using election outcome 
results.  This measure is calculated by using the Ranney competition index for states in 
the year 2004.  Lower numbers (i.e., where there are higher margins between the two 
parties) represent lower levels of competition and higher numbers (i.e., where there are 
lower margins between the two parties) represent higher levels of competition.  I predict 
that competition has a positive effect on voter turnout.  Competition brings more voters 
into the election by increasing the chance that their one vote may be the vote to win the 
election for their candidate.  Increased competition also leads political parties to get more 
potential gains from higher levels of campaign spending, which can lead to more 
participation.  The Ranney competition index also includes the number of Democrats and 
 
	132
Republicans in each statehouse.  This component of the measure is not expected to have 
an effect on voter turnout rates.  Overall, the Ranney index provides a general measure of 
state-level competition. 
 Registration closing date is measured on a scale ranging between 0 to 30 days 
before the election.  Individuals in states that allow for registration a few days before the 
election face fewer costs than individuals in states that set a deadline of 30 days before 
the election.  I predict registration dates to have a negative effect on voter turnout because 
states with early registration dates do not provide the opportunity for potential voters to 
register during the last few weeks of the campaign.  This means that as the strongest 
mobilization efforts are taking place, some likely voters will not be able to participate due 
to the registration date passing.  In other states with registration closing dates very close 
to or on election day unregistered potential voters who are caught up in the last days or 
hours of the campaign can participate in the election. 
The ballot initiatives variable is measured as a simple count of all the statewide 
initiatives and referenda that were available for voter consideration on the 2004 ballot.  A 
higher number of initiatives and referenda means there were a larger number of groups 
who provided campaign information concerning not only their specific ballot initiative, 
but also provided information concerning the times and dates when individuals could 
participate.  A large number of groups providing information about the election reduces 
the information costs to the individual.  I predict that individuals residing in states with 
more initiatives and referenda on the ballot will demonstrate a higher propensity to cast a 
vote.  
 Gubernatorial and senate races also are opportunities for political actors to 
mobilize supporters.  Political races are coded with a dummy variable for states that had a 
gubernatorial race on the 2004 ballot and with a dummy variable for states that had a 
senatorial race on the 2004 ballot.  I predict that individuals in states with more political 
races will be more likely to turnout than individuals in states with no gubernatorial or 
senate races.  Increasing the number of electoral choices provides more motivation for 
individuals to turnout because one trip to the polls will allow them to affect statewide 




 Political spending by the two major presidential candidates of the 2004 election is 
measured by adding the money spent by both candidates, their national committees, and 
special interests groups.  The total spending amount is calculated by dividing the total 
amount of money spent by the population of the state to produce a per capita measure of 
political spending by state (Shaw).  I predict that higher levels of state political spending 
will have a positive effect on voter turnout. 
 Differences between early voting and non-early voting states.  In order to 
compare turnout for states with early voting and states with election day voting, I 
estimate separate models for these two sets of states. The different voting environments 
in early voting and non-early voting states may have an effect on the significance of some 
of the variables and the magnitude of the coefficients. 
 
FINDINGS 
 I present the findings from Chapter 6 in four different tables.  The four tables 
represent four different voter turnout models.  The four tables include estimated logit 
effects of each of the independent variables and the marginal effects of each of the 
variables on the dependent variable voter turnout.  Table 6.1 shows the findings of the 
voter turnout model that includes all individuals in my data set.  The model in Table 6.1 
includes an ease of early vote variable to account for the availability of mail-in and in-
person early voting policies.  Table 6.2 shows the estimates of my voter turnout model 
with the ease of early vote broken into two dummy variables.  Table 6.3 shows the 
estimates of my voter turnout model from individuals residing in states with no early 
voting policies.  This model does not include the ease of early voting variable because the 
states used in the model all have values of 0 for that specific variable and does not 
include individuals from non-early voting states.  Table 6.4 shows the findings of a voter 
turnout model that includes all individuals residing in states with at least one type of early 
voting option.  This fourth model includes all the variables from the model in Table 6.3 
that allow for a comparison of marginal effects across the models shown in Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4.  The next section of this chapter examines the four models and their findings. 
 Table 6.1 shows that there are many significant predictors of voter turnout.  The 
most important finding from the model shown in Table 6.1 is the positive and significant 
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predictor ease of early voting.  This means that the presents of one or more early voting 
policies in a state leads to an increase in the probability that an individual will cast a 
ballot.  My opportunity hypothesis is supported with the significant finding of the ease of 
early voting variable.  Specifically, with increased opportunity to cast a ballot individuals 
who reside in states with early voting laws are more likely to cast any type of ballot.  This 
may be do to individuals being informed of early voting possibilities well before election 
day through social institutions, work place interactions, media outlets, or political 
advertizing.  Individuals in early voting states may hear about early voting becoming 
available and start to think about the electoral choices they can make on election day.  In 
this respect, states with early voting are reminding the potential voters of the upcoming 
electoral choices they much make.  This awareness of an upcoming election may not be 
as prevalent in states that do not allow for any type of early voting. 
The other significant variables are over 65 years of age, level of income, 
suburban, party strength, network television news, cable television news, and the Ranney 
competition index.  All of these variables are in the predicted direction and are associated 
with an increase in the probability of casting a vote.  Specifically, individuals over the 
age of 65 are a strong voting group due to their socialization (Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993), social groups and ties (Putnam, 2000), fewer time constraints (Downs, 1957), and 
dependence on social security or other benefits provided by the government. 
Level of income is a significant positive predictor of voting.   One of the theories 
on why level of income has an effect on voter turnout is that individuals with high levels 
of income pay more taxes and are more interested in how their taxes are being spent.  
Also, individuals in professional jobs may belong to a union or be more likely to discuss 
politics with coworkers (Roenstone and Hansen, 1993). 
Living in the suburbs was expected to have a positive effect on voter turnout, but 
suburban residence is found to be a negative significant predictor of voting.  This may be 
because suburban residents are too busy to cast a vote or that the polls are in a 
inconvenient location (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003).  Party strength, as expected, is 
found to be a significant positive predictor of voter turnout.  Partisan strength measures 
the commitment to a specific party and I find that individuals who have more at stake, in 
terms of party, are more likely to vote.  Party support may be considered in this sense to 
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be similar to supporting a favorite team, and supporting your team can provide intrinsic 
benefits that cover all cost of participation (Downs, 1957). 
The two news variables, cable and network television news, are both found to be 
positive and significant predictors of voter turnout.  Watching any type of television news 
should reduce the costs of voting because the potential voter all ready has information 
about who the candidates are and their issue positions.  Individuals who are in the habit 
of keeping up with the news do not have to do any additional information seeking, or 
homework, to take part in an election.  Finally, the Ranney competition index is found to 
be a positive significant predictor of voting.  When competition in an election is high, 
every vote is perceived to have the potential to make the difference.  As show in Table 
6.1, I find that the closer the election is, the higher the voter turnout.  Overall my model 
provides a typical view of the modern electorate with many of the traditional high voter 
turnout factors, including over 65 years of age and income. 
Several of the non-significant variables shown in Table 6.1 were unexpected.  The 
most noticeable are the education variable and the state-level variables of registration 
closing date, number of ballots, statewide elections, and spending per capita.  Education 
is a common significant predictor in the voter turnout literature (Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993; Timpone, 2000), but was not shown to be in this study.  The state-level variable 
coefficients also are not significant with the exception of the state-level composite early 
voting variable. 
The last column of Table 6.1 shows the marginal effects of all the estimated 
coefficients.  These marginal effects allow for interpretation of the estimated coefficients 
as a percentage change in the change of casting a vote in the 2004 presidential election. 
The marginal effect of the variable ease of early voting in column 2 of Table 6.1 shows 
the change in probability for ease of early voting is 2.2%.  This estimation means that one 
early voting policy in a state increases the probability of casting any type of vote by 2.2% 
and two types of early voting in a state increases the probability of casting any type of 
vote by 4.4%.  This finding suggests that the addition of early voting policies can lead to 
an increase in turnout. 
 Table 6.2 shows the estimated model from Table 6.1with the ease of early voting 
measure broken into two variables, in-person early voting policy and no-excuse absentee 
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voting policy.  Neither of the two early voting coefficients was found to be significant.  
This means that while early voting policies in the aggregate were found to predict higher 
voter turnout, they were not significant predictors of voter turnout when taken as two 
separate policies.  This finding supports the idea that state-level laws can have an effect 
on overall voter turnout rate but not with a one-policy solution.  The findings related to 
the early voting policies suggest that election policies need to be examined in a group or 
bundle as well as individually.  The other significant coefficients in Table 6.2 are the 
same as in Table 6.1 and are in the expected directions. 
 The last two tables are used to compare the significant predictors of voter turnout 
across states with early voting policies and without early voting policies.  The significant 
findings shown in Table 6.3 from the non-early voting states include party strength, 
network television news use, cable television news use, NRA membership, registration 
closing date, and number of ballot measures.  The significant findings shown in Table 6.4 
from the early voting states include over 65 years of age, level of income, suburban 
residency, network television news use, Ranney competition, and registration closing 
date.  Interesting findings from the models shown in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 can be 
found in the differences between the early voting and non-early voting states.  These 
differences come in the form of significant variables (age 65 years and older and the 
Ranney competition) in the early voting states that are not significant in the non-early 
voting states.  The significance of the Ranney competition variable in early voting states 
is important because this finding means that increased competition is leading to an 
increase in voter turnout only in states with early voting laws.  Age over 65 years also is 
only significant in early voting states leading to the conclusion that elderly voters will 
turnout in states with early voting. 
There are notable differences between the significant coefficients in the non-early 
voting states and the early voting states.  First, registration closing date has a significant 
positive coefficient in the early voting state model and a significant negative coefficient 
in the non-early voting state model.  This means that states with early voting and short 
registration closing dates have higher voter turnout.  Having a registration closing date 
close to election day appears to remove barriers to voting in early voting states.  In the 
non-early voting state context, registration closing date acts as a barrier to participation.  
 
	137
Second, in states with high levels of competition, states with early voting have more 
turnout than non-early voting states.  High levels of competition appear to lead to higher 
participation rates when potential voters have more access to the ballot box.  Perhaps in 
early voting states voters can see that an election will be competitive or close and bank 
their vote early to guard against something coming up on election day.  Third, the party 
strength coefficient is only significant and positive in the non-early voting model.  This 
provides evidence that in states with no early voting, and thus higher barriers to 
participation, high levels of party strength become more important in predicting voter 
turnout.  Fourth, number of ballot measures is only significant and positive in the non-
early voting model.  Again, the number of ballot measures act as an extra pull to the 
polls, but may require more time to gather information on all referenda prior to casting a 
ballot.  These findings support the idea that in state contexts with a high demand on 
voting, (i.e., where the election is close or there are potential voters with free time) early 
voting increases voter turnout. 
 The overall findings from the voter turnout models provide evidence that early 
voting policies can lead to more voting participation and that some variables become 
significant when examined in states with early voting.  These findings suggest that state-
level context can have can effect on voter turnout. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 A great deal of voter turnout literature focuses on the low voter turnout rate found 
in the U.S. compared to other western democracies.  Both the federal government 
(through HAVA) and state governments (through registration and early voting polices) 
address the low voter turnout issue.  This chapter directly addresses early voting as a 
solution to the voter turnout issue.  The first major finding form Chapter 6 is that the 
number of early voting policies does have a positive effect on individual voter turnout.  
As suggested in Chapter 2, the finding from this chapter suggest that many states still 
have the use of early voting laws as a viable option for improving political participation. 
  The second major finding from Chapter 6 is that state-level context has an effect 
on the factors that predict voter turnout.  The models used in this chapter were meant to 
examine the differences between early and non-early voting states and I find that there 
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are individuals choosing to cast ballots early that may lead to in increase in overall 
participation.  Living in a state with early voting laws appears to be one of the differences 
between voting and non-voting individuals.  Early voting laws allow individuals to 
participate in elections with more convenience and are predicted to increase voter turnout 
when measured as an early voting policy count variable. 
 The examination of the differences between early voting states and non-early 
voting states is important due to the political consequences of electoral participation.  The 
predictability of the models presented in this chapter could be improved by adding more 
observations across different elections.  An alternative measure of early voting could be 
used that is similar to the measurement of registration closing date.  The alternative 
measure of early voting would account for the number of days before election day that 
early voting opens.  This would better measure the amount of opportunity that early 
voting gives voters in a certain state, and may be more predictive of turnout that the 
measure of early voting which simple categories states as allowing or not allowing early 
voting.  In the next chapter I present a future research agenda for early voting research 
and summarize the findings from this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the research presented in the previous six chapters is to increase 
knowledge of how early voting effects turnout, who early votes, and the affect and 
multitude of factors on early voting.  As noted in Chapter 1, one measure of how well a 
democracy functions is to measure the number of eligible citizens who exercise their 
right to vote.  In the U.S., participation rates are low compared to those of other Western 
Democracies with turnout rates between 55% and 60% for presidential elections.  Such 
low turnout may be symptomatic of a variety of factors such as the majoritarian structure 
of the U.S. electoral system, which creates a sort of apathy among the electorate due to 
“wasted votes.”  Other factors affecting low turnout may be costs in terms of time or 
information gathering.  Regardless of the cause of low participation in the U.S., the cure, 
according to some theorists, must be found in order to ensure the health of the U.S. 
democracy.  Classical participation theorists view active participation of the electorate as 
necessary to a strong democracy.  From the classical stance, the identification of factors 
that increase voter turnout as extremely important.  Early voting opportunities were found 
in this dissertation to be a viable option for state to increase turnout. 
On the other hand, low participation in the U.S. is not always viewed as 
necessarily negative.  Elitist participation theorists see active participation as not 
necessary to a strong democracy because only a subset of the population has the 
resources to make good vote choices.  From an elitist stance, the identification of factors 
that increase voter turnout are not the primary focus when looking for ways to maintain 
or increase the health of the U.S. democracy.  The potential that early voting has to make 
the voter process more convenient for the subset of eligible voters who do exercise their 
right to vote is of interest to those of a more elitist view.  Early voting opportunities were 
shown in this dissertation to be a way to increase voting convenient for those citizens 
who typically vote. 
As early voting policies were passed over the last 20 years, they were believed to 
produce a dramatic increase in participation in U.S. elections.  Based on the early 
research on early voting we would expect to see increases in voter turnout by 10%.  
Based on the research in this dissertation, I find that each early voting policy increases 
the probability that an individual will cast a vote by only 2.2%.  While early voting 
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opportunities do not represent a panacea for increasing voter turnout, they do affect a 
significant increase, specifically when we consider that only half of the states have early 
voting policies.  The relatively low increase in voter turnout translates into traditional 
voters moving to early voting from election day voting without bringing in new non-
traditional voters. 
Looking at the political implications of the expansion of early voting policies, the 
expected political advantage of an expanding electorate is for the Democratic party.  The 
Democratic party coalition includes individuals that are not considered typical voters, 
such as minorities, the young, and the poor.  Since early voting presumably makes the 
voting process easier, it expected that early voting policies would cause an increase in 
voter turnout among those less typical Democratic voting cohorts.  As with the Motor 
Voter Law which increased the ease of voting, I have found that early voting does not 
dramatically increase the level of voter turnout. 
Early voting can also be examined in a comparative context.  Some counties in 
Europe, including Estonia, have used early voting as well as e-voting in national and 
local elections (Alvarez, Hall, Trechsel, 2009).  The use of e-voting brings up similar 
questions as early voting does.  Questions such as who uses the new voting technology, 
which political party gains from the new technology, and will the new technology 
increase participation will need to be examined in order to understand how e-voting may 
potentially effect election outcomes. 
 Regardless of the reason early voting is considered important, the potential it has 
to affect the ease and accessibility of voting warrants the attention of those who wish to 
better understand the state of U.S. democracy.  In order to examine early voting in the 
U.S., Chapters 2 through 6 of this dissertation address different questions related to 
factors that influence early voting policy and what the affect of early voting options and 
opportunity has on the electorate.  The major questions addressed are what affects do 
state-level factors have on early voting policy passage (Chapter 2), how early voting 
affects party mobilization efforts (Chapter 3), how early voters differ from election day 
voters (Chapter 4), what factors predict early voters (Chapter 5), and does early voting 




SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN THIS DISSERTATION 
The effects of state-level factors on early voting policy passage are addressed in 
Chapter 2 through examining the history and expansion of early voting since 1980.  
Nearly half of the states currently have early voting laws of one type or another (i.e., no-
excuse absentee or in-person early voting.  Based on results from the state-level models 
presented in chapter 2, the growth of in-person early voting laws appears to be due to 
state-level ideological factors (i.e., conservative citizen ideology, Democratic statehouse 
control, passage of the motor voter act, statehouse times gini coefficient and registration 
closing date).  Neighbor effects (i.e., diffusion) are shown to have a positive effect on any 
early voting policy passage and no effect in my models of in-person or no-excuse 
absentee early voting policy passage.  I find little support for the idea that early voting 
policies diffuse in a similar manner as other policies such as the use of a state lottery or 
levels of welfare support.  The findings of chapter 2 are not meant to describe what 
should be done in order to increase the likelihood of a state passing early voting policy, 
but rather are meant to be taken as a description of the type of state political environment 
that is conducive to the passage of early voting policy. 
The manner in which early voting influences state party mobilization efforts is 
addressed in Chapter 3 through the use of interviews with state-level political party 
representatives.  These representatives talked about the changes in mobilization due to 
the change in early voting laws.  The findings of Chapter 3 indicate political rallies 
immediately followed by early voting were utilized for early voting mobilization more so 
by Democratic state parties than Republican state parties.  Phone calls and targeted 
messages were used more in Republican early voting mobilization efforts that 
Democratic early voting mobilization efforts.  Despite differences in the specific method 
of early voting mobilization that state party representatives discussed using, a major 
theme emerged across all interviews with regards to the costs and benefits of early voting 
mobilization.  Representatives from both parties recognized that early voting created 
more opportunities to mobilize their supporters, but also noted that early voting 
mobilization is costly.  Overall, both parties saw early voting as positive, but neither 
thought that early voting mobilization greatly influence the vote outcomes in their state 
for the 2004 election. 
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The ways in which early voters differ from election day voters is addressed in 
Chapter 4 through a descriptive examination of demographic, political, and state-level 
factors.  Demographic factors of age and type of area lived in are found to describe some 
differences between early and election day voters with early voters being older and, 
regardless of age, more likely to live in urban areas.  State-level factors pertaining to the 
length or registration and the number of statewide initiatives and referenda on the ballot 
also describes some differences between early voting and election day voters.  Early 
voters tend to live in state with long registration process.  Early voters also are found to 
live in state, with few statewide initiatives and referenda on the ballot.  Interestingly 
political factors such as ideology and partisanship strength are not found to describe a 
difference between early and election day voters. 
The findings of Chapter 4 are not meant to be predictive of who among voters 
will choose to early vote.  The findings simply identify factors that were found to be 
different for groups who early vote compared to groups that election day vote.  The 
identification that observable differences do exist between early and election day voters is 
important because those differences indicate that there may be factors that are in fact 
predictive of who among voters will choose to early vote.  The demographic factors and 
state-level factors that were found to describe differences among early and election day 
voters informed the selection of factors examined in Chapter 5 to predict early voting use. 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to examine factors that predict early voting, not just 
describe differences between early and election day voting as Chapter 4 does.  
Convenience factors for voting are found to predict who early vote or election day vote 
with being employed predicting election day voting area predicting early voting.  Early 
voting also is predicted by the demographic factor of level of income.  In addition to the 
convenience factor of being employed election day voting is predicted by the state-level 
factor of living in a state with fewer direct democracy measures on the ballot. 
The identification of predicable differences between early voters and election day 
voters is important in that such differences show the two groups of voters to be unique 
groups in the electorate that may be targeted in the unique ways.  The identification of 
early voters as a unique groups of voters gave rise to the questions of whether or not early 
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voters were a new group of people who did not vote prior to early voting opportunities.  
This question is addressed in Chapter 6. 
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to examine whether the passage of early voting 
policies affects an increase in voter turnout.  If early voting opportunities do affect an 
increase is overall turnout, than early voters are, at least in part, a group who previously 
did not vote.  That is, early voting opportunities act to increase political participation.  
The findings of Chapter 6 show that early voting policies do have a small but significant 
effect on getting more individuals to the polls.  This means that early voting policies lead 
to support among classical theorists by expanding the electorate as well as elite theorists 
by making the voting process easier for individuals who would have normally voted. 
The results from this dissertation contribute to the discussion concerning the 
different effects of early voting on the U.S. political system.  Even when electoral 
institutional and individual-level changes are small, the changes have the opportunity to 
change different aspects of the political system from how parties mobilize the electorate 
to who choose to exercise their right to vote. 
 
EARLY VOTING POLICY TODAY AND BEYOND 
During the completion of this dissertation the implementation of early voting 
policies has changed and become more flexible than I expected.  In some cases early 
voting state have changed the rules regarding the number of days that early voting 
options are available.  Specifically, states have decreased the number of days that early 
voting in available before election day.  This may be due to two different reasons.  First, 
states may want to save money by limiting their number of early voting days.  Cutting 
back a few days of early voting does not change the nature of the state election but only 
limits the possible effects of the early vote. 
Second, states may not want to make the voting process more easy or convenient.  
The limiting of early voting can be viewed in a number of different ways.  One view is 
that the political parties may want to limit the use of early voting in order to increase their 
chances of winning an election.  This makes sense when taking the view that in some 
states the majority party would be able to keep control of the statehouse with lower voter 
turnout if the majority of the state population would vote against them.  A second view is 
 
	144
that early voting may not conform to a secure voting system.  Different models of early 
voting such as mail-in and on-line voting have brought up security concerns.  Some states 
may wish to avoid such security issues by focusing just on election day voting. 
 
THE CONTUNIED STUDY OF EARLY VOTING 
Towards an ease of voting measure   
In this dissertation I examine early voting policies and other state-level electoral 
policies as individual policies and not as a group or collection.  Early voting research 
could be expanded by combining all types of electoral policies into one ease of voting 
measure.  All of the individual measures I examined in this dissertation (i.e., in-person 
early voting, no-excuse absentee, and registration closing date) focus on the relative ease 
or difficulty of casting a vote. These measures could be combined using a factor analysis 
that determines an overall ease of voting score.  More factors of ease of voting could be 
added such as voter ID requirement, how many polling places there are in the local area, 
how long the polls are open, and how many days early voting is available.  The factor 
analysis variable could then be tested in a model similar to the voter turnout model used 
in Chapter 6 in order to determine if ease of voting brings more people to the polls and a 
method of vote model used in Chapter 5 to determine if ease of voting contributes to 
voters deciding to vote early.  Combining all ease of voting measures together also 
should allow for comments about which single institution is the most effective in 
bringing individuals to the polls or if a grouping of institutions lead to more participation.  
The debate on how easy or difficult it is to cast a ballot will continue but the wide range 
of electoral institutions available for study should allow the opportunity to find which 
institutions are effective in bringing individuals to the polls or keeping them away. 
Examining the day-to-day of early voting  
A second way to examine how early voting affects the U.S. political system 
would be to directly view the inner workings of a campaign by talking directly to early 
voters as they come out of the polling place.  This embedded method requires many hours 
of watching campaign workers do their work or standing outside of polling places and 
asking early voters why they went to the polls early.  This idea is closely related to the 
examination of methods of mobilization in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  Direct 
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interaction between subject, in this case political party and the voting public, allows for a 
clear view of individual political behavior.  By talking to people coming out of the 
polling place a deeper understanding of what brought people to the polls that specific day 
could be found.  For example, questions such as why did you early vote today, do you 
usually vote on election day, and would you have voted if early voting was not available?  
There are many different patterns that could emerge, from people leaving work a few 
minutes early, to retried voters, to parents with three kids. 
Early voting and internet voting 
Another avenue for future research in the use of technology and voting is at the 
ballot box, specifically if the ballot box becomes a virtual place with internet voting.  As 
internet or e-voting becomes more of a possibility, there are new questions that will need 
to be addressed.  Those questions are similar to the questions addressed in this 
dissertation about early voting, but have aspects that are unique to e-voting.  Specifically, 
questions relating to how to provide a secure method for casting a ballot over the internet, 
the possible digital divide between individuals who have internet connections and those 
who do not, and whether or not if older voters will embrace the new voting technology 
like they have with early voting will need to be addressed. 
	
	
THE FUTURE OF EARLY VOTING 
	 With the recent reduction of early voting days in many states the future of early 
voting remains uncertain.  While I think that some states will decreases the number of 
days for early voting I expect that early voting will remain an option for voters in states 
with current laws.  For states that do not have early voting laws, I expect that most will 
pass some type of in-person early voting policy.  Also, I expect that early voting laws will 
begin to cluster around allowing early voting for one week before election day in all 
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Table 2.2: State-level variable measurement 
Variable Measurement Data Source Value 
In Person Early 
Voting Policy 
Dummy for Passage of  
In Person Early Voting Policy Gronke 0 or 1 
No-Excuse Absentee 
Policy 
Dummy for Passage of In  
No-Excuse Absentee Voting Policy Gronke 0 or 1 
Neighbor State 
Dummy for States Sharing a Common 
Border Author 0 or 1 
2000 Year Event Dummy for Years After 2000 Author 0 or 1 





Count Variable of State Government 
Held By Democrats (Upper House, 
Lower House, and Gov. Office) 
Book of the States 
 
 
0 to 3 
 
 




State Public Opinion from 
Conservative (value 0) to Liberal 












Voting Eligible Population Measure of 





Voter Turnout Square 
 









State-level Gini Coefficient for Income 








Population of State Divided by Number 
of Square Miles per 1000 Square Miles 
Book of the States 
 
.40 to   
1170 
Motor Voter Passage 
 
Dummy for Passage of Motor Voter 
Law Before 1993 
Counsel of State 
Legislatures 




Number of Days Before Election that 
Registration Closes 
Counsel of State 
Legislatures 




Table 2.3: Predicting no-excuse absentee early voting policy passage, 1980-2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
        No-Excuse Absentee 
                 Passage 
       -------------------------- 
Variable          b    z 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Diffusion 
Absentee Voting State Neighbor (+)   0.006   1.19 
 
Events 
Event Year 2000 (+)     0.495   1.12 
  
State-Level Political 
Statehouse Party Control (+)    1.773   0.88 
State Citizen Ideology (+)                           0.001   0.07 
State-level Voter Turnout (+)                       -10.320               -0.44 
State-level Voter Turnout Squared (-)                     8.380   0.41 
 
State-Level Demographic 
Gini Coefficient (+)                 18.442   1.40 
Population Density (+)                      -0.003  -1.48 
Gini X Statehouse Party Control (+)               -4.348  -0.80 
 
Early Policy Adoption 
Motor Voter Passage (+)                  -0.339  -0.97 
Registration Closing Date (+)                            -0.017  -1.26 
 
Constant                   -4.807                   -0.62 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
N           288 
2          13.24 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient and directional 
predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
*  prob < 0.10 
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Table 2.4: Predicting in-person early voting policy passage, 1980-2006 
_____________________________________________________________________  
        In-Person Early Voting 
                 Passage 
       -------------------------- 
Variable            b    z 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Diffusion 
In-Person Voting State Neighbor (+)                 -0.146  -1.65 
 
Events 
Event Year 2000 (+)       3.440    1.34 
 
State-Level Political 
Statehouse Party Control (+)                        -27.392  -1.75* 
State Citizen Ideology (+)                                  0.235   1.74* 
State-Level Voter Turnout (+)                              -78.961  -0.39 
State-Level Voter Turnout Squared (-)                            116.537   0.66 
Gini X Statehouse Party Control (+)   75.703   1.98* 
 
State-Level Demographic 
Gini Coefficient (+)              -123.174  -1.15 
Population Density (+)                                -0.016  -0.95 
 
Early Policy Adoption 
Motor Voter Passage (+)                  10.361   1.93* 
Registration Closing Date (+)                   0.215   1.91* 
 
Constant                                 38.173   0.60 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N           256 
2          15.34 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient and directional 
predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 




Table 2.5: Predicting any early voting policy passage, 1980-2006 
________________________________________________________________________ 
             Any Early Voting          
                 Passage   
       --------------------------  
Variable       b    z
 _________________________________________________________________ 
Diffusion 
Absentee Voting State Neighbor (+)               -0.013              -1.14  
In-Person Voting State Neighbor (+)                0.015  1.98** 
 
Events 
Event Year 2000 (+)     0.481  1.09 
 
State-Level Political 
Statehouse Party Control (+)              1.134  0.52 
State Citizen Ideology (+)     0.000  0.03 
State-Level Voter Turnout (+)                                        -9.862              -0.42 
State-Level Voter Turnout Squared (-)   7.698  0.37 
Gini X Statehouse Party Control (+)               -2.501              -0.43 
 
State-Level Demographic 
Gini Coefficient (+)     19.503  1.43 
Population Density (+)     -0.003              -1.60 
 
Early Policy Adoption 
Motor Voter Passage (+)     -0.167  -0.47 
Registration Closing Date (+)    -0.017  -1.25 
 
Constant                               -5.297  -0.67 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N           224 
2          16.28 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient and directional 
predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
*  prob < 0.10 
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Table 2.6: Predicting no-excuse absentee early voting policy passage, 1980-2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
            No-Excuse Absentee 
         Passage No Interactions 
       -------------------------- 
Variable          b    z 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Diffusion 
Absentee Voting State Neighbor (+)   0.007              -1.09 
 
Events 
Event Year 2000 (+)     0.710  1.12 
 
State-Level Political 
Statehouse Party Control (+)    0.222  1.09 
State Citizen Ideology (+)              0.002  0.17 
State-level Voter Turnout (+)                         -0.624              -0.21 
 
State-Level Demographic 
Gini Coefficient (+)                 11.101  1.15 
Population Density (+)                      -0.004              -1.14 
 
Early Policy Adoption 
Motor Voter Passage (+)                 -0.310              -0.80 
Registration Closing Date (+)                           -0.018              -1.05 
 
Constant                  -5.041              -1.16 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
N           228 
2          3.646     
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient and directional 
predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
*  prob < 0.10 
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Table 2.7: Predicting in-person early voting policy passage, 1980-2006 
________________________________________________________________________ 
        In-Person Early Voting 
                                Passage No Interactions 
       -------------------------- 
Variable          b    z 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Diffusion 
In-Person Voting State Neighbor (+)               -0.029  -1.45 
 
Events 
Event Year 2000 (+)     0.147   0.22 
 
State-Level Political 
Statehouse Party Control (+)                         0.265                0.86 
State Citizen Ideology (+)                              -0.031               -0.89 
State-Level Voter Turnout (+)                              6.426                0.67 
 
State-Level Demographic 
Gini Coefficient (+)                  9.006   0.43 
Population Density (+)                              -0.003               -0.95 
 
Early Policy Adoption 
Motor Voter Passage (+)                 1.273  0.93 
Registration Closing Date (+)                0.015  0.40 
  
Constant                              -8.652              -0.91 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N                         256 
2        2.48 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient and directional 
predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
*  prob < 0.10 
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Table 2.8: Predicting any early voting policy passage, 1980-2006 
________________________________________________________________________ 
             Any Early Voting          
                  Passage No Interactions   
       --------------------------  
Variable       b    z
 _________________________________________________________________ 
Diffusion 
Absentee Voting State Neighbor (+)   -0.013               -1.22  
In-Person Voting State Neighbor (+)                 0.015**   2.02 
 
Events 
Event Year 2000 (+)      0.524  1.21 
 
State-Level Political 
Statehouse Party Control (+)               0.224  1.47 
State Citizen Ideology (+)      0.001  0.09 
State-Level Voter Turnout (+)              -1.144              -0.45 
 
State-Level Demographic 
Gini Coefficient (+)     14.125** 2.13 
Population Density (+)     -0.003              -1.69 
 
Early Policy Adoption 
Motor Voter Passage (+)     -0.143               -0.41 
Registration Closing Date (+)    -0.017               -1.27 
 
Constant                               -5.783  -1.99 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N           224  
2          16.59 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient and directional 
predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 




Table 3.1: Breakdown of party contacts and state early voting laws 
 Republican Democrat 
New Early Voting State 2 1 
Old Early Voting State 3 1 




Table 3.2: Revised Breakdown of party contacts and state early voting laws 
 Republican (7) Democrat (5) 
Early Voting State 5 2 




Table 3.3: Summary of early voting mobilization techniques (Question 1) 
 Republican (7) Democrat (5) 
Political Rally 29% (2) 60% (3) 
Door-to-Door 86% (6) 80% (4) 
Flyers 100% (7) 100% (5) 
Phone Calls 100% (7) 60% (3) 





Table 3.4: Differences in techniques (Question 2) 
 Republican (7) Democrat (5) 
Political Rally  + 31% 
Door-to-Door + 6%   
Flyers NA NA 
Phone Calls + 40%   




Table 3.5: Summary of early voting as helping candidate (Question 3) 
 Republican (7) Democrat (5) 
Yes 14% (1) 40% (2) 
No 86% (6) 60% (3) 
Note: Percentages are calculated by party 
 
 
Table 3.6: Use of targeted early voting mobilization (Question 4) 
 Republican (7) Democrat (5) 
Targeted 71% (5) 40% (2) 
No 29% (2) 60% (4) 
Note: Percentages are calculated by party
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Appendix 3.1 Interview Script for:  State Party/Interest Group Representative 
 
Thank you __________ for taking the time answer a few questions about early voting.  I 
will start off with some general questions about early voting before moving into specifics.  
To ensure our definitions are the same I consider early voting as in-person or advance 
voting as well as no-excuse mail-in voting.  Feel free to make distinctions between these 
two types of early voting. 
 
1) How have your mobilization strategies changed due to early voting?  Does early voting 
make your mobilization strategies more efficient? 
 
2) Have your mobilization strategies changed due to the actions of other parties and 
groups?  How are other parties and groups utilizing early voting? 
 
3) How has early voting increased the changes of your candidate being elected?  How has 
early voting decreased the changes of your candidate being elected? 
 
4) Do you make any type of targeted mobilization for specific types of voters during 
early voting and to which groups?  Do these groups include new voters?  
 
5) The media describe early voting as simply expanding election day, do you feel that this 
is an accurate description of early voting?  Why not?  Do you view early voting as a 
policy tool that leads to increased voter turnout?  How has early voting made your job 




Appendix 4.1: Independent Variables 
Variable Measurement Source 
Sex 1=Female, 0=Male NAES 
Age 18-97 Years Old NAES 
Black 1=Black, 0=otherwise NAES 
Hispanic 1=Hispanic, 0=otherwise NAES 
Education 
0= Did not finish High School 
to 10= doctoral degree 
NAES 
Married 1-married, 0=otherwise NAES 
Working 
1=Currently full-time working, 
0=otherwise 
NAES 
Years at address 
1 to 97 for number of years at 
current address 
NAES 
Suburban 1=Suburban, 0=Rural NAES 
Urban 1=Urban, 0=Rural NAES 
Income 
1= less than $15,000 per year 




1=Union member living in 
household 0=otherwise 
NAES 
Party Strength 0=Non-Partisan, 1= NAES 
 Weak Partisan, 2=Partisan  
 3=Strong Partisan  
Care for Election Outcome 1=Yes, 0=No NAES 
Evangelical 
1=Identify as an evangelical 
Christian, 0=otherwise 
NAES 
Network TV Use 
0=No Network TV use to 
7=Network TV use everyday 
NAES 
Cable TV Use 
0=No Cable TV use to 
7=Cable TV use everyday 
NAES 
Ranney Competition Index 
.5 to 1 from Low Levels of 
Competition to High 
Politics of the American 
States 
Statewide Races 
Count variable of number of 
statewide races from 0 to 2 
Book of the States 
Per Capita Political Spending 




Number of ballot measures 
count from 0 to 16 
www.ncsl.org 
Registration Closing Date 
Number of days before election 
day that registration closes, 
ranges from 0 (no closing date) 
to 30 (closes one month before) 
Book of the States 
Early Voting Policies 
Count variable of number of 
early voting policies from 0 to 
2 
Kinsky 2005 







Continued from Appendix 4.1   
Accurate Vote 
1=Very Doubtful to 4 Very 
Confident NAES 
Election Makes a Difference 
-2=Strong Disagree to 2 Strong 
Agree 
NAES 
Feel Guilty if You Did Not Vote 
-2=Strong Disagree to 2 Strong 
Agree 
NAES 
It is American to Vote 




0=No Party Affiliation 
3=Strong 
NAES 
Attend Religious Services 0= Never to 3=+1 per Week NAES 
Follow Politics 




0=Never to 3=Most of the 
Time 
NAES 
Perception of Personal Economy 0= Poor View to 3=Excellent NAES 
Perception of National Economy 0= Poor View to 3=Excellent NAES 
Country is Going in Right Direction 








1=Strong Liberal to 5=Strong 
Conservative 
NAES 
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Table 4.1:  Mean and F-test of independent variables 
  Number Mean Mean Mean ANOVA 
Variable of Cases Early Voter Election Day Non-Voters F-Statistic 
Demographic Variables      
Sex 2357 0.508 0.583 0.584 1.25 
Age 2324 51.279 47.767 39.887 2.80*** 
Income 2099 5.831 5.762 3.864 16.01*** 
Education 2320 5.828 5.681 3.894 21.01*** 
Married 2357 0.631 0.601 0.450 12.38*** 
Black 2357 0.105 0.066 0.103 4.08*** 
Hispanic 2357 0.026 0.049 0.299 106.36*** 
Employed 2357 0.561 0.553 0.526 1.44 
Years at Residents 2327 11.090 12.149 6.996 1.45 
Urban 2320 0.334 0.287 0.275 0.81 
Suburban 2320 0.446 0.503 0.509 0.20 
Union 2357 0.114 0.138 0.155 1.92 
Evangelical 2357 0.421 0.342 0.374 0.07 
Network News Viewership 2342 2.824 3.154 1.976 4.64*** 
Cable News Viewership 2346 3.717 3.342 2.003 8.67*** 
Number of Kids 2357 0.657 0.814 1.137 10.00*** 
Part Time Employment 2357 0.105 0.127 0.192 6.21*** 
       
Political Variables      
How Soon Mind Was Made Up 975 2.511 2.423 N/A 0.34 
Bush Vote 1558 0.431 0.472 N/A 0.26 
American to Vote 1324 0.878 0.828 -0.454 26.38*** 
Guilty if You Don’t Vote 1314 1.104 1.008 0.045 22.50*** 
Elections Make a Difference 1337 1.468 1.366 0.878 10.59*** 
My Vote Will be Counted 
Accurately 
1873 
2.548 2.666 N/A 0.93 
Ideology Folded 2320 2.177 2.249 2.297 1.26 
Party Strength 2152 2.221 2.223 1.826 11.55*** 
       
State-Level Variables      
Registration Closing Date 2350 26.359 23.382 24.597 2.18 
Ballot Measures 2350 2.754 3.603 4.134 6.27*** 
Governors Race 2350 0.167 0.144 0.117 7.11*** 
Senate Race 2350 0.544 0.759 0.731 0.18 
Rep. Spending per Capita 2350 3091775 4360669 4060975 5.66*** 
Dem. Spending per Capita 2350 3541171 4669610 4348184 6.04*** 
State Population 2350 8340695 8749496 1.03E+07 3.27*** 
State Wide Elections 2350 0.711 0.904 0.848 3.57*** 
      
*prob < .05  
**prob < .01  




Table 4.2: T-test between early voters and election day voters 
Variable Number Difference T-ratio Prob. 
Demographic Variables of Cases       
Sex 1317 -0.024 -1.54 0.123 
Age 1299 0.001 2.27 0.023** 
Income 1190 0.001 0.34 0.734 
Education 1300 0.002 0.67 0.5 
Married 1317 0.010 0.64 0.524 
Black 1317 0.049 1.59 0.111 
Hispanic 1317 -0.040 -1.09 0.274 
Employed 1317 0.002 0.18 0.86 
Years at Residents 1302 -0.001 -0.84 0.403 
Urban 1317 0.036 2.12 0.034** 
Suburban 1317 -0.043 -2.75 0.006** 
Union 1317 -0.016 -0.71 0.476 
Evangelical 1317 0.028 1.7 0.089 
Network 1308 -0.004 -1.26 0.209 
Cable 1311 0.004 1.34 0.182 
Kids 1317 -0.009 -1.37 0.171 
Part Time 1317 -0.016 -0.68 0.5 
         
Political Variables        
How Soon Mind Was 
Made Up 
952 
0.013 1.05 0.294 
Bush Vote 632 -0.014 -0.6 0.551 
American to Vote 1291 0.003 0.61 0.544 
Guilty if You Don’t Vote 1280 0.004 0.79 0.432 
Elections Make a 
Difference 
1302 
0.004 0.64 0.521 
My Vote Will be Counted 
Accurately 
1281 
0.004 0.39 0.697 
Ideology Folded 1298 -0.012 -1.08 0.282 
Party Strength 1192 -0.001 -0.02 0.982 
         
State-Level Variables        
Registration 1313 0.003 3.48 0.001*** 
Ballots 1313 -0.003 -1.73 0.083* 
Gov Race 1313 0.014 0.65 0.518 
Sen Race 1313 -0.089 -5.07 0*** 
Rep Spending 1313 -0.000 -1.71 0.088* 
Dem Spending 1313 -0.000 -1.38 0.168 
Population 1313 -0.000 -0.58 0.565 
State Wide Elections 1313 -0.042 -3.29 0.001*** 
     
     
*prob < .05  
**prob < .01  
***prob < .001  
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Appendix 5.1:  Independent Variables 
Variable Measurement Source 
Sex 1=Female, 0=Male NAES 
Over 65 Years of Age 65 or More Years Old NAES 
Black 1=Black, 0=otherwise NAES 
Hispanic 1=Hispanic, 0=otherwise NAES 
Education 
0= Did not finish High School 
to 10= doctoral degree 
NAES 
Married 1-married, 0=otherwise NAES 
Working 
1=Currently full-time working, 
0=otherwise 
NAES 
Years at address 
1 to 97 for number of years at 
current address 
NAES 
Suburban 1=Suburban, 0=Rural NAES 
Urban 1=Urban, 0=Rural NAES 
Income 
1= less than $15,000 per year 




1=Union member living in 
household 0=otherwise 
NAES 
Party Strength 0=Non-Partisan, 1= NAES 
 Weak Partisan, 2=Partisan  
 3=Strong Partisan  
Care for Election Outcome 1=Yes, 0=No NAES 
Evangelical 
1=Identify as an evangelical 
Christian, 0=otherwise 
NAES 
Network TV Use 
0=No Network TV use to 
7=Network TV use everyday 
NAES 
Cable TV Use 
0=No Cable TV use to 
7=Cable TV use everyday 
NAES 
Ranney Competition Index 
.5 to 1 from Low Levels of 
Competition to High 
Politics of the American 
States 
Statewide Races 
Count variable of number of 
statewide races from 0 to 2 
Book of the States 
Per Capita Political Spending 




Number of ballot measures 
count from 0 to 16 
www.ncsl.org 
Registration Closing Date 
Number of days before election 
day that registration closes, 
ranges from 0 (no closing date) 
to 30 (closes one month before) 

















Table 5.1: Predicting election day voting, early voting, and non-voting 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
       Election Day Voter            Early Voter 
     --------------------------  ---------------------------- 
Variable        b    z     b      z 
 
Convenience 
Employed (+)     0.494   2.16**   0.484   2.22** 
Married (+)    -0.219  -0.99  -0.171  -0.78 
Number of Children (+)   -0.042  -0.42  -0.056  -0.58 
Over 65 Years of Age (+)    0.392   1.36   0.037   0.13 
Rural (-)     -0.328  -1.25   0.078   0.38 
Suburban (-)    -0.546  -2.26**  -0.268  -1.11 
 
Information Needs 
Party Strength (+)    0.100    0.93  -0.061  -0.61 
Ideology Strength (+)   -0.160  -1.05   0.128   0.87 
Education (+)    -0.708  -1.41   0.068   1.41 
 
Mobilization 
Union (+)     0.205  .065  -0.141  -0.39 
Evangelical (+)    -0.142  -0.68   0.153   0.08 
 
Demographic 
Sex (+)     -0.106  -0.52  -0.226  -1.15 
Black (-)    -0.543  -0.99   0.376   1.03 
Hispanic (-)     0.454   1.29  -0.130  -0.30 
Years at Residents (+)    0.006   0.81   0.002   0.20 
Income (+)     0.157   2.50**   0.115   1.94** 
Network News Use (+)    0.026   0.70   0.040   1.12 
Cable News Use (+)    0.009   0.27   0.004   0.15 
 
State-Level 
State Wide Elections (+)   -0.612  -2.52**   0.192   0.55 
Spending per Capita (+)   -0.097  -1.31   0.336   2.54** 
Number of Ballots (+)    0.191   3.56***  -0.282  -2.79** 
Registration Closing Date (-)  -0.120  -3.28***  0.169   2.73** 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
N           1266 
Pseudo R2         .384  
2        132.60 
Prob (2)       0.0000 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient for the early voting group, 
the constant is not shown, and directional predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
*  prob < 0.10 
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Table 5.2: Predicting early voting from all voters 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
              Early Voter   Marginal Effects 
                 -----------------------------        -----------------------------  
Variable        b    z          dy/dx 
 
Convenience 
Employed (+)     0.477   2.89**   0.080** 
Married (+)    -0.202  -1.24  -0.034 
Number of Children (+)   -0.044  -0.60  -0.007 
Over 65 Years of Age (+)    0.239   1.09   0.041 
Rural (-)     -0.089  -0.47  -0.014 
Suburban (-)    -0.404  -2.25**  -0.066** 
 
Information Needs 
Party Strength (+)    0.020  0.26   0.0003 
Ideology Strength (+)   -0.019              -0.17  -0.003 
Education (+)     0.001  0.04   0.003 
 
Mobilization 
Union (+)     0.029  0.12  0.004 
Evangelical (+)     0.013  0.09  0.002  
 
Demographic 
Sex (+)                 -0.171              -1.16              -0.027 
Black (-)    0.048  0.16  0.008 
Hispanic (-)    0.190  0.66  0.032 
Years at Residents (+)   0.004  0.69  0.001 
Income (+)    0.135  2.96**  0.022** 
Network News Use (+)   0.035  1.29  0.006 
Cable News Use (+)   0.006  0.25  0.001 
 
State-Level 
State Wide Elections (+)   -0.502  -2.54**  -0.082** 
Spending per Capita (+)    0.019   0.30   0.003 
Number of Ballots (+)   -0.027   0.58   0.004 
Registration Closing Date (-)  -0.026  -0.82  -0.004 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
N           753 
Pseudo R2         .383  
2         50.89 
Prob (2)       0.0000 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient for the early voting group, 
the constant is not shown, and directional predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 




Table 6.1: All states voter turnout model 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
        Turnout Estimates            Marginal Effects 
      --------------------------           --------------------- 
Variable         b      z        dy/dx 
Ease of Early Vote (+)    0.029  2.18**       .0223** 
Sex (+)      0.441  0.77       .0067 
Black (-)     0.673                   -0.42      -.0117 
Hispanic (-)     0.399  0.84       .0188 
Over 65 Years Old (+)    0.006  2.75**       .0421** 
Years at Residents (+)    0.477  0.71       .0002 
Married (+)     0.118              -1.56       -.0180 
Income (+)     0.006  2.78**       .0090** 
Education (+)     0.197  1.29       .0025 
Urban (+)     0.829  0.22       .0044 
Suburban (+)     0.007                   -2.71**      -.0377** 
Party Strength (+)    0.010  2.57       .0144* 
Network News Use (+)    0.000  4.18***       .0076*** 
Cable News Use (+)    0.004  2.89**       .0057** 
Union (+)                  0.606              -0.52      -.0069 
Evangelical (+)     0.654  0.45       .0045 
NRA (+)     0.589  0.54       .0058 
Ranney (+)     0.001  3.24***       .2796*** 
Registration Closing Date (-)   0.193  1.30       .0011 
Ballots Measures (+)    0.262  1.12       .0017 
Statewide Elections (+)                 0.150              -1.44      -.0198 
Spending Per Capita (+)    0.417  0.81       .0035 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
N           5003 
Pseudo R2           .370  
2          388.38 
Prob (2)         0.0000 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient the constant is not shown, only significant marginal 
effects are shown, and directional predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 




Table 6.2: All states voter turnout model with early voting and absentee 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
         Turnout Estimates    Marginal Effects 
      --------------------------    --------------------- 
Variable         b     z              dy/dx 
Early Voting     0.352   1.24   .048 
No-Excuse Absentee    0.048   0.15   .006 
Sex (+)      0.045   0.68   .006 
Black (-)                 -0.108       -0.50             -0.014 
Hispanic (-)     0.002   0.71   .019 
Over 65 Years Old (+)    0.299   2.77**   .042** 
Years at Residence (+)    0.002   0.71   .000 
Married (+)                 -0.133  -1.54             -0.018 
Income (+)     0.069   2.71**   .009** 
Education (+)     0.019   1.36   .003 
Urban (+)     0.014   0.09   .002 
Suburban (+)                 -0.292  -2.75**             -0.038** 
Party Strength (+)    0.109   2.53**   .014** 
Network News Use (+)    0.058   4.22***   .008*** 
Cable News Use (+)    0.043   2.77**   .005** 
Union (+)                 -0.030  -0.29             -0.004 
Evangelical (+)     0.017   0.21   .002 
NRA (+)     0.047   0.58   .006 
Ranney (+)     1.591   1.26   .209 
Registration Closing Date (-)   0.000   0.01   .000 
Ballots Measures (+)    0.018   0.80   .002 
Statewide Elections (+)                -0.110  -1.04              -0.014 
Spending Per Capita (+)    0.019   0.61   .002 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
N           5003 
Pseudo R2           .370  
2          388.38 
Prob (2)         0.0000 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient the constant is not shown, only significant marginal 
effects are shown, and directional predictions use one-tailed tests. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
*  prob < 0.10 
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Table 6.3: Non-early voting state voter turnout model 
          Turnout Estimates                  Marginal Effects 
      --------------------------        --------------------- 
Variable         b      z               dy/dx 
Sex (+)      0.127   1.38  .0137 
Black (-)                 -0.206  -0.68              -.0207 
Hispanic (-)     0.352   1.13  .0429 
Over 65 Years Old (+)    0.113   0.70  .0125 
Years at Residents (+)                -0.001  -0.06              -.0000 
Married (+)                 -0.139  -1.08                 -.0153 
Income (+)     0.060   1.45    .0065 
Education (+)     0.011   0.49  .0012 
Urban (+)     0.091   0.36  .0100 
Suburban (+)                 -0.203  -1.29              -.0220 
Party Strength (+)    0.190   2.93**  .0173** 
Network News Use (+)    0.040   1.92  .004 
Cable News Use (+)    0.072   3.14***               .0078*** 
Union (+)     0.029   0.22  .0031 
Evangelical (+)     0.091   0.84  .0098 
NRA (+)     0.196   2.06*  .0221* 
Ranney (+)     0.676   0.80  .0729 
Registration Closing Date (-)               -0.017  -1.98*          -.0018* 
Ballots Measures (+)    0.102   2.81**  .0111** 
Statewide Elections (+)                -0.155  -1.22              -.0168 
Spending Per Capita (+)    0.023   0.57  .0024 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
N           2644 
Pseudo R2           .303  
2          2984.83 
Prob (2)         0.0000 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient the constant is not shown, and only significant 
marginal effects are shown. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 




Table 6.4: Early voting state voter turnout model 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
         Turnout Estimates             Marginal Effects 
       --------------------------             --------------------- 
Variable         b        z        dy/dx 
Sex (+)      -0.010  -0.10       -.0016 
Black (-)     -0.025  -0.08       -.0038 
Hispanic (-)      0.084   0.47        .0134 
Over 65 Years Old (+)     0.446   3.08        .0757 
Years at Residents (+)     0.004    1.24        .0006 
Married (+)     -0.125  -1.15        -.0197 
Income (+)      0.086    2.84**        .0132** 
Education (+)      0.024    1.34        .0038 
Urban (+)     -0.044  -0.22       -.0068 
Suburban (+)     -0.337  -2.36*       -.0518* 
Party Strength (+)     0.070    1.18        .0109 
Network News Use (+)     0.068   3.39***        .0104*** 
Cable News Use (+)     0.020    0.97        .0032 
Union (+)     -0.070  -0.43       -.0107 
Evangelical (+)     -0.047  -0.44       -.0072 
NRA (+)     -0.058  -0.46       -.0089 
Ranney (+)      2.146   2.42*            .3334* 
Registration Closing Date (-)    0.013   2.13*        .0021* 
Ballots Measures (+)    -0.006  -0.48       -.0009 
Statewide Elections (+)    -0.048  -0.31       -.0075 
Spending Per Capita (+)     0.047    1.18        .0072 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
N           2359 
Pseudo R2           .340  
2          461.96 
Prob (2)         0.0000 
Note: The symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient the constant is not shown, and only significant 
marginal effects are shown. 
***prob < 0.01 
** prob < 0.05 
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